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“Using the Predator is a tactic, not a strategy.”1 
—General Stanley McChrystal, Interview with Jane Mayer 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Question and Purpose Statement 
     Drones are legal. That is a fact. There is nothing that counters this premise and this research is 
destined to prove this point. But… The way they are employed is yet another matter for 
deliberation. The principle problem here, and this will be reiterated throughout the current 
research, has become one of mistaking a technology for a strategy. General McChrystal’s 
statement that “Using the Predator is a tactic, not a strategy,” strikes directly at the heart of the 
matter. A fact unfortunately often overlooked by those who have been lured and seduced by the 
promises of technology. Like any other weapons system, they must adhere to the established 
rules of warfare—international humanitarian law. The remotely controlled combat aerial drone 
does precisely this. It is an effective and precise weapons system. Drones are far more discreet 
and accurate than many other alternatives. 
     A second vital point that must be emphasized is that “unmanned” does not automatically 
insinuate “autonomous.” There is always at least one human “in the loop” and for the present, 
there are usually numerous individuals involved with flight operations and the target selection 
process. Hence, referring to them as “unmanned” is somewhat of a misnomer.  
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     Finally, it is worth bearing in mind the distinction between remotely piloted vehicles (RPA’s) 
and that of cruise missiles and similar systems. “In military terminology, vehicles are reusable, 
while weapons are expendable,” wrote Lt. Colonel David Glade, back in July of 2000. In other 
words, the drone is a weapons system and not merely a weapons package. The fact that the U.S. 
Air Force was already considering the role of drones in a combat role prior to the events of 9/11 
is telling. The fact is that many consider the development of drone warfare as a tool developed 
for counterterrorism and as a direct response to the attacks on the United States; in other words, 
an evolutionary tactical response to a specific problem.  
     International law does not provide a definition of terrorism and terrorism as an international 
crime in itself does not exist. As Ben Saul notes “Despite numerous efforts since the 1920s, the 
international community has failed to define or criminalize ‘terrorism’ in international law.”2 In 
other words, there is no specific international crime of terrorism: i.e. the use of force, either by a 
state or non-state actor against the citizens of another state to force them to comply with certain 
demands. Despite this shortcoming there have been numerous efforts on the part of the United 
Nations and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene and interdict terrorist 
activity. There currently exist over 60 different resolutions geared toward impeding terrorism. 
Historically, these span the period ranging from 1970 to the present day. These various initiatives 
hint strongly at efforts to more clearly define the terrorism. Some of the most significant 
Resolutions for our purposes include 1267 (1989), 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001), 1390 (2001), 1452 
(2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005) 1730 (2006), 1735 (2006), 1989 
(2011), 2253 (2015), 2368 (2017), and UNSCR 1373 (2001), as updated, amended, and 
modified.3 The related sanctions most often adopt the form of asset freezing, arms embargoes, 
and travel bans. 
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     These acts are most often transnational in nature as they frequently cross several international 
boundaries. Additionally, they cannot be attributed to a legal personality such as a host state. 
There exists no specific international legal framework for dealing with this conduct, which 
would be considered criminal in any other context. As a result, most prosecution has occurred at 
the domestic level. This exclusion from prosecution is supported under the legal principle which 
asserts Nullum crimen, Nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali, or quite simply the concept that 
there is no penalty without the existence of previously established law.  
     Under current international criminal law (ICL) this principle has been defined by two separate 
subcategories of application according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to wit: 
 Article 22 (under the heading “Nullum Crimen sine lege;” no crime without law), which 
specifically stipulates that: 
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in 
question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
Article 23, with the heading "Nulla poena sine lege", or more simply no penalty without law, 
provides that: 
“A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.”4 
The question then arises, what is to be done at the international level given the transnational 
criminal nature of these acts? There are no official bodies or judicial frameworks for dealing 
with this phenomenon. It is therefore conceptually legal…but it should perhaps also be regulated 
according to a legal framework at the international level. This is a central tenet of the current 
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research. The problems in developing a legal framework are as manifest as they are complex. 
Non-state actors have no international legal personality and states are reluctant to pass any such 
legislation, lest they too be held accountable for their own transgressions. There are a host of 
competing interests at stake. If the world wishes to truly deal with the phenomenon of terrorism, 
then legal recourse, complemented by necessary kinetic enforcement, is certainly a viable option. 
Such an option, however, entails honesty and integrity, something sorely lacking in the current 
climate of interstate relations.  
     This research has been designed to examine the legal, ethical, moral, technological, and 
strategic aspects of these precise and deadly weapons and their intimate relationship with 
terrorism and to seek a response to the following questions:  
1. What are the existing moral, ethical, legal and technological boundaries which define the use 
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and uninhabited aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs) and; 
2. how do these boundaries relate to autonomy and discretion?   
3. Furthermore, how do these disparate phenomena interact and what specific criteria can be 
formally established and articulated between them? 
As I hope to make clear later, in this work I will test four main hypotheses that are leading in my 
research, and which will be formulated later. An important underlying concern, however, which 
remains in the face of such far-reaching technological advances is: who controls what?  Is 
machine technology forcing us, either directly or indirectly, to adopt behavior and approaches 
which might otherwise have been avoided? More specifically, are we resorting to armed 
intervention as a solution to conflict resolution, with an ever-greater propensity to rely upon this 
tactic as a strategy, merely since we now dispose of this deadly technology?  
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     Drones, armed or unarmed, have become the focus of bitter controversy, from which few if 
any, answers have arisen. Much of this debate is founded upon arguments couched in polarized, 
emotional rhetoric, geared toward political expediency. It has been fueled by ambiguity of the 
law itself, which allows multiple, often completely inverse, interpretations. What I commonly 
refer to as the “three E’s;”5 education, engineering (ethical, and structural), and enforcement are 
the three logical starting points for seeking solutions in this contentious debate. 
     There exist many probing questions as to the ethical justification relating to the use of this 
new technology. Questions such as, who can be legitimately targeted; can this technology be 
legitimately employed in situations outside an established zone of conflict; can unmanned aerial 
vehicles be used in situations other than recognized armed conflicts (such as in humanitarian 
interventions), or is it morally permissible to use drone attacks to target a fleeing individual as 
was the case with Omar Gadhafi in Libya? The answers as we shall see are not as evident or 
clear-cut as we might first imagine. Sometimes they can even be contradictory or context 
specific. In other words, while they may be acceptable in some cases they may not be so in 
others. 
    The title “The Grotius Sanction,” is not, by any means, a random coincidence and it is quite 
apt in the context of the current research for several reasons, which may not be immediately 
apparent. Hugo de Groot, Huig de Groot (Dutch), or Hugo Grotius, as he is more commonly 
referred to in the literature, was the ultimate law of war scholar. He is credited with having 
refined and developed the foundations for the current body of secular international law and 
jurisprudence, known as the Law of Nations.  
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     That corpus juris related to the proper conduct of war, in his seminal opus (composed in 
Latin), “De Iure Belli ac Pacis (1625, by Hugonis Grotii),” which can be loosely translated as 
“On the Laws of War and Peace.” While other scholarly work on the subject existed prior to this, 
Grotius took the monumental step of unifying and cohesively defining the codes for the conduct 
of war. No longer was war a condition that was divinely inspired, rather an affair of interstate 
relations. If indeed, as renowned and oft-quoted strategist Claus von Clausewitz reminds us, with 
his immortal aphorism, war is politics by other means, then Grotius may rightfully be considered 
not only the father of not international relations, but the laws of war as well. Writing on the 
phenomenon of suicide bombing, perpetrated during the 1980’s sponsored largely by Iran, 
Maxwell Taylor remarks “Indeed, we can see in probably the most explicit way in this Islamic 
context the use of terrorism as a form of warfare, and in this context, in parallel with 
Clausewitz’s notions of the relationship between war and politics are, of course, obvious.”6 This 
observation made in 1991, is even more valid in the volatile climate of international relations we 
currently witness today. 
     Von Clausewitz himself, rather unfortunately, heralded and promulgated absolute warfare and 
destruction of the enemy as the ultimate measure of success. His teachings, relating to victory at 
all costs, have been forging military leadership for generations. A conflict, however, arises with 
such a view—victory as the fruit of absolute war, if we assume that the purpose of war is to 
render justice and that the goal of said justice is peace.  
     Grotius, the “miracle of Holland’s”7 work, though complex and convoluted was (and indeed 
remains) a masterpiece of legal genius. It displayed a rich understanding of previous historical, 
theological, philosophical, and legal traditions, including those drawn from ancient Greek, 
Roman, and Hebrew writers, to the later Christian theologians, notably St. Augustine. His work 
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also continued to inspire future legal scholarship. Grotius entered Leiden University at the ripe 
age of eleven, in 1594, and thus, we come full circle, in our current investigation, to where these 
very same principles were originally raised. Principles, which are, no less important today than 
when they were initially formulated.    
     The second portion of the subtitle concerns the consideration of the term “sanction.” A 
sanction is a double-edged, semantic sword, in that it may refer to either the approbation of an 
action, or conversely as a punishment for illegal, or unethical actions. It is the focus of this 
research, and hopefully, the interest of the reader, to critically evaluate and determine the 
answers to many of the fundamental questions that currently plague us, concerning robotic 
warfare, anticipatory self-defense, targeted killing, human shielding, and collateral damage. 
Questions such as: “Does the use of robotic warfare automatically invite the resorting to armed 
intervention, as an expedient and convenient means of conflict resolution, thereby reducing the 
consideration of other alternative responses?” Even if this should be the case, does there exist a 
significant and fundamental difference between the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, as opposed 
to that of other types of weaponry? Does this new type of transnational armed conflict (TAC)8 
enter a completely different category from that of conventional, nation-state warfare, or non-
international armed conflict (NIAC)? If this is the case, how does it differ, and are new and more 
appropriate rules and laws required for its proper guidance? These questions are examined over 
the course of the current research. 
     While the answers are still being framed, these are the sort of compelling questions both the 
current research and the reader need to bear in mind when tackling this complex subject. The 
present research attempts to provide tentative answers to such probing questions and offer 
alternative recommendations, for consideration, wherever possible. The previous epigraph, from 
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General Stan McChrystal, has been echoed by many due to the inherent soundness of its logic. 
The opening lines of The Assassination Complex also reiterate this simple, yet profound logic, 
with the words, “Drones are a tool not a policy.”9 These seemingly simple assertions retain a 
fundamental truth which frames and underlies the answers sought within this research. Drones 
are a state-sponsored instrument of legitimate armed force during conflict. This raises the more 
general question: are there certain weapons that international law forbids to use and the answer 
to this, of course, is yes. The laws concerning the  “means of warfare” restrict certain weapons 
systems. The use of chemical weapons or antipersonnel landmines, for instance, are illegal under 
international law. Such weapons systems are considered abhorrent due to their indiscriminate 
nature and their lack of lethal precision. The way in which a weapons system is used is referred 
to as the  “methods of warfare” in legal parlance. So, the question is, should drones be placed in 
the same category? Drones are an evolutionary and tactical response to a changing state of 
international conflict. In the same way, terrorism itself and the related tactic of suicide bombing, 
are strategic responses to the same asymmetric imbalance and challenges faced by those on the 
receiving end of drone technology.10 The Battle of Thermopylae between the Spartans and 
Persians was numerically asymmetric. Colonial conquest was technologically asymmetric by the 
use of guns against people with less advanced weaponry. Are the charges of asymmetrical 
superiority founded and given the scope of the threat are such objections even justified? We will 
consider the concept and historical implications of asymmetry further in chapter VI. 
     Certainly, this is the opinion of Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, who developed the theory of 
Fourth Generation Warfare, or 4GW (alternatively referred to as “netwar”). According to 
Hammes, war is an evolutionary process that follows hard on the heels of other changes to 
society. These evolutionary changes indicated by Hammes—political, economic, social and 
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technical, I have henceforth grouped these variables under the rather appropriate acronym PEST. 
Hammes presciently remarked in his title The Sling and the Stone, “I became more convinced 
than ever that we were facing not just a different kind of enemy but a fundamentally different 
type of warfare.”11 Clausewitz warned us in Book 1 chapter 7 of On War, that “Everything is 
very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”12 Another profound observation worthy of 
reflection. If such is the case, then a new type of warfare would require a specifically tailored 
approach and either new or amended rules for guidance. Such rules must deal with the legal, 
ethical and strategic aspects of armed conflict. 
     Throughout the text I have largely opted to adopt, the more frequent, colloquial, and generic 
term “drone” to describe what the U.S. military currently refers to as an RPA or remotely piloted 
aircraft. This usage is balanced along with the former official appellations of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) and uninhabited aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs). The term “Drone” has 
become common usage; a familiar word, even if the military looks upon it with disdain. 
     One might be understandably excused for believing, that with all the ink which flowed, 
following the devastating events of 9/11, that there might be nothing further to contribute, write 
about, or discuss concerning terrorism, and drone warfare. While this would certainly be a 
logical conclusion, it would also be an exceedingly false one. The fact is that modern terrorism, 
is a dark mirror, which reflects the shortcomings and past sins of geopolitics; the reprehensible 
and constantly morphing offspring of warfare and failed international relations. In the current 
complex, globalized and interconnected world, rarely, if ever, does any political event occur 
without at least some connection, regardless how distant, to the ubiquitous phenomenon of 
terrorism, and vice-versa. Historically, terrorism and geopolitical conflict have always existed. 
The difference between then and now is that in the globally interconnected, post-WWII, post-
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Cold War era, civilization had attempted to outlaw war. The widespread, transnational and 
delocalized resurgence of terrorism and transnational conflict is an aberration that arrives on our 
doorstep like the invasion of the Mongol Hordes. Terrorism has become a phenomenon with 
global dimensions. 
     The interrelated topics of drone warfare, Just War Theory, targeted killing, and radical 
Islamist sponsored theoterrorism13 have produced a constant and exponentially expanding range 
of contributions to the literature. In as far as, drones and robotic technology, themselves, are 
concerned, a profusion of erudite perspectives and professional opinions abound, yet there is a 
distinct lack of consensus and much of it remains largely polemic and highly contradictory.  
      Yet, despite this abundance of information presented to the public, various officials, 
legislators, and agencies, research has also suffered from a limited basis in empirical evidence, 
data and solid research. Much of the support for research previously conducted, finds its origins 
in selective interpretations, which are based upon the formulation of unenforced or non-binding 
resolutions and loosely worded international agreements. The balance is often composed of 
hyperbole and the reconfirmation of random academic speculation. Marc Sageman writing on the 
psychology of terrorism, for instance, cogently remarks that the “Lack of empirical data is the 
plague of overt psychological research on terrorists and leaves this field wide open to 
speculations.”14 Yet academic consensus could and can play a vital role in the shaping of world 
opinion. It has in the past, on many issues, it could do so now. 
     The use of drones, and “Black Ops,” and special forces (SF), often in the form of covert ops, 
are seen by many, and perhaps rightly so, as the middle path between diplomatic approaches and 
outright warfare. Micah Zenko has retitled them as discreet military operations, or DMOs. While 
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highly efficient, their contribution to, or their reduction of, a state of armed conflict, remains 
ambiguous at best. The failure to measure their actual impact is directly related to the secretive 
nature of their implementation, combined with policies of inherent political deniability. Zenko’s 
critical analysis was a first step in examining the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations 
regarding DMOs (such an analysis also applies neatly to drone strikes as a strategy versus drone 
strikes as a tactic). 
      Joseph Nye, on the other hand, might conceivably argue that the middle path is perhaps that 
of “smart power,” instead of DMOs. Nye and Welch, however, make the pertinent observations 
that, “Soft power is not automatically more effective or ethical than hard power.” And that 
“Twisting minds is not necessarily qualitatively better than twisting arms.”15 Smart power 
incorporates a strong military force combined with effective strategic alliances. Both soft power 
and hard power are ineffective on their own. An ideal solution incorporates both aspects. This 
was the underlying philosophy which led to the development of the Just War Theory. War as an 
inevitable last resort. 
          Little, if any, empirical data has actually seen the light of day. There are several 
understandable and fundamental reasons for this, which we shall examine more closely over the 
course of this research. Briefly, here are some of the principle reasons that the study of terrorism, 
counterterrorism, and how it relates to strategic drone warfare, and targeted killing has failed to 
adopt an empirical approach: 
1. The subject (terrorism), itself is highly complex and multifaceted and defies a simple 
empirical analysis given the numerous variables involved; 
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2. Since we are speaking of the moral, legal, and ethical attributes, these aspects fall largely 
outside the realm of empirical discourse and lie more in the field of dialectics and 
reasoned cognition; 
3. A distinct lack of first-hand data, research, access, and eye-witness accounts have 
precluded researchers from developing more empirically robust models; 
4. While there is much disagreement and speculation concerning the difference between the 
classical and modern forms of terrorism, both the typology and manifestation of modern 
terrorism and drone warfare, in the opinion of the current research, are composed of 
relatively new, misunderstood, and complex phenomena. These differences belie the 
often simple, yet hypothetical approaches defined, and answers supplied in terms of 
theoretical frameworks; 
5. Any research, in this area, is often supported and funded by government and will be 
impugned by official sources should their results fail to coincide with the officially 
established discourse, thus resulting in questionable validity; 
6. There exist many constraints imposed by official agencies limiting access to numbers and 
data which would purportedly challenge the interests of national security; 
7. There are no definitive solutions to such a complex web of interlocking cause and effect 
relationships, which themselves remain unstable and difficult to define. We cannot 
provide answers unless we first know the questions; 
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8.  Academic reviews have been constrained by political correctness; by principles of 
format and presentation. They rarely challenge the status quo or extend beyond well-
defined parameters. Thinking “outside the box” could have a devastating career impact; 
9. There has been a distinct antithetical polarization between advocates and critics, which 
has served to hamper and retard research efforts; 
10. Much of the research to date, has been built upon a decidedly shaky foundation. A 
constant reconfirmation of previously stated opinions. Certain hypotheses have been 
adopted as sound without having been either challenged or tested. This is akin to a bad 
diagnosis from a doctor being repeated and endlessly confirmed; 
11. There has been a failure, or oversight to apply broad-spectrum critical analysis, which 
considers all variables accompanied by a tendency to rely solely upon a typological 
model of reference, contrary to standard academic practice;  
12. Interaction between government and academia has been largely selective, much of the 
current research being conducted is financially sponsored and supported by the 
government. Thus, much of the research produced has been designed, either directly or 
indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, to support specific views or agendas. This 
tendency is evidenced in claims supporting the absolute accuracy of precision munitions. 
While these claims may certainly be well-founded, there also exists the distinct 
possibility that such findings have been developed to conform with preconceived 
expectations as well. Thus, in some cases, research can result in misleading and 
inaccurate conclusions when it is meant to satisfy certain expectations or specifically 
sought results. No better example of this sort of confirmation bias exists (if true) than that 
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of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) findings, which served as an impetus for the 
March 2003, invasion of Iraq (although controversy on this topic still exists).16   
 
As this body of the research developed, it became painfully apparent that the question of drone 
warfare could not be examined entirely in isolation. Another problem and a very significant one, 
appeared as the research was nearing its conclusion. This raised a new consideration requiring 
the addition of a separate hypothesis, extensive supplemental research, and profound textual 
modifications. I could not possibly speak about this ultimate weapon of counterterrorism without 
also addressing the topic of terrorism itself—particularly that of theoterrorism. The two topics 
are, after all, intimately connected and interdependent. This latter (theoterrorism) gave impetus 
to the former (armed drones) while the former depends upon terrorism for legitimation and 
justification.  
     Obviously, the purpose of this research initiative, as with any serious study, was to attempt to 
clearly separate fact from, enlightened and informed, opinion, while additionally offering various 
recommendations. Upon further investigation, it became clear that while empirical reasoning is 
the cornerstone to both understanding and knowledge, so too is the need for professional opinion 
derived of both experience and learning (experiential and cognitive balance). This fundamental 
relationship allows an informed introspective analysis of complex and nebulous topics—such as 
those of terrorism and autonomous aircraft. Thus, it would be wrong to entirely dismiss the 
importance of reasoned opinion and insightful dialectics as one possible path to discovering the 
truth.  
     In other words, empirical data, while they may inform us, are not imperative to developing 
informed perspectives and a more balanced approach to drone warfare and terrorism; but 
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objective honesty is. In a topic so contentious and complex, it is in fact difficult to develop 
definitive truths and this is indeed one of the primary reasons why empirical fact finding has 
taken a back seat in favor of more reflective epistemology. Researchers, to their credit, have been 
making the best possible analyses using the limited available material and research at hand. 
     Research can at times seem sterile—a source of disconnected information, based upon the 
ideas and opinions of others; disparate when compared with the harsh reality of war. Thus, I have 
also complemented the current research with my own field experience having served in the 
combat zones of both Iraq in 2010, and later in Afghanistan in 2012. My functions during those 
periods varied greatly but allowed me a closer, more personal and detailed view. This field 
experience also provided a much clearer understanding of the situation with actual “boots on the 
ground.” This unique perspective provided additional insight regarding the threats and 
advantages posed using remotely piloted aircraft (RPVs) which could be witnessed on a day to 
day basis.  
       What is required for a broad-spectrum analysis then, is a combination and balance of the 
scientific method, which employs inductive reasoning and relies upon quantitative data (when 
and where possible) and theory-based, deductive reasoning and its associated qualitative 
measures. There is also a need, of course, for some impartial normative evaluations to be carried 
out, though this tends to be less objective in principle. An additional explanation for academics 
and researchers failing to employ empirical based research, besides the previously cited fluid 




     From computers to satellites, sophisticated technological development has touched, modified, 
and enhanced the daily existence of mankind in all walks of life. The worlds of intelligence and 
defense have not been exempted from such influence. These two “offspring,” born of the same 
mother—national security, encompass some of the foremost pioneers, researchers, developers 
and first-hand users of said technology. This technology is then passed into the public domain. 
     Robotics and drone warfare have become subjects of extreme public interest and lively, often 
heated, debate. There is a good reason for this, since robotic technology touches our lives on 
many different levels, from concerns about our own personal privacy to national security and the 
way we conduct war. There is scarcely a day that passes that some new surprise, revelation or 
story does not appear in the media, related to this topic.17 For better or for worse technology will 
certainly lead the way into the future. 
     As shall be seen, public complacency and satisfaction with the status quo represent a clear 
and present danger. This complacency has been fostered by post-modernist sloth, hibernation 
rooted in material comfort, inward-looking isolationism, a false interpretation of multicultural 
diversity, moral relativism, and a failure to recognize the impending danger camouflaged by 
overt and oppressive political correctness. Yet despite this complacent security (often afforded 
by the same drones they abhor), the public has an increasing aversion to any type of armed 
conflict whatsoever. Janine Dill, for instance, observes that “From the point of view of the 
international public in the twenty-first century there are no truly legitimate targets of attack in 
war.”18 Such prevalent use of this technology desensitizes a public which is often thousands of 
miles away from the action taking place and renders the phenomenon of targeted killing as 
commonplace as grocery shopping. This, in turn, creates a false sense of security and 
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justification, based upon circular logic. In other words, “because it does not affect us, we are not 
threatened by it and henceforth it does not concern us.”    
     Robotics was once an obscure domain of interest to only engineers and the military; however, 
they have increasingly found their way into the public sphere. This trend promises to increase 
with the passage of time. If Moore’s law of geometric progression, on technological advances, 
holds true (and it may well have underestimated this phenomenon) we can expect phenomenal 
growth in this new area already showing multifaceted expansion.19 What had once been the stuff 
of science fiction on film and screen is now the rapidly changing reality of everyday life. Thus, 
we can presently observe the development of semi-autonomous drones and unparalleled 
breakthroughs in swarm intelligence based upon biomechanical models. 
     While it is true that the military originally developed this technology, the same can be said 
about the internet and many other forms of technological progress, from global positioning 
systems (GPS) to computing. Once the technology has been developed, and the expense of initial 
research and development (R&D) are absorbed, the commercial civilian market often steps in 
and adopts and adapts this new technology for its own profitable ends. One merely needs to 
consider the advent of the first computers compared with the technology available in such a 
relatively short space of time to realize the phenomenal possibilities and the rapid growth of 
technology in our everyday lives. This rule has not faltered in the case of robotics, and we now 
see the advent of an ever-increasing number of unmanned aircraft entering service domestically 
with state and federal agencies and law enforcement, as well as the private civilian and industrial 
sectors. On a less positive note, criminal and terrorist organizations have also increasingly called 
upon this technology for their own nefarious use. 
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     While such technology offers many advantages, it must be borne in mind that any technology 
has the potential for misuse as well. The advantages they present, particularly to political elites, 
are well detailed by Zenko. They include the fact that they are both politically and militarily 
effective; that they can be easily controlled; there is limited domestic political blowback, thus the 
cost to politicians who must always consider public sentiment are reduced; finally, they indicate 
determination, to respond effectively, on behalf of the afflicted state.20 
     I recall my first encounter with an armed drone. It was heavily laden with Hellfire missiles, as 
it buzzed, close by, just above my head.  I was driving my vehicle close to the landing strip, and 
despite being on the “just side” of the conflict there was something remarkably eerie about the 
experience, something that spooked me and sent a shiver down my spine. This experience, and 
others like it, allowed me to comprehend and relate, at least marginally, to the sort of 
psychological trauma faced daily, by many, both guilty and innocent alike. Perhaps it was the 
looming threat it projected; like a robotic sword of Damocles, which was a part of its sinister 
menace. Nevertheless, I reminded myself that these aircraft had saved many lives, my own 
included and were a far better alternative to less precise and more powerful options. The use of 
drones, as killing machines, is a relatively new phenomenon, historically speaking. While they 
were employed extensively during the conflict in Bosnia for intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition, and reconnaissance collection (ISTAR), they had never been armed or equipped with 
weaponry. Indeed, there had been reticence on the part of both the military and the intelligence 
community to confront the idea of arming them.  
    The Predator drone, the first hunter-killer of its species, found its genitor in a model developed 
by expatriate Israeli, aerospace engineer, Abraham Karem. After moving the U.S.in 1977 and 
setting up his own firm, Leading Systems Inc., Karem produced his first drone, rather 
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pessimistically named the Albatross.21 The U.S. military was giving up hope on the possibility of 
developing a functional unmanned aerial vehicle at the time. The Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency (DARPA), the forward-looking U.S. military research organization, became 
interested in and acquired his design, which led to the development of the Gnat 750, by way of 
the much-maligned Amber, offspring of the Albatross and predecessor to General Atomics’ first 
Predator model.22   
     Surprisingly, one of the major concerns was the investment involved and who would pay the 
costs for lost predators (priced at a cool $3 million at the time) and Hellfire missiles. This was 
not a trivial concern, considering that budgeting for the Intelligence Community (IC) and the 
CIA, had been drastically reduced since the end of the Cold War. This became a point of 
contention between the US Department of Defense and the CIA. Other concerns were more 
ethical in nature, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), for the CIA, George Tenet, felt 
that they had absolutely no authority to conduct targeted killings. Finally, the initial warhead for 
the Hellfire missile had been primarily designed as a rather imprecise anti-armor piecing shell, 
rather than anti-personnel, and would require re-engineering.23  
     The program was run largely by the U.S. military. U.S. Air Force General John Jumper began 
the actual program to equip armed predators shortly following his return from the Balkans 
conflict in 2000. It was in September of 2000, that a joint military/CIA test of unarmed predator 
drones was carried out in Afghanistan. The results were deemed a success, but once again, the 
specter of cost reared its ugly head. The CIA was particularly reticent on both economic and 
ethical grounds to become involved. Despite any reservations, the first armed predators began 
appearing in Afghanistan, ready for action, during October of 2001, just one month following the 
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reprehensible events of 9/11 and coincided with the onset of U.S. military involvement in 
Afghanistan.  
     Technology can be a great boon to increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces, however 
when it becomes the central strategic and operational driver it can limit and even reverse any 
advantages it may offer. It is essential to stress that technology itself is not a problem, rather the 
blind overreliance on its capacity and the failure to adapt said technology to the form of conflict 
currently being conducted is. Technology is evolutionary, not revolutionary. Thomas X. 
Hammes calls attention to the fact that the intelligence community failed to follow through on 
both valuable and rather obvious intelligence that preceded the events.24 The fact that the 
individuals piloting the aircraft used in the attacks had taken flying lessons, yet never expressed 
any interest in effecting a take-off or conducting a landing with them, should have raised 
immediate concerns to all but the most obtuse. This was a possible expression of suicidal intent, 
which seems rather obvious in retrospect. “This type of behavior was demonstrated by Khalid al-
Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi [two of the Pentagon attackers] who flunked their flying lessons 
because they were disinterested in the landing process, administrative actions, or flying anything 
other than Boeing jets, notes Joseph M. LaSorsa”25 More important than the technology itself is 
the insight and foresight used in its application. The technology for detecting and divulging the 
impending attack, for instance, was in place but, for several reasons, the dots were never 
connected, and it was never properly implemented.  
     Technology is a doubled edged sword, which must be adopted wisely so that people control 
machines and not the reverse. While some writers, such as Ray Kurzweil, laud the future of 
man/machine integration with fanfare, others are more circumspect and advise far greater 
thought and caution. Be it the writings of Dr. Patricia Greenfield, or the insightful research 
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conducted by Byrne and Marx, many denounce social irresponsibility and warn of the intrusive 
nature and possible dangers of allowing technology a free hand.26 There exists lively and often 
heated debate about artificial intelligence, autonomy, biological integration, bandwidth and other 
associated aspects of new and emerging technology.  
     Volumes have been dedicated to the ethical and moral aspects of technology and human-
computer interface (HCI). There is an inherent ethical and moral responsibility which comes 
with the adoption of any new technology; a responsibility we all too frequently ignore for 
convenience sake.27 Part of this comes from human nature and the desire for ever simpler, more 
expedient solutions to life’s problems, without measuring the long-term consequences. However, 
such advances need to be measured against other, equally important, issues such as safety, the 
right to life, and individual privacy. In a previous doctoral dissertation, Aimee van Wynsberghe, 
pointed to the need for and the lack of ethical reflection in technological development by 
emphasizing that, “…technology assessments which aim to create guidelines and policies for the 
initial introduction and continued use of a technology fail to incorporate an adequate ethical 
analysis to guide such an introduction.”28 Ethics matter and they need to be incorporated at the 
outset not merely as an afterthought.  
     These ethical and moral aspects, as van Wynsberghe intuitively indicated, must be examined 
and implemented during the engineering phase and not after the horse has already bolted from 
the stall, so to speak. This research contains an evaluation of some of the risks and limits that 
should be considered when adopting any new technology—particularly when that technology 
can be lethal.  
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      The United States was a precursor and remains the foremost user of this specific technology, 
however, this equation is rapidly changing, as more and more states begin to adopt or develop 
their own sophisticated systems. Given the importance and widespread use of such technology 
by the United States, much of the research in this writing, surrounding the use and proposed 
limitations is, therefore, focused upon U.S. military development, tactical and operational use 
and strategy. This use is, however, counterbalanced by examination of the existing international 
laws, customs, and treaties which pertain to the conduct of modern warfare. The related 
concepts, therefore, apply universally to all. It should be noted that the United States no longer 
holds an exclusive claim to armed drones and many other states and nonstate entities are in the 
process of developing or have already developed such capabilities. This fact is but one further 
reason a clarion call for oversight and regulation must be sounded. This holds true for drones as 
it does for other, as yet unforeseen, deadly technology, which may be developed in the future. 
     Today, a vast array of technological systems has become available, to both the international 
Intelligence Community and the military, to perform their critical missions safely and efficiently. 
One such platform is that of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS). It consists basically of two 
subcomponents with its related support groups: the UAV (unarmed) intelligence surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) version and the weaponized, unmanned combat air vehicle, or the 
uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).  
     The focus of this research is primarily, but not exclusively, centered upon the armed, UCAV 
versions; the Predator and Reaper platforms as tool to combat terrorism. The Standard 
intelligence surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) version shall also be 
considered in context as will the so-called hybrid model which combines both functions and is 
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referred to as the “Multi-purpose UAV.”29 This latter model combines both the functions of 
hunter-killer and that of an ISTAR, intelligence collection platform. 
     The Predator is certainly more well-known than its heavier counterpart the Reaper (also 
known as the Predator B or Guardian). Technological enhancements and improvements over 
these models have resulted in the Predator-C model the Avenger. The U.S. Air Force produces 
many Fact Sheets, which are particularly informative for a basic understanding of the various 
platforms.30 The idea of arming drones with Hellfire missiles was developed immediately in the 
wake of 9/11. A joint venture involving the CIA and the U.S. Air Force undertook this task in 
two successive operations: Night Fist and Positive Pilot.31  
     There have been numerous articles, treatises, and scholarly works devoted to examining the 
various facets of legal, moral, ethical, and strategic issues and their individual dynamics 
regarding the use of UAVs and UCAVS. None of these studies to date, however, has appeared to 
have addressed the issue in an integrated manner. This is important because these variables are 
all closely interrelated in the battlespace of the 21st century. Rarely if ever, do such studies 
consider the relationship between terrorism and the use of armed drones, which are often seen as 
separate and distinct phenomena. This research represents an effort to examine both drones and 
their use in counterterrorism within a more integrated and comprehensive framework. 
     Dill, speaking on the utilitarian logic of efficiency (contrasted with the logic of sufficiency), 
brilliantly and eloquently captures this premise when stating that, “Technology makes it possible, 
doctrine frames it as instrumental, and law endorses it as also appropriate.”32  This is quite 
understandable since drones represent a concrete, mechanical, and empirically measurable entity, 
whereas, the concepts of law, ethics and morality are, by their nature and design, more open to 
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flexible interpretation. Dennis Patterson, adopting a legal realist perspective, cogently remarked, 
“The law is not a rigid body of fixed and unchanging rules but a shifting and flexible social 
institution, with sufficient play, sufficient give-and-take, to accommodate the balancing of competing 
interests within a society.”33 With any new discovery, there is always a conflict; an unfortunate 
and inevitable “trade-off,” not exactly a zero-sum game, but imbalanced, nonetheless. This can 
conceivably, be framed as a man vs. machine, or a technology vs. humanity paradigm for 
instance. Unmanned vehicles (UMVs) and robotics, however, appear to hold the promise of 
conceivably melding the two entities (the man-machine interface or HMI).  
     This particular concern is echoed by Brunstetter and Braun, who also suggest that “The risk 
becomes that the military will bypass nonlethal alternatives, such as apprehending alleged 
terrorists and continued surveillance, and move straight to extrajudicial killing as the standard 
way of dealing with the perceived threat of terrorism.”34 While this is certainly a valid concern, 
recent history has clearly demonstrated that it is the executive branch, rather than the military, 
which poses the greatest threat of relying upon a sole technology in response to prosecuting 
conflict resolution. The initial kill/capture policy of the previous administration, for instance, 
morphed into a strategically inept and shortsighted kill only policy. 
      Does unmanned warfare lower the bar and the consequences of armed aggression, induce and 
facilitate its adoption, as the silver bullet bridge35 which spans diplomacy, covert operations, and 
warfare? This is certainly the view to which this work adheres and one point where Grégoire 
Chamayou advances a valid claim; a claim originally based upon price theory, and presciently 
presented by Benjamin Friedman who posits quite simply that, “…orthodox price theory that 
tells us that lowering costs increases demand.”36  A simple cost-benefit analysis or return on 
investment (ROI). In other words, who runs the show, are people controlling machines or people 
25 
 
ultimately controlled by technology? The answer might appear obvious at first; however, with 
the ever-increasing complexity of artificial intelligence (AI) and human reliance upon state-of-
the-art technology, it soon becomes clear that the borders are far less distinct than might have 
initially been imagined.  
     These are vital and important questions which need to be answered, as the world is 
increasingly faced with global American military, political and industrial hegemony. An 
unparalleled unipolar power making unilateral decisions. It is in a spirit of comprehensive and 
critical examination that this research additionally explores and asks: “What exactly are the 
existing moral, ethical, legal and strategic boundaries involved in the use of UCAVs and less 
directly, UAVs; if such boundaries exist, how do these boundaries relate to autonomy, discretion 
and sovereignty?”  Furthermore, “how do these disparate phenomena interact and what specific 
criteria can actually be formally established and articulated between them?”  
     Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this research focuses upon the pivotal question to be 
examined: “Does the use of lethal robotic technology, substitute diplomacy, thus lowering the 
standards of compliance regarding international norms, laws and treaties, while at the same time 
increasing opportunities for engaging in armed intervention as a form of conflict resolution?” 
This study tends to affirm these conclusions. According to the most recent estimates available, 
the U.S. currently boasts a fleet of over 10,000 operational UAVs (all types combined with the 
majority being hand-held control models). This represents more than a 200-fold increase since 
the year 2002 when the U.S. military claimed ownership of only 50 drones.37 Future 
development and even greater exploitation of this technology have been forecasted by the U.S. 
Department of Defense. Even greater numbers of personnel, ground control stations (GCS), and 
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aircraft as well as the adoption of other advances such as swarm intelligence and collaborative 
autonomy. As might be expected this trend will undoubtedly spread to other powers as well. 
     The findings of this research also tend to indicate that, any unbridled or indiscriminate use of 
drone warfare, rather than diminish the chances and occurrence of terrorist activity will, on the 
contrary, incite and contribute to the rise of even further outbreaks worldwide. In this vein, Caleb 
Carr, considers that terrorism (either that of non-state, or state-sponsored actors) is a bankrupt 
strategy, doomed to failure over the course of time. This is certainly a reasonable hypothesis if 
one considers the factors working against its success (particularly in the case of theoterrorism) 
such as, a lack of clearly defined goals, the reduced sustainability over time (due to the enhanced 
rule of law, general weariness, lack of availability for new recruits, and the inability to maintain 
sufficient funding and support mechanisms). Nevertheless, there remains difficulty in attempting 
to draw that “red line” where a state passes from the legitimate use of force and resorts to 
terrorism. Examples include Nazi Germany, The Turkish genocide of 1912, The rape of 
Nanking, and the widespread use and support of terrorism by various Iranian governments. 
     Carr also insists that “…warfare against civilians must never be answered in kind. For as 
failed a tactic as such assaults have been, reprisals similarly directed against civilians have been 
even more so—particularly when they have exceeded the original assault in scope.”38 While his 
point here strikes home and his contribution is well researched and interesting historically, Carr’s 
theory of progressive war adopts a flawed approach, steeped in constructivist theory, to the war 
against terror.  His approach is flawed in that he adopts a moral relativist stance, according to 
which he places the blame for the advent of terrorism at the doorstep of Western industrialized 
nations (colonialism, capitalism, mercantilism, greed, revenge, etc.). The interactions of these 
latter serving as the triggering mechanism for the terrorism of the former. While there is certainly 
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some degree of influence involved, as is indicated within this research, it is naïve to deduce a 
direct link between an ostensible cause and effect relationship. Such a  perspective relates more 
to colonialism then present-day geopolitical relations. The second flawed constructivist assertion 
by the author is that there exists a standing and deliberate (and failed) model of terrorizing 
civilian populations as a strategic tactic. While there are numerous cases where this has indeed 
occurred, once again the author has made a gross and collective generalization. 
     Constructivist theory remains a mystery to many given its numerous nuances, permutations, 
and applications. In the current guise, Carr adopts that standard constructivist model whereby 
international relations, both past, and present, are interpreted through socially constructed 
phenomena. Carr considers terrorism as a form of warfare and as such should not be conducted 
nor complemented by what he refers to as “intelligence and criminological work.” This view 
stands in direct opposition to the more cohesive approach advanced in this research, which calls 
for cross-spectrum coordination between military, law enforcement and intelligence. The need 
for careful, measured deliberation and balance in the application of any targeted killing is 
essential. Civilian casualties create a fertile ground for future terrorist recruitment. 
Proportionately, each civilian killed geometrically contributes to the number of terrorist 
candidates available. This holds particularly true for clan and tribal-based societies where 
retribution (eye for an eye revenge) is an integral part of the culture. 
     Ben Emmerson, the “UN Special Rapporteur, on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism,” suggested in his 2013 report, “If 
used in strict compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), remotely 
piloted aircraft are capable of reducing the risk of civilian casualties in armed conflict by 
significantly improving the situational awareness of military commanders.”39  It is the view of 
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this research, however, that such use must be carefully circumscribed and regulated. There are 
still no real set of definitive rules for the establishment of such boundaries yet.  
     There is also the question of targeting nationals to consider. The removal of the cleric, 
terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, if controversial, was certainly a strategically positive, ethically 
justifiable, and legally sound move, as well as a boon for any of his numerous possible future 
victims. Though the killing of al-Awlaki has been often misrepresented as the first time a U.S. 
citizen had been targeted abroad, without the benefit of due process, this dubious distinction 
actually belongs to Kamel Derwish, who was eliminated as a threat in 2002.40 Al-Awlaki’s 
notoriety, due to his public image, was, no doubt, the source of this misconception. Such 
targeting practices, against nationals, have raised hostile recriminations, caused suspicion, and 
have often aroused acrimonious debate. Following his elimination, the debate centering on the 
legality of the targeted killing policy was rekindled, ultimately and not unsurprisingly arriving at 
a deadlocked polarization.  
     This perspective, however, raises an important philosophical conundrum. Quite simply, if 
individuals such as the former Anwar al-Awlaki or the Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini 
can be justifiably condemned for their exactions calling for assassination, and even legitimately 
eliminated such as in the case of al-Awlaki, why then should Western powers not face the same 
consequences for carrying out extra-judicial targeted killing? The response lies in part in the 
justifications behind the acts themselves. While it is eminently clear that targeted killing is seen 
as a distasteful, but necessary tactic of modern conflict resolution, the United States in carrying 
out the targeted killing of al -Awlaki based its justification upon two important principles: the 
right of self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and that of justa causa or just 
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cause. These two causes are intimately related since self-defense is one of the three elements 
justifying the legitimate use of state-sponsored force.  
     Khomeini and al-Awlaki both called for the execution of various foreign nationals based 
solely upon the spurious criteria of having offended the Islamic faith.41 For these perceived 
infelicities they were condemned to the maximum penalty that may be levied upon another 
human being. Of course, under the dictates of Shari’a law, this is considered justifiable. In other 
words, they were to be condemned to death for blasphemy. Targeted killing in response is, 
therefore, not only morally and ethically justifiable it also condones the legitimate use of state-
sponsored force in response to such threats. It is important to bear in mind that the right to self-
defense, as enshrined under Article 51 of the UN Charter, addresses the threat to the collectivity 
of the state.42 This collectivity is, of course, composed of individuals; a threat against a group or 
indeed even a single individual may, therefore, be construed as a threat against all. “And to the 
extent that the wanton killing of innocents is an affront to basic human decency, Al Qaeda and 
those it inspires are a threat to us all, regardless of where we live.”43 Daniel Byman insightfully 
adds. 
     Some may well contend that such a position is based upon and ethnocentric perspective 
entailing vested national self-interests and argue for the constitutional freedom of expression. 
The absurd contradiction of any such assertion, however, should immediately be apparent. Given 
their respective positions and the large following, of individuals such as the Ayatollah or al-
Awlaki, the issuance of a fatwa (pl. fatawa) is tantamount to the endorsement of homicide. In 
simple terms, they serve as the gun and their followers carrying out their misdeeds are the 
bullets. The fact remains that those who had been ostracized and eventually targeted, such as  al-
Awlaki, were guilty of soliciting and complicity to commit murder. They were either directly or 
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indirectly responsible for inciting the death of individuals who were innocent of any 
internationally recognized crime for which they may have been held accountable. The fatawa 
placed upon them had no international legal standing or jurisdiction and were not recognized 
according to the principles of either international criminal law nor customary international law. 
     Far less controversial was the elimination of Mohammed Emwazi (born Muhammad Jassim 
Abdulkarim Olayan al-Dhafiri) otherwise known as ISIS militant Jihadi John. A British national, 
repugnant by any civilized standard, he was eventually, positively identified using high-tech 
voice recognition software and other intelligence gathered in a multinational effort to track down 
and eliminate the active and imminent threat he posed. Emwazi’s identity was publicly 
confirmed, by Prime minister David Cameron, on September 14, 2015.  Any vile future atrocities 
Emwazi may have had planned were happily “evaporated” along with Emwazi himself, “like a 
greasy spot on the ground” (opinion of U.S. Operational Spokesman, Colonel Steve Warren), by 
a drone strike on November 12, 2015.44  His death was eventually confirmed by ISIL in January 
of 2016.  
     This is an example where the targeting of a national who was also simultaneously a high 
value target (HVT) coincided in exacting justice, sparing the lives of future innocent victims, and 
resulting in an added if unplanned, bonus of retribution for past victims. Diane Foley—mother of 
reporter James Foley, one of his hapless victims, whose beheading was video recorded and made 
public, quixotically and bizarrely decried what she referred to as a so-called “revenge strike,” 
telling ABC news that “Jim would have been devastated with the whole thing. Jim was a 
peacemaker; he wanted to figure out why this was all happening.”45 A position difficult for many 
to agree with, much less comprehend, to say the least. On the positive side, any future victims of 
31 
 
that ruthless killer have been spared the suffering and anguish of that suffered by her own son 
James Foley. 
     There seems to be an inherent human norm against the act of assassination, despite its 
precision and strategic utility. Michael Gross suggests that it may be related to the concept of 
“naming” or identifying an individual, perhaps this tends to make the act more intimate and 
personal, and hence more morally repulsive.46 The paradox is perhaps best understood by the 
anonymity of numbers. A thousand victims are faceless when compared with the tragedy of a 
single individual.  
     There also exists the ever-present and troublesome tension of combatant identification and 
discrimination. If al-Qaeda and associates are combatants, then they should be treated as 
prisoners under the laws of war (combatant equality). Conversely, if not combatants, they should 
be prosecuted as criminals, and are thus entitled to due process and the protections afforded by 
international human rights law (IHRL), as opposed to international humanitarian law (IHL), also 
alternatively referred to as the law of armed conflict (LOAC), or more generally, the laws of 
war.47  The quasi-legal status of “illegal combatants,” is just one of the reasons justification of 
targeted killing is so contentious an issue. This is yet another aspect of the current grey zone 
surrounding transnational armed conflict and fourth generation warfare. It is essential to remind 
the reader that transnational armed conflict is a term I have adopted throughout the current 
research in order to describe the sort hostilities carried out between states and non-state actors, or 
stateless international entities (SIEs) as I have labelled them. 
     Caleb Carr does not consider this disparity to be a decisive issue in the prosecution of the war 
against terror, however. “Thus, while arguments over what domestic law-enforcement measures 
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are or are not constitutional can and indeed must continue, all quibbling over whether we are or 
are not at war with an army of soldiers [as opposed to illegal noncombatants and other quasi-
designations], and all call for our citizenry to carry on their lives ‘as usual,’ must stop.”48 The 
current research certainly concurs with this particular point of view. Such recognition of a 
combatant status would put an end to the debate and by extension afford the rights of combatants 
to those captured but, by the same token, they would also be automatically held accountable 
under the laws of war and the international rule of law. 
     Another extremely problematic aspect, in the prosecution of the war on terror, is the shifting 
identities of targeted individuals. The important distinction established here is not that the use of 
UCAVs is unethical, immoral, or even illegal per se, rather a lack of strictly limited, cohesive 
and clearly established guidelines often sets them beyond the pale of international values and 
standards of normative behavior. Furthermore, until appropriate laws outlining and defining 
international terrorism are established and settled by a competent tribunal, it is likely that 
transnational armed conflict (TAC) will continue to remain in this twilight zone. Since its 
conduct cannot be attributed to criminal acts or acts of war it remains sandwiched in a no man’s 
land somewhere between the regimes of law and war.  
      An important, yet fundamental, aspect also included in the purpose and intent of the current 
treatise is to examine current literature on the subject and shed light upon the various political 
and diplomatic ramifications, associated blowback, second-and-third order effects and 
consequences, and normative limitations. “When covert killings are the rare exception, they 
don’t pose a fundamental challenge to the legal, moral and political framework in which we 
live.”49 With this observation Rosa Brooks pertinently reminded us that should the United States 
wish to preserve its legitimacy and represent itself as the champion of liberal democracy on a 
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global scale, then it must also bear in mind that the injustice and suffering of one man or woman 
mean injustice and suffering for all mankind.  
     The study also seeks in parallel, to clarify the strategic, operational, and tactical advantages 
and disadvantages, surrounding the use of such deadly and sophisticated unmanned technology. 
Ethicist Patrick Lin et al., refer to these aspects as “risks and benefits.”50 Given the extremely 
complex nature of the current research—as well as providing an opportunity for expanded 
exploration and controversy surrounding the subject; the ethical focus of the current work is a 
limited descriptive investigation of normative values related to the use of remotely piloted 
aircraft (RPAs) and their relationship to counterterrorism operations. The study has been 
designed to foster new perspectives, contribute to the existing body of knowledge, and call for 
further meaningful research in the field, including comparative quantitative studies which 
should, where possible, employ probing cost versus benefits analyses. 
     The current work also very briefly considers and explores various aspects and applications in 
the artificial intelligence realm, representing the crossroads between ethics and technology. 
Platforms such as, KEEL® Technology engines and the KEEL Dynamic Graphical Language 
(DGL), which adopts Colonel John Boyd’s well-known and established “observe, orient, decide, 
and act (OODA) loop”51 explain how they are related and apply to judgment, reasoning, 
discretion and autonomy in unmanned systems (UxS).  
     The technological research is sophisticated and highly complex, due to the inherent intricate 
nature of the components involved; various formulae and computations surrounding variables of 
intent, judgment, logic, discretion, and reasoning and how these characteristics apply to machine 
technology. They could and indeed have comprised entire tomes. Complex, as well, since there 
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are also philosophical, social, political, diplomatic, legal, strategic and humanitarian dynamics 
and repercussions involved. All these different variables need to be taken into consideration and 
balanced against one another to draw any sound and significant conclusions. These 
considerations outline the possibilities and boundaries of the present research effort. 
     It is worth noting that a significant conflict arises when attempting to correlate quantitatively 
and empirically measurable criteria (c.f. technology and limitations) and then cross-referencing 
them with more nebulous, qualitative philosophical and humanitarian constraints (laws, rhetoric, 
ethics and morality).  A review of the current literature exposes the vast range of views and 
opinions, as well as the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of this technology, as well as 
considerations for future development, applications, and sound doctrine. Complex technical 
aspects are presented for general guidance, but this is neither the very specialized domain nor the 
focus of the current research. Terms and concepts related to the complex technological aspects 
are presented in layman’s terms. Those readers interested in further research and a more precise 
accounting of this facet are encouraged to make full use of the extensive bibliography included at 
the end of this work.  
     There is unquestionably an imperative need to develop a far-reaching and well-balanced set of 
international guidelines and enforceable rules, concerning the use of this new technology. This 
research asserts indisputably that vague and imprecise guidelines, provided in the past, related to 
this new realm of transnational armed conflict (TAC),52  need to be replaced by more flexible yet 
coherent diplomatic efforts for the formulation of appropriate legal precepts.  
     Presently, international law is comprised of two distinct sources: that of customary 
international law, which is binding on all States and even upon non-state actors, and that of the 
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law of treaties, a form of positive, or statutory law, which is binding upon those signatory states 
who have ratified such written instruments. We shall examine both bodies of law, as they regard 
the conduct of modern warfare, later in the current work.  
     Most authors declare that these laws, as they currently stand, are inadequate to face the 
changing realities of modern warfare and particularly legitimate state-sponsored anticipatory 
self-defense in the case of violent non-state actors during periods of transnational armed conflict 
(TAC). I am inclined to concur with this view; at least in their current form. These new, or 
revamped, laws must also consider the unique changing face and the menace of modern, 
asymmetric, transnational warfare, which neither respects nor recognizes geographical 
boundaries, traditional normative values, nor international law. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
legal, moral and ethical perspectives, as they pertain to increased UAV autonomy, will be 
required to keep pace with new and evolving technology. Such considerations should, as a 
consequence, be incorporated into the research and development phase and not ex-post facto 
when it is already too late. 
     This new threat, largely represented by Islamist radicalism (not to be conflated with Islam as 
a creed), is the same species of manifestation which reared its head with the rise of fascism 
during WWII and the ideological expansionism and violent repression as expressed under 
communist and  Marxist ideology. While this has been a less than popular view there has been 
ample documentation in support of this position.53 Religion and ideology have many common 
denominators, notably their quest for power and domination.  
     This work has been approached, primarily, as an analytical study. A central theme is to 
propose and recommend the need for the development of an international body dedicated to 
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regulating the arbitration, development, and enforcement of international robotic law. This would 
concern robotics and especially those intended for use in armed conflict. Should this task remain 
unattended, there is a great risk of dire consequences in the long run. I wish to make it clear here 
I am not promoting a one world government (which would pose more problems, than solutions, 
for those advocating it), that Janina Dill seems to favor, rather an international regulatory body 
with adequate restraint and enforcement powers. Again, given vested state interests and the 
current international “imbalance of power,” compounded with weak and subservient 
international governing bodies, such a structure remains unlikely, at least for the foreseeable 
future, if ever.54 
     A series of related and important questions are posed. What if, for instance, China, Russia, 
North Korea, or Iran, adopt a similar tactical strategy against its foes as has the U.S. in the past? 
What would be the consequences of a failure to recognize international sovereign boundaries in 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as has been the wont of the industrialized nations to date? 
Would we face technological and political anarchy? What if violent non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups like ISIS, transnational organized criminal groups and others, avail themselves of 
this technology in the future for more sinister and nefarious purposes? These are serious 
questions which need to be posed and to which solutions need to be found. Currently, the United 
States has fallen upon the excuse of self-defense, or the exception of host-state consent as a 
doctrine of armed intervention. Such an excess, however, stretches the intent underlying both 
Articles 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, while maintaining an open door to endless 
hostility. 
     As any good intelligence analyst knows, no scenario should ever be considered too far-
fetched. Thus, a set of binding rules and coherent legislation concerning the use of armed drones 
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appears self-evident, not only strategically, but also as a moral and ethical imperative. To 
continue to merely maintain the status quo, regardless how convenient, is not only 
counterproductive it is also morally and politically bankrupt as a strategy. Failing to address the 
root causes underlying the issues at hand and relying solely upon a “whack-a-mole,” tactical 
choice in the stead of a more insightful and well-balanced grand strategy, is both counterintuitive 
and shortsighted.  There are two important factors which currently inhibit our developing such 
comprehensive legislation and they are intimately related. It is quite possible that without 
international cooperation and goodwill, these two impediments to regulation may never actually 
be realistically surmounted: the question of national sovereignty and the self-interested 
maintenance of power by technologically advanced industrialized nations possessing said 
technology. 
      Certainly, the dissemination of knowledge, to the greatest number of interested readers, while 
simultaneously inducing critical thinking, is the central goal of any writer, lecturer or 
academician, or at least it should be. I have purposely attempted to remain a neutral observer and 
to avoid taking sides in this contentious debate. Researchers and scholars, however, are also 
human and inevitably our personal preferences tend to speak out, regardless how balanced an 
approach we may adopt, this is merely a part of being human.  
      One point, upon which I do pronounce and clearly take a stance, is the need for a unilateral 
examination of not only the use of this new and lethal technology, but also for a reclassification 
of the time-worn definition of transnational armed conflict itself. A new world, a new war, and 
new technology all call for new thinking in both diplomacy and legislation. These two variables: 
technology and insurgent warfare are not mutually exclusive. They are in fact, rather, mutually 
interdependent and both require profound reevaluation, both jointly and individually.  
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       Besides the examination of these two fundamental themes, the remainder of the work is 
dedicated to examining several pertinent questions regarding the legal, moral, ethical and 
technological boundaries and limitations imposed on these lethal instruments accompanied by 
various recommendations. Hopefully, such an examination will contribute to a rapidly expanding 
body of scholarly literature and lay the foundations for even greater research. The world of 
robotics and artificial intelligence is evolving at unprecedented levels. These changes need to be, 
not only critically examined, but also shrewdly governed.  
     The central premise of this research is that while targeted killing rests a viable strategic 
option, in the fight against unbridled terrorism, to be legitimate it must remain a strictly 
controlled tactic based upon clearly defined, transparent and justifiable action. It cannot be 
indiscriminate, such as in the case of the controversial signature strikes and should be founded on 
the strongest possible actionable intelligence. High value targets (HVTs), representing a direct 
threat to national interests or innocent human life must remain the sole priority.  Miller, 
Nakashima and DeYoung, for instance, underscored the unfortunate fact that “Signature strikes 
contributed to a surge in the drone campaign in 2010 when the agency carried out a record 117 
strikes in Pakistan.”55 This intensive campaign was followed by a temporary respite before 
escalating dramatically, once again in January 2013. My hope is that the information and 
research presented within these pages will help shed light upon this important topic of current 
debate, increase awareness and present possible avenues and opportunities for measured 
international conflict resolution, while at the same time making for enjoyable reading.  
     One final note concerning style and format is in order. I have taken the liberty of randomly 
adding appropriate epigraphs, to the current research. Such epigraphs may at first appear out of 
context and not immediately apparent, however, their placement has been carefully calculated to 
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contribute to the larger picture. This will help to complement and emphasize certain points while 
allowing the input and reflections of great thinkers. Any errors or shortcomings in this work 



















“Bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.” 
—Edmund Burke, Speech at Bristol Prior to Election (September 6, 1780). 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Methodological Analysis 
The method of research adopted includes extensive qualitative, cross-referential, content 
document analysis. Both primary and secondary research and documentary sources were 
consulted. This entailed drawing various conclusive arguments from these sources, and then, 
where appropriate, integrating them together with various theoretical paradigms. The conclusions 
drawn served to complement and guide my own personal conceptualized analysis and theory of 
UCAVs and their relationship to counterterrorism. 
      A large portion of this methodology is an effort to formulate and tease out an unbiased and 
sound approach to establishing the normatively acceptable legal, ethical, political and 
technological boundaries of the use of uninhabited aerial combat vehicles, or UCAVs. Careful 
analysis has been conducted, employing both a textual and purposive analysis of existing legal 
and scholarly materials. Throughout this book an effort has been made to draw a rational and 
appropriate (acceptable would be a stretch) balance between normative and positivist application 
of both international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL), concerning 
the justification of targeted killing and collateral damage (c.f. doctrine of double effect or DDE) 
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with the use of robotic aircraft. In other words, defining clearly between what the law says or is, 
and what it should be or say.  
     According to natural law thinkers this separation between the law “as it is,” and the “law as it 
should be” is highly artificial.57 In this book, however, we will stick to the legal positivist 
convention that such a separation has some merit. There has also been an attempt to find a 
suitable balance between constructivist rationale, that is—the (active) state of international 
relations being a result of historically and socially constructed events—and that, on the other 
hand of (passive) consequentialism, where ethical appropriateness of given outcomes is based 
upon the means employed to achieve those ends. Thus, a constructivist view, which determines 
consequences as a result of social interaction, allows for change, whereas a consequentialist, ex-
post facto, perspective, does not.  
     Such an approach represents an attempt at creating a cohesive framework by coalescing and 
balancing radically different perspectives drawn from among the different viewpoints and 
theories, which have been or are currently being advanced. I also draw from my own personal 
knowledge and experiences, gleaned from the combat zones of Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 
These personal insights have been integrated and woven into the research, in a neutral fashion, 
without having breached or violated any specific protocols or non-disclosure agreements 
(NDAs). Such experiences help to temper and balance secondary research with firsthand 
experience. 
     Peer-reviewed scholarly journals, official documents, case law, international treaties, 
congressional testimony and carefully filtered and selected secondary sources have been used in 
support of data collection. Cutting-edge technology was examined through the analysis of 
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various white papers and conference proceedings, electronic correspondence and personal 
interviews. The research is further bolstered using graphic displays developed by examining and 
collating earth-based, analytics, such as Google Earth and ARC GIS. General, comparative, 
quantitative statistical inferences may be drawn from sites such as the Long War Journal, 
bearing in mind the existence of possible biases and margins of error. Now, let us turn to a few 
more relevant points relating to the development of the methodology adopted in the current 
research. 
Methodology applied in the Grotius Sanction 
Like all other scholarly work in law, both national and international, this book is based on certain 
premises concerning legal methodology. The sources of law in international law are well known, 
of course: (a) treaties between States; (b) Customary international law derived from the practice 
of States; (c) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of international law: (d) Judicial decisions and the writings of “the 
most highly qualified publicists.” It should, therefore, come as no surprise that all these sources, 
make their appearance in this dissertation. But identifying the sources is one thing, deciding how 
to apply these sources is another. 
     One of the great scholars of public international law, Martti Koskenniemi, reflected on this 
very issue in the Epilogue (2005) of his From Apologia to Utopia: The Structure of International 
Legal Argument (1989, 2005).58 In the 2005 edition of this book, first published in 1989, he 
reflected on the nature of international law which he had studied for much of his life. His words 




     In the Epilogue, he reveals that “none of the standard academic treatments really captured or 
transmitted the simultaneous sense of rigorous formalism and substantive or political open-
endedness of argument about international law that seemed so striking to me”.59 Although the 
profession had historically developed as a cosmopolitan project in the 1980s “it had become a 
bureaucratic language that made largely invisible the political commitment from which it had 
once arisen or which animated its best representatives”.60 Koskenniemi was unhappy with the 
way much of the relevant literature portrayed international law. International law was generally 
characterized as a solid formal structure whose parts (rules, principles, institutions) had stable 
relations with each other. He also reflects on his past as a civil servant who was confronted with 
questions about international law by his superiors in the government organization. He said: 
“Had I responded to my superiors at the Ministry when they wished to hear what the law was by 
telling them that this was a stupid question and instead given them my view of where the Finnish 
interests lay, or what type of State behavior was desirable, they would have been both baffled 
and disappointed, and would certainly not have consulted me again.”61 
Koskenniemi’s concerns, as expressed in From Apologia to Utopia, are relevant for the world of 
international law. They also are in harmony with my own experiences that there is less consensus 
about the central questions of the discipline than many think.or would like to beleive And if there 
is consensus, this is on weaker grounds than might be expected. This, clearly, necessitates 
rethinking the methodology adopted in writing about international law. How to deal with the 
traditional sources mentioned above? What perspectives to adopt? 
44 
 
 In The Grotius Sanction, I will try account for Koskenniemi’s criticism by following a 
legal methodology developed by the late Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) and thereby other authors 
in the hermeneutic tradition. Allow me to briefly elaborate on this. 
     Dworkin’s early work was on the importance of principles for law and, accordingly, legal 
theory.62 Law is not only a system of rules, as H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992) had chosen as the focus 
of his attention in The Concept of Law (1961),63 but also a system of principles.64 The most 
concise summary of his work might well be that he advocates arguing about principles. 
Although Dworkin successfully defended his approach against the legal positivistic theories of 
his time, one of the frustrations of his later life was that there was so little attention for arguing 
about, and on the basis of, principles. Especially in American political culture at the beginning of 
the twentieth millennium. Principles do matter, and this is a core theme throughout the current 
research.  
     In Is Democracy possible here? (2006) he cogently chastises American political culture for 
being totally polarized between the red and the blue, without any attempt being made to argue 
about the issues “from deeper principles of personal and political morality that we can all 
respect”.65 We are no longer partners in self-government, he writes, “our politics are rather a 
form of war”.66 He refers to the matter of same sex-marriage as it had been decided by Chief 
Justice Margaret Marshall of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. So divided were people on the 
issue, that people did not notice that the judgment of the court was based on “widely shared 
principles” inherent in Massachusetts’s constitution.67 
     As Dworkin makes clear in his “The Forum Principle” (1981) there is a common distinction 
between “interpretative” and “noninterpretive” theories of judicial adjudication and 
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interpretation.68 The interpretive theories pretend to base their interpretation on the text itself 
(e.g. the American Constitution) while the noninterpretative approach would be based on some 
sort of source other than the text, for instance, shared morality, theories of justice, or some 
conception of genuine democracy.69 Dworkin rejects that theory as too simple and even 
misleading. He sees the law as deeply and thoroughly political. “Lawyers and judges cannot 
avoid politics in the broad sense of political theory”, he writes in an article published one year 
later entitled, “Law as Interpretation” (1982).70  
     As I said, Dworkin also takes a stance in the classical debate between legal positivism and 
natural law doctrine, which also plays an important role in The Grotius Sanction. Legal 
positivists believe that propositions of law are wholly descriptive: they are in fact “pieces of 
history”.71 That leads to a methodology that assumes that interpretation of a particular document 
means that we have to discover what its authors (legislators, delegates to the conventional 
convention) meant to say in using the words they did.72 Dworkin emphasizes the flaws in this 
simplistic view on the essence of both legal scholarship and legal interpretation. On many issues, 
the author had no intention. That brings Dworkin to develop his own theory of interpretation 
which significantly deviates from the legal positivistic approach that finds widespread 
acceptance among lawyers and legal scholars. This raises an important point worth bearing in 
mind. And that is a viewpoint is not necessarily wrong, merely because it is different. For his 
own theory, Dworkin seeks guidance from literary and other forms of artistic interpretation.73 
His own theory he presents as “the aesthetic hypothesis” meaning that an interpretation of a 
piece of literature “attempts to show which way of reading (or speaking or directing or acting) 
the text reveals itself as the best work of art”.74 Interpretation of a text, according to Dworkin’s 
methodology, “attempts to show it as the best work of art it can be (…)”.75 
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     According to the approach adopted by Dworkin, there is no longer a flat distinction between 
interpretation as discovering the real meaning of a work of art and criticism – two things some 
scholars try to keep separate as much as they can. 
 Dworkin also attempts to keep theories that stress the importance of the authors 
intentions center stage at bay. Of course, no plausible theory of interpretation holds that the 
intention of the author is always irrelevant. But one should not overemphasize the importance of 
intention, as is so often the case in legal scholarship. The license to interpret is, of course, also a  
licence to misinterpret. Significantly, he illustrates his theory of interpretation by an analysis and 
commentary of John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman.76 
A closer look at Dworkin’s theory of interpretation: “Fit” and “value” 
     When taking note of the main features of Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation one 
objection easily comes to mind, the objection of subjectivity. Does not comparing law with 
literature make law too “subjective”? Dworkin denies this. He stresses that any plausible 
interpretation of legal practice must satisfy a test. That test is that the interpretation must “fit” the 
practice it pretends to interpret and also that it must illustrate its point or value. And, needless to 
say, “point” or “value” cannot mean artistic point or value, of course, but something else. What? 
Law is a political enterprise and therefore the value, or the point, interpretation is directed at, is 
political. It lies in: 
“…coordinating the social and individual effort, or resolving social and individual disputes, or 




     Dworkin has developed his theory of interpretation in many essays, books, and lectures and 
he makes more or less the same point again and again. There are minor differences in the way he 
brings forth his argument, though, and some of his renditions are more convincing than others. A 
particularly successful version of his defense of the law as interpretation he offered in his article 
“‘Natural’ Law Revisited” (1982) where he contrasts his own approach to interpretation with the 
“conventionalist” theory of others.78 Dworkin begins with a theory he calls “naturalism”. 
     Naturalism is a theory based on natural law doctrine, although the word “natural” is placed 
between brackets in the title of his article. So, if we want to call this the “natural law doctrine”, 
this is because it hints at some similarities but also differences with the classical doctrine 
attributed with title. The broad concept that Dworkin espouses, from natural law doctrine, is this. 
“Natural law insists that what the law is depends in some way in what the law should be.”79 
     Dworkin claims that no one wants to be called a natural lawyer,80 but he thinks this general 
idea of natural law doctrine (he calls it a “crude description of natural law”) is not only 
defensible, but it is also a very welcome and necessary idea to understand both legal practice and 
sound legal theory. 
     The implications of naturalism for the theory of interpretation are far-reaching. Naturalist 
judges think that they have to decide hard cases by interpreting the political structure of their 
community by trying to find the most appropriate justification they can find in principles of 
political morality for the structure as a whole.81 Judges have to give a judgment about that past. 
But this judgment about past law pends on their judgment concerning the most ideal possible 
justification of that law. This brings them within the ambit of political morality. 
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     As I mentioned previously, Dworkin claims that the law is very much like literature. Dworkin 
illustrates his analogy between law and literature with his idea of the chain novel: a group of 
novelists deciding to write a book together. Every participant in the writing process has the 
responsibility of interpreting what has gone before except the first one. Every subsequent 
participant has to interpret what his predecessors have done, i.e. develop the novel further into 
the direction of a good novel, the best the novel it can be. The “chain of the law” is no different. 
The best interpretation of past judicial decisions, or stare decisis, is an interpretation that “shows 
these in the best light”.82 And “best” in this context does not mean, of course, best aesthetically, 
rather morally and politically. The interpretation must come closest to the ideals of a just legal 
system. There are constraints, to be sure. The judge cannot invent a better past for instance. An 
interpretation has to fit the data it interprets. But having said that, there is an orientation of the 
law in its best light. It is clear from what has been said that interpretation is not a mechanical 
process. 
     Naturalism, as Dworkin’s legal methodology, is contrasted with what he calls 
“conventionalism”. Conventionalism pretends to be the more “democratic” theory. 
Conventionalism is based on two pillars. First, it wants to identify the persons or institutions 
which are authorized to make law by the social conventions of their community. Second, a 
conventionalist proceeds to check the record of history to see whether any such persons or 
institutions “have laid down a rule whose language unambiguously covers the case at hand”.83 If 
such a rule exists it has to be applied. If not, they have to create the best rule for the future. This 
removes the inherent flexibility which is a defining feature of both law and justice. 
     Conventionalism is based on the presupposition that people only have rights if these have 
been attributed to them by institutions that have legislative power, but naturalism also assigns 
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rights to people that no official institution has ever sanctioned before.84 Another point on which 
naturalism and conventionalism differ is with regard to the concept “political order”. According 
to naturalism, a community’s political order is provided by the principles assumed in the best 
interpretation of its political structures, practices, and decisions.85 
     Naturalism is also based on a separation between the responsibility of the judge and the 
responsibility of the legislature. The legislature is aimed at the ideal of our political order in 
some sort of external sense. The aim of the legislature is to seek the ideal of a perfectly just and 
effective system. But there is also an internal ideal, to wit the challenge of making the standards 
that govern our lives articulate, coherent and effective.86 
The relevance of all this for The Grotius Sanction 
     Dworkin’s theory of interpretation strikes me as relevant to the methodology of international 
law. I started with Koskenniemi’s autobiographical reflection responding to his superiors at the 
Finnish Ministry when they wanted to hear “what the law was”. Koskenniemi, a civil servant by 
that time, couldn’t tell them and he wanted to answer them that he could tell them “where the 
Finnish interests lay”. Or “what type of State behavior was desirable”.87 Needless to say, this did 
not satisfy his superiors. But it would not satisfy Ronald Dworkin either.  
     The law is not, at least not only, about “interests”. Neither is the law exclusively about what is 
“desirable”. The Empire of the Law88 is about principles, moral principles, political principles, 
and in according with the natural law doctrine (what Dworkin calls “naturalism”) these 
principles are relevant for the law. This is especially the case with international law, I am 
inclined to think. In the traditional sources of international law, I have referred to the “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations”. Dworkin would have had no qualms in 
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stressing the importance of these and I side with him. Especially with relatively new techniques 
as those I am writing about in The Grotius Sanction, principles, and arguing about principles, is 
of supreme importance. Dworkin showed us with his introduction of the dimensions of “fit” and 
“purpose” that an orientation on a “moral reading”89 of treaties and other foundational texts of 
international law does not have to bring us into the troubled waters of relativism and skepticism. 
Theoretical Foundations 
 Theoretically, national security lacks the sort of cohesive and explicative framework which 
denotes other related social science disciplines, making it difficult, if not impossible, to attribute 
a specific theoretical framework to the current research. The closest possible and most applicable 
theories are those pertaining to the laws of war, such as the Just War Theory and the global 
conflict paradigm. The constantly changing and nebulous character of asymmetric, non-state, 
actor-oriented conflict, however, tends to render the Just War Theory somewhat less 
applicable—while many researchers consider the global conflict paradigm as no longer adequate 
either.  
     The truth of the matter is that what the world currently faces has no precedent. It is an entirely 
new model of armed conflict and the old rules, such as those of the Just War Theory, simply no 
longer apply. The classic Just War Theory is just that; classic. There is a need for a new and 
more comprehensive approach which encompasses and considers the unique and deadly nature 
of fourth generation transnational armed conflict. All the best intentions of the world will be in 
vain should we ignore this harsh reality. While the basic tenets and guidelines initially 
formulated need not be jettisoned, they must be nuanced to take account of this newer, more 
deadly form of armed conflict. Wars of the past, violent as they may have been, largely 
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respected, or at least recognized certain parameters of conduct. The current situation is one 
where the barbaric exception to the rule is no longer an exception, rather it has become the rule 
itself. 
     There are indeed portions of the “Collective Security” approach, first developed in 1914, 
which can be applied particularly regarding either UN-Charter Article 51, and the right to state 
self-defense, or alternatively under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN-Charter, for establishing 
collective security, such as was exercised during the first Gulf War.  However, such a theory is 
limited in scope regarding a conclusive and specific application concerning drone warfare and 
other aspects involved in this research such as, targeted killing, state sovereignty, and 
noncombatant immunity.  
     Elements from other structurally applicable philosophical frameworks have been considered 
and either discarded or adopted, incorporated, enhanced. These perspectives, derived from a 
variety of sources: utilitarian theory, liberalism, liberal multilateralism, liberal multiculturalism, 
the ethics of duty theory (otherwise referred to as deontology), complexity theory, chaos theory, 
game theory (Neumann and Morgenstern), isolationism, classical realism, neorealism, 
democratic realism, moral democratic realism, constructivism, communitarianism, democratic 
globalism, revolution in military affairs theory (RMA), postcolonialism theory, and identity 
politics (to a lesser extent but relevant nonetheless for comprehending the historical 
“denouement”),  were evaluated regarding the development of theoterrorism as a transnational 
phenomenon.  
     It was found that elements from revolution in military affairs theory (RMA) were marginally 
applicable regarding the development and implementation of new military technologies. Thomas 
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X. Hammes, importantly reminds us that revolution in military affairs is but the evolutionary 
end-product of or response to, strategic, operational and tactical problems faced by the military. 
Sometimes the changes are minor, and at other times drastic and revolutionary in character. Such 
is the case of the advent of the unmanned aerial vehicle. Revolution in military affairs, when 
correctly interpreted, therefore, simply represents practical solutions to tactical dilemmas.  
     Complexity theory is particularly apt in this instance, as it relates to organizational changes 
and adaptations required, to better understand and come to terms with transnational armed 
conflict (TAC). Current use and foreign development were influenced by game theory, while 
future technological development and nanotechnology, by that of chaos theory and fractal 
mathematics. A brief definition of each of these can be found in a separate index at the end of 
this work. Legal concepts such as enshrined within Formalism (textual interpretations) and 
Relativism (purposive interpretations), also informed the development of the theoretical legal 
aspects involved in this research. 
     Many of these theories are minor variants, and spin-offs, which are developed out of an 
original philosophical point of view. Oftentimes the differences between the original theories are 
either negligible, vague or difficult to discern. Nevertheless, they provide us with competing 
perspectives to better inform the research and develop keener insights regarding military and 
political strategy and its application regarding the use of armed drones to combat terrorism.  
     It is vitally important to understand the impact and consequences of previous historical and 
cultural developments and how these may have affected, either directly or indirectly, the current 
state of international geopolitics. Thus, events such as, the Peace of Westphalia,90 the Sykes-
Picot Agreement,91 the Balfour Declaration,92 the McMahon Hussein Correspondence,93 or the 
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Treaty of Versailles (particularly concerning the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Caliphate),94 still impact international affairs today and are thus central to our understanding.  
Like the rings of a pond, which are formed, when a stone has been tossed, their reverberations 
can still be felt long after the initial event. 
     A cross-sectional analysis, of different political theories examined, reveals three broad central 
themes. The first relates to particularism and the rights of the individual advanced by liberal 
philosophers such as John Rawls. The second manifests itself by political and military 
isolationism for the United States. Finally, the third expounds a selective agenda, that of the 
expansion U.S. liberal democratic values, compounded using unilateral, anticipatory military 
intervention where and when necessary. Western industrial interests and expansionism are 
closely aligned with these democratic ideals. Of course, as with many of the theories and 
paradigms presented, there is a substantial intermingling between them. Some of the theories are 
particularly more adept at clarifying certain points of reference, while others seem to inherently 
contradict themselves. 
     A passage from imagination or speculative theory to realistic application is hinted at, for 
instance, in the writing of Taylor and Reising. Here one discerns a bridge between the relative 
application of RMA, the current research being conducted in this field, and the eventual 
possibility of totally autonomous robotics. The authors note that, “Although some progress has 
been made – there are UMVs operating in various areas of the world today – no integrated theory 
of human-automation integration has surfaced as of this writing.”95 A clear and succinct 
description of the current reality. Such a perspective considers the various possibilities, 
limitations and the potential risks. We must always bear in mind that theoretical perspectives are, 
by nature, tenuous at best. 
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        The research of current and future technological developments, as they relate to 
autonomous aircraft, was largely carried out through private interviews and consultation of first-
hand sources. Interviews were also conducted to better interpret the legal implications and 
psychological aspects. During the current research, Tom and Helena Keeley, the developers of 
KEEL® Technology were interviewed, to obtain greater insight into the technological aspects of 
artificial intelligence (henceforth referred to as AI). These explanations were further enriched 
through email correspondence with Carlos Kopp. Lt. Colonel Dave Grossman was also consulted 
on various aspects relating to psychological trauma and killing in war. Amos Guiora also kindly 
accepted to be interviewed concerning certain legal and ethical aspects surrounding drone 
warfare and targeted killing. Finally, cautious examination of mainstream media reporting was 
referenced, while bearing in mind once again, possible falsehoods, unsubstantiated claims, 
misleading information, personal agendas, and biases.  
Four Hypotheses 
As I made clear when introducing my central question there are four hypotheses that are posited 
throughout the research. They are: 
Hypothesis 1: The widespread use of drones will become ever more prevalent in the modern 
battlespace. Reduced risk to personnel, plausible deniability, and increased public support, 
foreshadows an increased use of armed drones as the “go to” response for conflict resolution. 
Hypothesis 2: A new, revised, and enforceable set of laws and rules of engagement, specifically 
aimed at transnational armed conflict and robotic warfare, must be developed and clearly 
defined. They shall succeed only if they are shaped through unified political will and coherent 
but flexible policies.  
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Hypothesis 3: Unmanned aerial vehicles will become more independent, precise, and 
increasingly autonomous in the political and military decision-making process. 
Hypothesis 4: The war against terror is both ideological and kinetic [physical]96 and a more 
cohesive, two-pronged approach, such as that afforded by effects-based operations (EBOs), is 
required to achieve any measure of lasting success. 
It is relatively clear that these significant advantages will automatically facilitate resorting to 
armed conflict as a convenient, cost-effective means of conflict resolution. Alternative soft 
power and smart power diplomacy measures, such as mediation, sanctions, condemnation, 
resolutions, suspension of aid and relations, boycotts, proactive investment, and nation building 
will eventually become less attractive and consequently be less relied upon. It is nonetheless 
essential to bear in mind, as Samuel P. Huntington importantly warns us, that “Soft power is 
power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power.”97 Soft power, therefore in and of itself 
may be persuasive, but it does not carry the day unless backed by its more menacing companion. 
Likewise, hard power is futile unless accompanied by its more diplomatic companion. Caleb 
Carr, speaking of terrorism reiterated these reflections while emphasizing the existential menace 
that it holds forth, “For while it is true diplomacy should have its place in all wars, terrorists are 
no longer holding guns to our heads and making demands—they are pulling triggers without 
discussion or warning.”98  Unfortunately, there has been a clear reversal in the approach to 
conducting modern warfare. Historically, states were required to justify their intervention prior to 
conducting any sort of armed conflict; the Just War Theory of jus ad bellum. In the current 
international environment, however, far more emphasis has been placed upon way war is 
conducted (jus in bello) as opposed to the why war is conducted (jus ad bellum).  
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This vacillation is currently a great problem in the war in Syria. Public opinion, shaped by the 
media, ranges back and forth. One day in it finds favor in President Assad, and his attacks on IS, 
the next condemning him for the alleged use of poison gas.  The political climate is no different, 
attack and support alternate rapidly as the wind. Bombard today, support tomorrow. There 
appears to be no concrete strategy in what appears to be a contest of wills, the advancement of 
vested interests, and the adoption of Occam’s razor99 and most often resulting in the support of 
what is considered the lesser of two evils. 
     Rosa Brooks, speaking on the enticement of adopting robotic warfare as a strategy, 
insightfully admonishes, “…if all that appears to be at risk is an easily replaceable drone, 
officials will be tempted to use lethal force more and more casually.”100 Michael Walzer reflects 
upon the alternatives and considers these less seductive measures, including others mentioned 
above, such as the establishment of no-fly zones and pinpoint targeted missile strikes as 
“measures short of war.” Brunstetter and Braun later requalified these jus ad vim concepts or the 
just use of force, initially developed by Walzer.101  
     Thus, a different strategy and new approaches to combat this plague are called for. The 
current strategy has been influenced by an outdated perception, first advanced by Clausewitz, 
that success in war derives from the destruction of the opposing force. It is the contention of this 
research, as well as other authors and researchers, that we are fighting a new—a different type of 
war. This new war is one that combines both kinetic and ideological aspects. A premise which is 
echoed throughout the current research is that a new type of warfare and its associated responses 
also calls for either new or drastically amended regulation, legislation, and enforcement. 
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     Dependent variables adjust in accordance with changes in the independent variables. At its 
most basic it is a cause and effect relationship. As the independent variable changes, it has a 
demonstrable effect upon the dependent variable. Some of the dependent variables outlined 
within the body of this research include legal, ethical, and technological boundaries and 
limitations in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and their efficiency as instruments in 
counterterrorism. Thus, in an examination of drone efficiency, drones would be the independent 
variables while the success or failure rate would be the dependent variable. 
     Some of the numerous independent variables having an impact upon these dependent 
variables include: The effects of globalization and the question of nation-state sovereignty versus 
international mandates; the process of radicalization; political grand strategies and the balance of 
military versus diplomatic initiatives; the evolution international humanitarian law (IHL) and the 
development of enforceable legal precepts; international human rights law (IHRL) and the 
polarization of national self-defense as defined by Article 51 of the UN Charter; the ethical 
justification of targeted killing in the face of transnational aggression; the issues of collateral 
damage and its relationship to urban insurgent infiltration and human shielding; the articulation 
of international customary and treaty law in regard to the violation of national sovereignty and 
restricted air land and sea space; accessing intelligence from neutral or non-belligerent 3rd party 
states; technological advances in hardware and software engineering; the integration and 
consequences of discretionary reasoning in the decision-making process, such as human - 
computer interfaces (HCI), particularly in the case of enhanced autonomy and automatic target 
recognition and acquisition (ATR), with regards to normative and ethical standards; operational 
and strategic effectiveness of the use of UAS technology; socio-psychological characteristics and 
58 
 
the impact of targeted killing on victims and operators; the psycho-ethical issues of the target and 
distance relationship, incorporating the concept of morality of altitude.  
Approach to Research 
 The body of the research is broken into three distinct segments: Reaching, which consists of 
examining the topic, posing specific questions to be answered and developing a path of 
investigation; Bridging, through examining the current literature and drawing cognitive 
connections related to this research and Seizing, during which findings and conclusions are 
drawn based upon all the potential resources available. Much like the intelligence cycle,102 this 
study utilizes a “research cycle.” This consists of: investigating the problem, analyzing the 
problem through personal experience and the aid of associated literature, drawing specific 
conclusions, and eventually presenting recommendations to provide various outlets for further 
research and policy development. These proposed changes and recommendations are presented 
in the conclusions of the final chapter. 
     It is impossible to merely delve directly into the questions surrounding the legal, ethical, and 
technological applicability of the unmanned aerial platforms, without also undertaking, at least 
briefly, the other surrounding, and essential issues which relate to them. There are numerous 
aspects, both negative and positive, involved in examining the role and use of UAVs and 
UCAVs. Each of these aspects is worthy of in-depth treatment and consideration. To fully 
understand the larger picture, we must consider topics, which may not appear at first blush to be 
relevant. Topics such as targeted killing; autonomous flight and the human-computer interface 
(HCI); theoterrorism; non-combatant immunity, human shielding; media exploitation, human 
rights versus national security, the doctrine of double effect; the Just War Theory, and so forth.   
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     It is equally essential to separate the relevant materials, such as peer-reviewed journals and 
investigative reporting from some of the less academically reliable sources, which may be tainted 
with bias—sometimes very strong bias. Certain references such as The Predator War, a report by 
Jane Mayer, in the New Yorker, cited several times in this research, are infallible, while other 
more dubious articles must be subject to circumspect and rigorous examination for possible bias 
and error.  
     Reports from non-governmental organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), Amnesty International (AI), and Human Rights Watch (HRW), were intentionally 
omitted due to their strong obvious bias, their sloped language, and selective reporting. This 
might seem counterintuitive to the uninitiated reader. Human rights organizations, such as HRW, 
are powerful international entities. The total expense budget for HRW was $ 78,162, 105 in 
2016, with reported revenues of $60,888,259, and total net assets of $214,651,900.103 While 
undoubtedly well-intentioned, many of their arguments are selectively presented in support of a 
specific agenda. Consider the following example, that of a research report on the conflict in 
Columbia, between government forces and the FARC [Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces], spanning the period between 1988 and 2004.  
 
We process the main written output of Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch on Colombia covering the period 1988-2004, recording all numerical 
conflict information and accounts of specific conflict events. We check for internal 
consistency and against a unique Colombian conflict database. We find that both 
organizations have substantive problems in their handling of quantitative 
information. Problems include failure to specify sources, unclear definitions, an 
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erratic reporting template and a distorted portrayal of conflict dynamics. Accounts 
of individual events are representative and much more useful and accurate than the 
statistical information. We disprove a common accusation that Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch rarely criticize the guerrillas but do find 
some evidence of anti-government bias. The quantitative human rights and conflict 
information produced by these organizations for other countries must be viewed 
with skepticism along with cross-country and time series human rights data based 
on Amnesty International reports.104 
 
The above report indicated the use of vague, imprecise language, biased reporting, and indirect 
attributions. Of course, to be fair there are obviously varying degrees of abuse in reporting. The 
use of one-sided, selectively presented research and statistics, over-reporting, misreporting, 
emotionally laden semantics and presenting hearsay as purported fact, renders many of them less 
credible for the purposes of any sort of balanced and impartial evaluation. This type of 
manipulative reporting is referred to as “information politics” in social sciences. Cohen and 
Green examine the inherent conflict of competing issues of institutional credibility and issue 
dramatization, during Liberia’s civil war (1989 – 2003), regarding this issue 105 Humanitarian 
reporting quite often becomes distorted, clouded and colored by an alternate vision of reality.  
     In yet another instance of selective reporting, Kathleen Peratis, reported on her visit to Gaza 
where she investigated smuggling tunnels with members of Hamas. It is worth bearing in mind 
that Hamas has been designated terror organization by Israel, the U.S., EU, and Canada. 
Kathleen Peratis was co-chair of the Advisory Committee of HRW’s Middle East and North 
Africa Division, at the time of these reports.106  An additional, perhaps less obvious problem, is 
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that those pointing out such bias may themselves have their own personal agenda in addition to 
that of the organization they represent. It, therefore, behooves both the researcher and reader to 
scrutinize any suspect reporting regardless the source. While the basic research presented by 
some of these organizations can be used, in a very general sense for the purposes of guidance, 
most of their production could not adduce sound evidence.  
     When comparing the relative merits of peer-reviewed material against that of mass media 
sources and public journalism, there is inevitably a tradeoff. Peer-reviewed, academic, 
empirically-based research material often takes a very long time to see the light of day, whereas 
journalistic reporting, although circumspect, is often up-to-date covering the most recent and 
topical events. It is up to the individual researcher to navigate between the two and attempt to 
develop a reasonable balance while drawing as clear and current a picture as possible. Of course, 
the same caveats apply to government reporting which may, itself, also be biased and pone to 
serving a specific agenda. Governments, however, have a much harder time distorting the facts, 
since they most often find themselves in the spotlight of public scrutiny and at least limited 
political and public oversight.  
The Challenges 
It is perhaps best to consider a few of the most probing and relevant challenges facing the use of 
UCAVs in the modern battlespace and their relationship as a response to transnational terrorism. 
These contentious issues, which have caused so much ink to flow must inevitably be borne in 
mind, while advancing our analysis, to assist the reader in formulating an independent judgment. 
There are five core and immediate pressing areas that have sparked debate, and which shall be 
analyzed throughout the research:  
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1. Drones are considered as a method of extrajudicial assassination. They are depicted as 
depriving humans of the right to life and due process, both fundamental precepts and the 
cornerstones of liberal democracies. Once again, it must be borne in mind that vested 
national interests will always remain paramount and impede the progress of any such 
efforts to develop implement and sustain such an ethical framework.  
 
2. Drones are considered unfair. Due to their technological superiority, they are considered 
as creating an unnatural and excessive asymmetric imbalance in the proportionality 
equation. 
 
3. They are politically alluring. They seduce politicians into lowering the bar for conflict and 
create a false sense of justified confidence, due to the lack of friendly casualties (at least 
physically, if not psychologically). Meanwhile, however, their excessive exploitation fails 
to account for indirect consequences and long-term effects such as damaged legitimacy. 
 
4. Drones are imprecise. There are numerous accusations of massive civilian casualties and 
collateral damage. The precision of such reports, however, remains questionable at best. 
 
5. It has been proposed that the use of drones violates the sovereignty of states who are not 
at war. This, of course, depends upon the legal situation at the time. This concern may be 
(and indeed has repeatedly been), overridden in failed states, where it was determined that 
the lack of resolve or capability (the unwilling or unable test) to establish the rule of law, 
present a direct threat to an external state. Furthermore, sovereignty is not infringed when 
the legal criteria under Chapter VII, Article 51 (self-defense), Chapter VII, Article 42 




Conversely there exist, perhaps unsurprisingly, five countervailing positions, which serve to 
balance, neutralize or respond to each of these various challenges, as hinted at in their 
descriptions. These issues, presented above, will be analyzed, examined and evaluated 
throughout the course of this research. I will attempt to fairly address both sides of the 
argument—both for and against the use of drones as a weapon of choice. As might be expected, 
both the positions supporting and those against the use of UCAVs are largely, or at least in many 
cases, based upon a somewhat subjective interpretation of international humanitarian law. Both 
proponents and critics select those sections which best suit their needs. Law, as an instrument of 
governance, is deliberately designed to be flexible to allow for unforeseen circumstances and 
exceptions to the rule.  In the case of drone warfare, the entire paradigm was unforeseen and 
grew at such an alarming rate, that it was difficult to keep pace with and adjust the law 
accordingly. Please refer to the figure below for a comparative perspective relating to this debate. 





      
 
 
                        Figure 1© James P. Welch 2018. 
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 There are strategic, operational, tactical, historical, cultural, political, economic, social, 
technological, and humanitarian issues which must be taken under consideration, examined, 
developed, and evaluated to develop a more cohesive understanding. Additionally, accurately 
analyzing these elements often depends on whether they are held according to a national, 
transnational, regional, or international perspective as a scale of measurement. These viewpoints 
can also change, in their approach and interpretation according to a frame of view; for instance, 
that of a realist, versus a liberal or constructivist perspective.  
Terrorism and The Clash of Consciousness 
 
 
“The idea of Voltairean tolerance is lively and sometimes rough debate, 
 the idea of multiculturalist tolerance is polite silence.”107 
—Paul Cliteur and Tom Herrenberg, The Fall and Rise of Blasphemy Law (2016) 
 
When considering the use of drones and targeted killing as weapons of counterterrorism, it is 
incumbent upon us to also examine, if only briefly, the phenomenon of terrorism as a strategy. 
The fact is that the vast majority of terrorist-related conflicts are the result of various 
interpretations of Islam. There has been great sensitivity regarding this topic and a culturally 
driven reticence to recognize reality. One cannot possibly hope to combat an idea without being 
able to discuss it. What  Huntington correctly referred to as a Clash of Civilization’s could  be  
more precisely considered as a Clash of Consciousness, which in turn incorporates a clash of 
tolerance. For at the very basic level we are what we think. 
     One of the most lucid clarifications casting light upon this phenomenon is the remarkable 
contribution by Cliteur and Herrenberg, where they explain their concept of “Voltairean 
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tolerance. This concept they have contrasted with what they refer to as “multiculturalist 
tolerance.” For Cliteur and Herrenberg Voltairean tolerance adopts a position where “You can 
disagree, but you should not aim to silence your discussion partner.”108 In other words, quite 
simply, we agree to disagree.  The authors suggest that it is only through the adoption of such a 
stance that any consensus may eventually take place. They contrast this type of approach with 
that of multiculturalist tolerance which silences all criticism. Often subsumed under the label of 
“political correctness,” multiculturalist tolerance is based upon the supreme injunction of 
avoiding offense to other parties at all cost. The negative aspects of such a restrictive view are 
knowing what exactly should be considered offensive; evaluating different cultural 
interpretations and, above all else, the muzzling of the free expression of thoughts and ideas.  
      For most people, terrorism is something that happens to others, not to them and therefore 
they are lulled into a false sense of security—a sense of security reinforced by the safety of 
robotic warfare. This is not, of course, what terrorists hope to project, they wish to instill fear and 
chaos. Fear and the projection of fear are their most powerful weapons. Creating a public lack of 
confidence in the government’s ability to provide security is a core strategy of terrorists. 
     The psychological dimensions of terrorism have been exhaustively examined by many 
leading writers in this field. There has been, however, little to no consensus achieved in this 
domain. There has been a rather obstinate adherence to Freudian psychodynamic principles in 
the search for psychopathological motivations. This contested approach was, however, embraced 
by Jerold Post, a leading and controversial author in the field. While his approach may be 
contested, it is nevertheless still worthy of our consideration. Other authors, such as Marc 
Sageman and Maxwell Taylor, have posited that there is no significant psychological aberration 
among those electing to resort to terror.  
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     In the interests of understanding group or crowd psychology and the interactions related to 
social psychology a very good primer is provided in the writings of Gustave Le Bon.  While first 
published in 1895, Le Bon, brilliant by any standard, played a leading and significant role in the 
understanding of the principles behind group related psychology and violent behavior. Indeed, 
many of his ideas presaged those of Sigmund Freud and his writing on crowd control also 
exercised an influence upon such historically significant figures as Freud, Hitler, Mussolini, 
Lenin, and even Theodore Roosevelt. His expertise and insights still resonate strongly to the 
present day. Another author who contributed to the current research and the understanding of 
group dynamics was Stanley Schachter in his title, The Psychology of affiliation. As we shall see 
later small group dynamics play a key role in the process of radicalization and the spread of 
terrorist ideology. Maxwell Taylor examines the issue from the behavioral aspect, relying upon a 
Skinnerian approach (B.F. Skinner), rather than from a psychodynamic model. In other words, 
the behavior becomes the defining aspect of fanatical response, rather than determinations of a 
psychological character. 
Research Significance 
The information and insights developed during this research examine the extremely polarized 
positions within international humanitarian law and international jurisprudence. The current 
rules, laws, and regulations are outmoded, inadequate and must be addressed. “Essential point: 
the U.S. seems to be struggling to adapt its 20th-century moral code of warfare to the 21st-century 
practice of sending flying robots into other countries to kill people,”109 clarifies Grossman. 
Michael N. Schmitt also cogently submits that “…interpretation of ambiguous norms has to 
reflect contemporary warfare. States both apply and are the subjects of international 
humanitarian law norms. Said norms must remain relevant to contemporary circumstances if 
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States are to remain willing to implement them in practice.”110 It is the opinion of this research 
the current outdated and inappropriate norms relating to international relations and the just 
conduct of armed conflict are no longer suitable, nor are they adaptable to the current state of 
asymmetric warfare which can include militarized non-state actors, sub-nationalist groups, and 
transnational organized criminal activity (TOCA). Fortunately, there have been promising efforts 
in this direction such as the initiative represented by the six-year, 56-page, study conducted 
Harvard University which resulted in the, Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and 
Missile Warfare (2009).111  
     Those on the pacifist side of the equation would argue otherwise, advancing that the current 
laws are adequate if properly enforced (according to their specific and tightly bound 
interpretations). Unfortunately, effective enforcement of such rules remains highly improbable. 
     This is a new type of hybrid warfare and as such calls for the evolution and insightful design 
of suitable laws designed to deal with these new phenomena. There are clear warning signs, all 
about us. The opportunities for bold and decisive action are rapidly fading. While this research 
focuses primarily on U.S. systems, the precepts are equally applicable to all states adopting this 
new and lethal technology. This research provides a possibility for an enhanced understanding of 
these fundamentally contentious issues, while simultaneously laying the foundations for further 
research.  
     Another positive objective is to establish a functional framework concerning the legal, ethical, 
and technological challenges, limitations, and boundaries, relating to the use of armed drones. 
The current polemic is murky and shrouded in obfuscation. To place limitations and boundaries 
on the use and application of any combat-proven technology, it is imperative to first examine, as 
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in the case of the current research, the historical, and ethical precedents. This study also 
highlights the far-reaching consequences of advances in technology, while the legal, and ethical 
impact of increased autonomy in unmanned aerial vehicles is evaluated. The relationship 
between the rise of Islamist theoterrorism and the use of armed drones, as a tactic of response, is 
also subject to rigorous scrutiny. The various political, strategic operational, and tactical 
advantages, disadvantages, and ramifications are explored. The social and psychological 
dynamics including collateral damage, trauma, and morality of distance are also investigated.  As 
with any research project, it is the hope of the author that the material presented here will provide 
insights and foster even greater efforts at research in the quest for providing effective solutions in 
these troubling times. 
Summary 
This chapter laid out the ground work for the remainder of the book by introducing the various 
themes, which shall be covered in depth and analyzed more fully. The theoretical models used to 
develop the core of the research were examined. Conceptual paradigms and philosophical 
frameworks, relating to international geopolitics and war—realism, liberalism, constructivism, 
etc., were outlined. Important historical considerations were also briefly highlighted. 112   
     The four central hypotheses, to be examined were clearly defined. The first being that 
Unmanned aerial vehicles will become more independent, precise, and increasingly autonomous 
in the political and military decision-making process. The second hypothesis theorizes that A 
new, revised, and enforceable set of laws and rules of engagement, specifically aimed at 
transnational armed conflict and robotic warfare, must be developed and clearly defined. 
Furthermore, it was stipulated that they shall succeed only if they are shaped through unified 
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political will and coherent, but flexible policies. The third hypothesis, a strategic concern of 
international importance, posits that the widespread use of drones will become ever more 
prevalent in the modern battlespace. Reduced risk to personnel, plausible deniability and 
increased public support, foreshadows an increased use of armed drones as the “go to” 
response for conflict resolution. Finally, and certainly no less important, the fourth hypothesis 
stated that the war against terror is both ideological and kinetic and a more cohesive, two-
pronged approach, such as that afforded by effects-based operations (EBOs), is required to 
achieve any measure of lasting success. 
     Positions of both critics and proponents were developed, representing the five central 
challenges, or points of contention. It was also indicated that for each of the core challenges there 
exist five countervailing defenses. The core objections and their rebuttals are examined 
throughout the research. The importance of academic integrity, avoiding bias, and the need for 
care when selecting various materials for research was also broached. We briefly examined the 
dependent and independent variables relating to this research.  
     There are multiple considerations involved in researching unmanned warfare and 
theoterrorism. These include: historical, political, economic, social, cultural, strategic, 
operational, tactical, legal, ethical, humanitarian, and technological aspects, to mention but a 
few. Each of these has its own specific boundaries and limitations which need to be sketched out 
and properly defined. Such a definition must consider national, regional and international 
influences and interactions as well. Finally, and certainly no less important, the interdependent 







“…any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, 
 and therefore never send to know for whom the bells tolls; it tolls for thee.” 
 
—John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions. Meditation XVII (Nunc Lento Sonitu 
Dicunt, Morieres. Translation: Now this bell tolling softly for another, 
says to me, Thou must die. 1624).113 
 
 
FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
Targeting Imprecision 
When we consider the fourth major objection or challenge raised earlier, the assumption that 
drones are imprecise and lead to excessive civilian casualties, the calculus is, relatively 
straightforward. This is particularly the case if we are speaking merely of the technical aspects of 
the weapons package, and its relationship to collateral damage. The truth of the matter is that this 
newest technology is robust, both in its striking precision and in reducing and containing the 
number of casualties to a more confined area. This fact has been proven on numerous occasions. 
     Additionally, constant enhancements and improvements in avionics, optics, and missile 
guidance systems, have led to even greater efficiency and precision. Any imprecision is more 
likely due to human error than system faults. While there are other areas where the precision may 
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be called into question, as far as targeting and delivery are concerned, drones have proven 
remarkably efficient, despite criticism to the contrary.  
     There are some who disagree with the perspective that drones are nothing more than a tactical 
delivery platform for munitions. Braun & Brunstetter, however, argue that the nature of the 
platform entirely alters the way in which war is waged.114   Currently, at least, there is still a 
human in the loop, and in this respect, they are no different from any other manned aircraft, 
albeit the operator targets from a much safer, more distant environment. They are, as a matter of 
fact, more precise due to their hovering and loitering capability. The fact that the Hellfire missile 
load can be delivered from a helicopter, patrol boat, fixed-wing aircraft or semi-autonomous 
aircraft, invalidates the singular arguments which have been selectively applied against the use of 
drones and their weapons payload. It appears that the impersonal and relative risk-free nature of 
the platform has more to do with the resentment against these birds of prey have garnered, than 
with the actual question of precision. 
     It should also be borne in mind that many of the reports of civilian casualties have also been 
greatly exaggerated, fabricated, or based upon unsubstantiated hearsay and speculation.  
Conversely, given  recent documented and verified revelations, made by sources such as the 
McClatchy report, the human-rights group Reprieve, and the digital magazine The Intercept, it 
appears there are indeed more noncombatant casualties and less accurate target strikes than had 
been previously advanced by the Obama administration.  
     Reprieve reported in 2014, for instance, that as of November of that year 1,147 persons had 
died in attempts on 41 targets.115 Often, a target is sought out multiple times, thus increasing the 
civilian casualty count. It must, however, be specified that these shortcomings are related to the 
72 
 
identification and prosecution of the strikes and not the responsibility of the accuracy of the 
weapons platform itself. We can no more hold drones accountable for the death of 
noncombatants than we can blame a vehicle for being responsible for a deadly car crash when 
driven by a drunken motorist. 
      In other words, it is a lack of strategic foresight and accuracy in intelligence and execution, 
which are largely at fault, and not a lack of precision in the weapons system itself. One of the 
problems with these sources is their obvious bias and the use of conditional language. Their 
usefulness as serious research material, unfortunately, is therefore circumscribed by their own 
obvious agenda. While the Intercept and the McClatchy Report both have an obvious bias, they 
also provide a wealth of verifiable information. Care needs to be taken. However, in interpreting 
the data presented. 
     The lightweight design and the integrated circuitry of their avionics renders drones highly 
vulnerable to climatic conditions. There are many factors which can wreak havoc on these 
“fragile birds of prey,” which in turn could conceivably result in loss, destruction or even 
collateral damage if they come down in a populated area. There is no question that conditions 
such as weather, cloud cover, delays in transmission signals, and faulty components, can indeed 
limit the operation and efficiency of the platform. The components used in these aircraft are 
highly sensitive digitized materials and are susceptible to damage from the harsh environment in 
which they operate. This initial vulnerability is, however, misleading if considered in isolation. 
The fact is that any new technology requires a period of testing and application to be able to 
work out the possible systematic flaws. Given the real or imagined advantages offered by drone 
technology, they were rushed into the field of operations to provide immediate assistance prior to 
their having gone through rigorous field testing and evaluative examination.  
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     In other words, testing was basically measured by their performance in the field of operations. 
Is it any wonder, given these facts, that there would be a significantly higher number of accidents 
recorded? Another important and often overlooked element is that These factors will contribute 
to the negative performance reports relating to drones for the foreseeable future, until such time 
that the reported flaws can be detected, isolated, and improved upon. Once again, however, the 
errors are more likely attributable to external (satellite signal transmission), or human 
shortcomings in the ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance) process, 
rather than any inaccuracy of the platform and its components itself. Finally, technical problems 
are diminishing following this initial period of evaluation, evolution, and adaptation. 
     There exist counter-arguments to this position, concerning the accuracy of drones. These 
counter-arguments, however, rather paradoxically tend to support the position of the current 
research, rather than reduce its validity. This is due precisely to the fact that the shortcomings, 
noted by critics, most often revolve more around attribution blunders, such as a lack of coherent 
strategy or concrete intelligence estimates, rather than errors in the technology itself.  
     Early in the program, there were, also notable instances of pilot error. Some of this was 
related to a drastic reduction in training time due to a pressing need for pilots. McCurley, for 
instance, reported that “Over the years training has been trimmed. Pilots graduated barely 
qualified for combat, a stark contrast to the full program I had completed nearly two years 
before. The ever-increasing need for crews in combat justified these cuts. A crew’s first flight 
with their permanent squadron was in combat over a live target with live weapons. Spin-up 
happened on the fly, literally.”116 If indeed the axiom “practice makes perfect” holds true then 
such a failure, of adequate training and obvious neglect opened the door to substantial human 
error. Such errors and shortcomings should logically diminish over time. 
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     The McClatchy report gained valuable access to a large and rather complete number of 
intelligence reports and deduced that the drone campaign was in fact far less efficient than 
previously presented. Note. however, that they were referring to the shortcomings related to the 
prosecution of the campaign and not the performance of drones themselves. Thus, in a manner of 
speaking it was the cooks who spoiled the soup and not the soup itself. The report indicated that 
during the 12 months ending in September 2011, 43 of a total of 95 strikes were against non-al-
Qaeda elements. That is an average of 45%.  
     Mary Ellen O’Connell, arch-critic of drone doctrine outside the battlespace explains, “The 
United States began using weaponized drones to attack the border area between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,” and further that “Drone attacks by the U.S. in Pakistan began in 2004.”117 O’Connell 
further asserted that “These attacks resulted in the deaths of hundreds of unintended victims 
including children.”118 It must be emphasized in response to such assertions, however, that 
extreme caution must be exercised, with the use of such, unofficially unsubstantiated, statements, 
when putting forth specific numbers of civilian casualties.   
     We must also ask ourselves the question, does it automatically follow, that if there are 
“hundreds of victims,” we are automatically obliged to demonize or prohibit drones as a 
weapons platform worthy of consideration? Other armament systems also result in comparable, 
if not greater, numbers of victims. We come full circle to the tenuous objections raised 
concerning alleged asymmetrical “unfairness.” This issue shall be thoroughly investigated 
throughout the course of this work. These same arguments have historical antecedents which 
posed challenges to earlier forms of armament, including the crossbow, the tank, the submarine, 
and the machine gun—today it is the turn of the drone.  
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     This concern expressed by O’Connell is also echoed in an article by Christian Enemark, who 
underscores the difference in calculus between other forms of military technology and the risk 
posed to the operator “However, when a mode of killing is risk-free to the individual killer, it is 
worth asking whether or not “war: is going on at all.”119 Are unintended civilian casualties, 
however, not the unfortunate consequences of any armed conflict, regardless the weapon of 
choice?  Surely the incredibly accurate, “smart” surveillance technology and precision 
munitions, currently employed, serve to help reduce excessive civilian casualties. Elshtain 
concurred with this view and considered that such new and enhanced precision technology, 
“serves the ends of [target] discrimination.”120 The fact is that the target selection status (TSS) 
process within the designated weapons engagement zone (WEZ) is carefully monitored and 
tightly controlled prior to any targeting commands being issued. Despite these precautions, 
however, mistakes do occur; part of the inevitable fog of war.121 There are extensive procedures 
in place, both legal and operational, to comply with the laws of war. Additionally, the U.S. 
Military has adopted a complex system of calculation and goes to great lengths to ensure that any 
damage inflicted is proportional to any perceived military advantage to be gained in the targeting 
process.122 
     Such a lack of effectiveness can also raise issues, and criticism concerning the prosecution of 
the conflict and these have not always been exclusively from external sources. In 2006, for 
instance, there was a major flare-up between a ranking member of the Australian Defense Forces 
and a U.S. senior commander. The Australian officer, according to reports appeared to have 
witnessed extensive civilian casualties resulting from a U.S. land-based rocket strike, during 
Operation Mountain Thrust. The Australians claimed to have witnessed unmanned aerial footage 
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of numerous civilian causalities including children. The confrontation only became public in 
2009.123 
      If the numbers presented by O’Connell, which remain largely unsubstantiated, were indeed 
correct, then perhaps she might be justified in her assertion that the, “Most serious of all, 
perhaps, is the disproportionate impact of drone attacks. Fifty civilians killed for one suspected 
combatant killed is a textbook example of a violation of the proportionality principle.”124 It is 
important to recall, as indicated several times throughout this work, the proportionality principle 
in no way infers that a fight must be fair, or that each side has an equal chance at victory. The 
proportionality principle requires that an attack must be cancelled if the expected harm to 
civilians will be excessive to the anticipated military advantage gained.125 
    Such a definition may appear to be  rather vague; Since the relative value of a target is 
subjective. However this principle is clearly outlined in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. As far as the damage they incur is concerned, however, it is presumably far less 
than that inflicted by the two atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the 
firebombing of Dresden during WWII, or the carpet bombing that was a characteristic feature of 
the Vietnam conflict. Thus, when employed as a tactical platform, the magnitude of damage 
inflicted, is really a non-issue when speaking of drone warfare. 
     While the use of disproportionate force is illegal under international law, it is an extremely 
difficult concept to measure, in the modern battlespace. The ultimate proportionality calculus, 
when estimated in relation to intended military advantage, remains unquestionably with the 
judgment of the field commander according to the precepts of international humanitarian law. 
There do not appear to exist any legal or ethical barriers to the adoption and employment of this 
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new technology. While something may be legally and ethically acceptable, however, does not 
always imply that is necessarily wise. A primary objective of this research is to analyze and 
define the utility, boundaries, and limitations of this technology for its effective use in 
counterterrorism operations. 
     Armed drones have proven themselves, more selective in their targeting, more precise in their 
application and less destructive in their aftermath. As Brunstetter and Braun emphasize, “The 
point is that drones arguably cause less damage than the often unpredictable and destabilizing 
effects of large-scale uses of force.”126 If there have been shortcomings, they are more often 
related to intelligence failures, or questions of command, control, communications, and 
intelligence (C3I) rather than the accuracy of the given platform itself.   
     This became painfully evident in the October 2015 strike which mistakenly hit a hospital in 
the Kunduz region of Afghanistan, run by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF or Doctors Without Borders).  During this particularly deadly strike, 10 
patients died along with staff members, resulting in a total civilian casualty count of 42 dead. It 
is vitally important to point out here that, while critics use this raid and justifiably so, to 
condemn callous and inefficient targeting, this kinetic strike was conducted by a US AC-130 
gunship with a crew, and the failure was attributed to onboard sensor and communications 
failures, and human misjudgment. Making matters even worse the hospital had been observed for 
68 minutes prior to opening fire, and no hostile activity had been detected.127 It is entirely 
conceivable, that a similar error might have been avoided had a drone been employed in the case 
of the gunship.  
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     Despite the criticism which has been levied, the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, itself clearly 
reflects confidence in the enhanced capabilities of modern targeting platforms, “The extended 
range, capabilities, and accuracy of modern weapons systems (direct and indirect) and target 
acquisition systems make fires more lethal than ever before.”128 While such an insight is 
certainly enthusiastic, it must be borne in mind that lethality does not automatically equate with 
precision. Fortunately, in the case of drones both lethal capabilities and precision target 
acquisition have been combined within a single platform. 
Boots on the Ground 
As clarified earlier in this book, I have incorporated perspectives from my own actual 
participation in these zones of active combat. During my second deployment in 2011, at a 
forward operating base (FOB), in the Khost province of Afghanistan, close to the Pakistani 
border, our base was subjected to a constant barrage of mortar rounds by day and a steady regime 
of sniper attacks by night. Often the attackers would sneak across the long, porous border, attack 
and then immediately withdraw. A rather common insurgent tactic as espoused by Mao himself.  
     Our base was nestled in a valley at the base of the bleak, rocky foothills which rose to the 
surrounding mountains. Due to these geographic constraints, the base could only receive small 
takeoff and landing aircraft known as “STOLIES.” Upon our arrival, we were greeted by an 
insurgent welcoming committee, lobbing mortar rounds onto the runway. The young slightly 
overweight soldier, running next to me, was breathing heavily, his cheeks puffed out and flushed 
red with the exertion. I grabbed one of his bags as we dashed, for cover, either behind the Hesco 
barriers129 or in the nearest available hard shelter, accompanied by the “whoosh” of the falling 
mortar rounds. There was no time for second thoughts nor reflections on the wisdom of having 
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accepted this deployment. They were out there, and they were looking to kill us “so much for 
democracy,” I thought to myself. I was so tired and worn out by the time I got to my makeshift 
quarters that there could have been a Taliban suicide team, or a deadly krait (snake) under my 
bed and I would never have even noticed. Attacks were so frequent that we were only able to 
move about using small, shielded and colored hand lamps once night fell.  
     When it wasn’t mortars rounds it was Chinese Type 63, 107 mm rockets, or sniper fire. C.J. 
Chivers writing for The New York Times, in 2011 remarked that during what we referred to 
downrange as the “fighting season” (roughly the 6-month period between May and the end of 
October) there was a drastic increase in the number and volume of rocket attacks. These attacks 
took place in Paktika and Khost provinces which bordered the Waziristan region of Pakistan. 
Whereas in 2010, there had only been two such incidents during this period, there were 59 
attacks recorded in 2011.130  You always knew the distinct whistle of the 107 when you heard the 
call “incoming,” incoming!” over the loudspeakers. It was said that if you heard the tell-tale 
shriek of its whistle it was already too late, and you were finished, because you wouldn’t even 
have time to experience the detonation of the heavy explosive warhead (HE). There was some 
truth to this because I heard and saw their devastation up close. They pack a powerful punch and 
often passed right through the walls of our billets. 
     Whatever the source, it was called indirect fire (IDF). These attacks were often complemented 
by full-fledged “banzai-type” suicidal charges131 numbering 300 or more insurgents at a time, 
known as “Dragon Black’s.” Several cross-border incidents were of a significant magnitude 
involving heavy trucks laden with high explosives. The cumulative and incessant effect of these 
attacks was equivalent in intensity to that of a single large-scale attack, and perhaps, in some 
respects even more difficult to contend with. This appears to be the opinion of both Wettberg and 
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Dienstein as cited in Molier, however, Wettberg imposes a principle of “severe quantitative 
gravity, while Dienstein proposes a doctrine of accumulated events.” This caveat appears to be 
an effort to bridge the gap which currently exists between the cumulative and severity criteria.132 
 
The State’s Right to Self-Defense 
 The question of self-defense has a long lineage in international law. Grotius, himself pointed out 
the fact that, “”[t]he right of self-defence…has its origin directly, and chiefly, in the fact that 
nature commits to each his own protection.”133 There exists a difference of interpretation 
between what is considered a natural and inherent right and  the constraints of positive law.134 
This  is a reflection of the long-standing struggle to find an appropriate balance between 
international law and state power. It is difficult under such circumstances, as those described 
previously, to precisely determine what constitutes and qualifies the criteria of, imminent, 
overwhelming and grave danger, regardless of these being “mere” cross-border skirmishes. 
Things look much different when one is on the receiving end.  
     It is also worth noting that according to the decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua v. U.S. that, “The 
Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply 
to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, 
because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a 
mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.”135 Thus the scope and 
scale of the attacks do indeed have an impact on defining an action as an armed attack in the 
legal sense. In fact, the Court mentions and takes into consideration in its judgment the aspect of 
scale and effects. Unfortunately, the qualification of state attribution remains a sticking point. 
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     An alternative position, less frequently articulated, is the proposal to have a stronger 
enforcement mechanism framed within Article 51 (perhaps by the inclusion of an annex), 
guaranteeing the states’ absolute right to self-defense, regardless the source of aggression. Dill 
makes a worthwhile and balanced observation here worthy of consideration, “The best the 
international community can currently do to ensure that a state has a shot at truly and effectively 
winning a war in self-defence is to underwrite states’ Article 51 right with a promise to intervene 
on their behalf if their own defensive action in accordance with the logic of sufficiency proves 
ineffective in overcoming an aggressor militarily.”136 While this is certainly a reasonable and 
legitimate proposition, and also underscores the boundaries and limitations faced by states in the 
case of self-defense actions. A position the current geopolitical environment and the international 
legal framework fail to adequately address. 
    Regardless of the position adopted, concerning targeted killing and the use of armed drones, 
the primary obligation and principle function of any state remains that of delivering protection to 
its own civilian population.  This important principle also incorporated into the ICISS report,137 
cannot be emphasized strongly enough. This report, initially destined to enforce state 
responsibility for the respect of human rights toward its own citizens, by extension also raises the 
obligation of a State to provide protection against external agents as well. Moreover, it is a 
foundational principal—the “raison-d’être,” or the reason for a State’s very existence. This is not 
by any means a new perspective and is reflected in the Latin dictum: salus populi suprema lex 
esto, which roughly translates to: “The priority of good governance is the welfare of its 
people.”138 This sentiment was famously popularized by the father of the social contract, Thomas 
Hobbes, in his 17th-century masterpiece The Leviathan. 
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     The position adopted by this research is: yes, the state does indeed benefit from an inherent 
right to self-defense. However, the contours of that right must be clearly delineated and defined 
within specific parameters; parameters which ethically balance and respect both the inherent 
right and the spirit of restraint (not restriction). 
The international legal regime with regard to the use of interstate armed force, the so called ius 
ad bellum is primarily laid down in the UN-Charter. The most important rule of ius ad bellum is 
art. 2 par. 4 of the UN-Charter, which contains the prohibition on the use of armed force. In the 
next chapter we will take a closer look at the UN-Charter, in order to understand the current legal 
regime regarding the use of force.   
. Before questions relating to targeted killing, the use of armed drones, and even questions 
relating to illegal belligerent status and rendition can be addressed, the issue of anticipatory self-
defense and the justified use of state force must first be settled, since the latter flow from the 
former. The question of anticipatory self-defence also will be dealt with in the next chapter on 
legal considerations. 
Assassination, Treachery, and Perfidy? 
Some critics have equated the use of drones and targeted killing with assassination, treachery, 
and perfidy, which is prohibited according to the rules of jus in bello, such as The Hague 
Convention IV, Annex, Art 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2301-02. Questions of 
assassination, treachery, and perfidy (of which treacherous killing or assassination is merely one 
sort of perfidy) are by no means new to the laws of war. These criteria were previously 
examined, to a greater or lesser extent, in these erudite and seminal classics: Balthazar Ayala’s 
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De Jure et Oficiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari Libri III (1582),  Alberico Gentili’s De iure Belli 
Libre Tres (1612), Francisco Suárez’s, Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore, (1613), the much 
esteemed De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (revised edition of 1646), by Hugo Grotius, and 
Samuel von Pufendorf’s work (inspired by Hobbes and Grotius), De iure natura et gentium 
(1672), Emerich  de Vattel (1758) Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractum (The Law of 
Nations According to the Scientific Method, also heavily influenced by Grotius’s writings as 
well as those of Leibniz).  
     Cullen, counters such assertions and criticism, relating to targeted killing, by pointing out 
that, “Provided the manner of a targeted killing does not involve treachery or perfidy, it is not an 
illegal assassination under international law.”139 Injections, explosions and other forms of 
targeting are certainly within the realm of technological possibilities. The U.S. Department of 
Defense research agency DARPA has already developed robotic UAV insects such as a 
hummingbird. Any future modifications involving the legal perspectives related to the use of 
targeted killing should also necessarily include enhanced, and consistent legal and ethical 
training for commanders, operators, and legal staff as applicable under international 
humanitarian law. This aspect has been increasingly neglected and ignored. Part of this neglect 
stems from the ever-increasing complexity relating to the field. 
     Over the past, more balanced views and approaches have been proffered by such prolific 
scholars as Amos Guiora, Kenneth Anderson, and Peter Cullen. Guiora, while defending the 
rights to preserve national security and preemptive self-defense, also establishes precedents for 
well-defined targets and strategically measured response under international humanitarian law. 
While hotly contested, preemptive attacks (anticipatory self-defense), sometimes referred to as 
the “Bush Doctrine,” have gained increasing acceptance, notably by Israel and Russia, as well as 
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in the case of humanitarian and so-called pro-democratic interventions. Their ethical legitimacy 
and legal justification, however, particularly in these latter cases, rests upon shaky footing and is 
far more questionable. 
 Striking a Balance 
One of the major ethical dilemmas posed by many critical thinkers is the view that enhanced 
technology lowers associated risk factors and thus, inadvertently, opens the path to warfare and 
provides a greater propensity for resorting to armed intervention as the sole recourse to conflict 
resolution. This is also the primary thrust and assertion adopted by the present research. Rosa 
Brooks, writing for Foreign Policy magazine, in 2012, echoed these sentiments, “…By lowering 
or disguising the costs of lethal force, their availability can blind us to the potentially dangerous 
longer-term consequences of our strategic choices.”140  This theme has also reverberated 
consistently throughout numerous sources consulted during the current research.  
     Benjamin Friedman repeatedly echoes these assumptions, “Even the most avowed fans of 
drone strikes should admit that by lowering cost, they preempt debate and make killing easier,” 
and he depicts the consequences of this as “a problem for democracy.”141 Radsan and Murphy 
additionally conclude that “The lower ‘costs’ of drone strikes, however, encourage governments 
to resort to deadly force more quickly…”142 While such support does tend to attest to the relative 
validity of the perception, the assertion has not, as yet, been empirically proven. 
      Evidence to support such a viewpoint is, however, increasingly strong, as reflected by an 
ever-expanding area of drone-related operations, in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Syria (possibly Mali and the Philippines as well) more recently Niger, and elsewhere. 
One brake on this reflexive response to conflict resolution is held forth by adherence to the tents 
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of Just War Theory. Esther D. Reed, for example, astutely notes that “[…] JWT [Just War 
Theory] resists premature militarization of a problem that might be dealt with by other means 
[such as diplomacy or sanctions].”143 Of course, such a supposition is dependent upon the proper 
enforcement mechanisms, which, for the present at least, remain weak or nonexistent. 
Furthermore, sanctions and diplomatic pressure hold little promise and exercise negligible 
impact upon transregional and transnational theoterrorist organizations. 
     Confirmation of this “escalation theory” was also apparent in the use of a US predator drone 
to attack Libyan, Colonel Gaddafi’s fleeing convoy. While attempting to escape he was targeted, 
first by a predator which let loose with several AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, followed up by a 
salvo of 500 lb. Paveway bombs, or AASM munitions, from French jets just for good 
measure.144  
     It is a torturous mental exercise to understand the legal nuances which would permit such 
selective interpretations of IHL and IHRL. If this well-orchestrated assassination does not 
qualify under the heading of treachery and perfidy, then little else will either. This was, for all 
intents and purposes, a high-tech, political assassination conducted upon a fleeing sovereign head 
of state. This event established a disturbing precedent where a blind eye was turned, in favor of 
political expedience sponsored by international collusion under the feigning legitimacy of 
NATO. While such actions may have been legally sanctioned, they were, nevertheless ethically 
questionable at best. The reign of anarchy and violent chaos which currently prevails in Libya 
today bears sad testimony to a failed military intervention in the name of “humanitarian” 
intervention and “peaceful” international relations. 
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     The real crux of the problem has been the advent of what I have taken the liberty of defining 
as laissez-faire geopolitics.145 There has been an increased prevalence by the United States, in its 
position as the unipolar military hegemon, to serve as judge, jury, and executioner in the 
arbitration of international conflicts. There have been unparalleled, breaches of sovereignty, even 
if at times justified in the light of events, and a failure to respect standard diplomatic protocols. 
Much as with laissez-faire economics, laissez-faire geopolitics also carries the warning of caveat 
emptor 
     Michael Byers underscores the manipulative character that political influence currently 
exercises upon modern international law, “Whenever the US government wishes to act in a 
manner that is inconsistent with existing international law, its lawyers regularly and actively seek 
to change the law.”146 Importantly though, not only do lawyers seek to change the law, they also 
attempt to reinterpret it as well. There is a distinct failure to follow the rule of customary 
international law and accountability and to summarily execute heads of state without the slightest 
sense of due process. Much of this has been accomplished using this new and powerful 
technology we refer to as drones. The Libyan case study offers us insights into the more far-
reaching dimensions of drones when used as a strategy for the extension of political power. 
     In other additional developments, The Guardian newspaper reported that during July 2015, 
US forces attacked, Muhsin al-Fadhli, thought to be the operational leader of the radical 
Khorasan group. He was reported as having been killed in the strike, following false reports of 
his death in 2014.  As might be expected, he was automatically qualified as a high value target 
(HVT), since attaching such a stigma automatically legitimizes the targeted killing . The attack 
on the Khorasan group itself, however, was justified by the US Government as a form of 
individual and collective self-defence. In its letter to the Security Council Samantha Power, the 
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then permanent representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stated that: 
“ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, but also to many other 
countries, including the United States and our partners in the region and beyond. States must be 
able to defend themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defence, as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, when, as is the case here, 
the government of the State where the threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use 
of its territory for such attacks. (…). In addition, the United States has initiated military actions 
in Syria against al-Qaida elements in Syria known as the Khorasan Group to address terrorist 
threats that they pose to the United States and our partners and allies.”147 
 
     Since there didn’t seem to be a direct threat to the United States this seems to be a very 
expanded interpretation of the right of self-defence of art. 51 of the UN-Charter by the United 
States government. This increasing violation of sovereignty, in cases where national self-defense 
does not seem to be the real issue, raises the question of whether international rules pertaining to 
sovereignty still apply?  Established norms do not always follow state practice, however, if state 
practice deviates from established universal norms, then state practice must change, and the 
offending state should subsequently be held accountable for such violations. Unfortunately, there 
has been a marked decrease in the respect of sovereignty and a failure to both respect and 
enforce this norm. This question is inextricably linked to the problem of dealing with 
transnational sub-state actors and the inability or lack of desire of certain “failed” states to 
exercise executive power within the confines of their own borders. “The principle of sovereignty 
lies at the heart of the safe haven challenge, defining how and when the US can legitimately 
target and destroy terrorists in foreign territory,” Peritz and Rosenbach point out.148  This may 
not appear a significant problem, yet such unbridled disregard for national sovereignty touches 
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upon the very cornerstone of diplomacy and international law, regarding respect for the rights of 
nations, first established under the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Simply put, how can one profess 
to defend the legitimacy of international laws and sanctions, while simultaneously contravening 
these selfsame principles?  
     The major problem here is one of increasing semantic and political manipulation. Through the 
application of a thin veneer proclaiming military intervention in the name of humanitarian relief 
operations, a false sense of legitimacy is afforded to governments, whose underlying concerns 
are in advancing their own vested national interests, while conveniently overlooking the Just War 
principle of last resort.  According to the literature and current perceptions, last resort is seen as a 
later development—a non-predominant feature—and was not one of the cornerstones of Just War 
Theory.149  Writing for the Brookings Institute, Roberta Cohen, highlighted this move toward the 
diminished respect for sovereignty, in the face of humanitarian disasters. Cohen cited the 
example of, “former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar who made the observation in 
1991, ‘We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards 
the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers 
and legal documents.’”150  Granted this balance between the tensions of humanitarian relief and 
the respect of national sovereignty is a difficult one to strike. Increasingly, however, there has 
been a tendency to rely solely upon rapid military intervention as a “silver bullet” solution. 
Oftentimes, true humanitarian necessity comes as an afterthought, if at all. The failure to 
establish a meaningful civil society and the corresponding mismanagement in the wake of the 
incursion of Iraq, being a case in point.  
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     Drones, in their relationship to the laws of war, are merely one symptom of a much larger 
problem. We are blinded by our own “brilliance” and are out of step with the reality of modern 
warfare.  
     We  need to address and redefine the issues of sovereignty, targeted killing, the concept of 
imminence, and the use of multifaceted technology in warfare. Such a comprehensive 
restructuring of the traditional model would require monumental effort and willpower on the part 
of all states.  
     This is largely due to the unfortunate and inherent complexities of international relations (or 
the lack thereof, relations that is). The larger the group, the greater the divergence. Elshtain also 
concurs that “The fog of politics grows thicker and less penetrable when states whose cultures 
are alien to each other try to interact.”151 While this is one possible solution to creating a more 
balanced, legitimate and more humanitarian approach to modern warfare, the current power 
imbalance and a distinct lack of political willpower seem to preclude such changes, at least for 
the present.  
     Nevertheless, until the voices calling out in the wilderness are heeded, we shall face an 
erosion of legitimacy, increased chaos, and wide-spread anarchy. This topic, albeit worthy of 
serious research, is beyond the scope of this current work, which is limited to examining the use 
and limitations of UCAVS in relation to theoterrorism. Strong international condemnations 
combined with effective sanctions and commitment to enforce are the only response to unilateral 
violations. The essential point should be: either the law is the law, equally applicable, for all or 
it is not the law for any.  
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     Barring a remodeling or restructuring of the current framework of international laws of war 
we are forced to seek alternative measures to address our immediate concerns. One positive, 
promising, and relatively painless proposal was presented recently by Amos Guiora, who 
proposed the establishment of a “drone court.” This would be structurally similar to the already 
existing courts established under the Federal Intelligence Security Act of 1978 (FISA, and 
related amendments) established for the authorization and oversight of electronic surveillance. 
The function of such a court would be the oversight and authorization of specifically designated 
targets for attack by drones. Such a mechanism would help enhance transparency and legitimacy 
in the eyes of the world and reduce much of the speculation and widespread condemnation to 
which the U.S. drone campaign is currently subjected. Additionally, such an institution would 
restore appropriate checks and balances which are currently missing.  
     As Guiora astutely points out, “…there would need to be significant restrictions on when 
targeted killings would be deemed justified, including narrow definitions of an imminent threat 
and legitimate target.”152 In a similar vein, Murphy and Radsan conclude, “… that under 
Boumediene, the executive has a due process obligation to develop fair, rational procedures for 
its use of targeted killing no matter whom it might be targeting anywhere in the world. To 
implement this duty, the executive should, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Israel 
(among others), require an independent, intra-executive investigation of any targeted killing by 
the CIA.”153 We will examine this question in further detail in the body of this research. 
Comparatively, the proposal by Guiora, seems more ethically appealing, whereas the intra-
executive arrangement advanced Murphy and Radsan, would leave itself open to manipulation 
and abuse from an already overly powerful and largely unfettered executive branch.       
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     Concerning the establishment of the proposed drone court above, a few important factors 
need to be taken into consideration. First, while it is indeed an interesting and laudable project, 
which would ensure much-needed transparency, the proposed court as laid out by Guiora and 
Brand, would be constituted solely of US judges. The problem here is that the use of drones has 
taken on an international character and their armed interventions are rarely if ever conducted at 
the national level. Further, Blum and Heymann argue against the establishment of such a court 
on pragmatic grounds, “Such mechanisms need not involve external judicial review; judges are 
neither well situated nor do they have the requisite expertise to authorize or reject an operation 
on the basis of intelligence reports.”154 Such assumption could, however, easily be overcome by 
having trained advisors inform the judiciary as to the pertinent facts involved and indicating the 
grounds for necessity. Additionally, this would offer a greater sense of legitimacy to the overall 
tactic when it is employed. 
     In such circumstances, the proposed court could serve as a safeguard against overreach and 
runaway decision-making which had been the wont of the previous administration’s executive 
branch. By the same token, it would, at the same time, overlook the rights of other states 
involved in the targeting process. The danger to the establishment of such a court is that it would 
necessarily have US interests at heart and would run the risk of being commandeered by the 
executive function much as drones themselves were. 
      Questions involving the legitimacy of the decision-making process concerning the targeting 
of foreign nationals and that of individual state sovereignty would need to be fully explored and 
addressed by such a court. Such a court, while it might serve, national interests, would perhaps 
fall short concerning the vested interests of other members of the international community. One 
possible solution to this would be to fold national drone courts into a more representative 
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international organization, such as the UN, or the ICJ (given US hostility toward the ICC). Such 
an international body could then be concerned not merely with aerial drones, but also serve as an 
ethical and judicial instrument for evaluating the legitimacy, use, and application of any robotic, 
or indeed any new weapons and intelligence gathering systems.  Such a suggestion is, however, 
predicated upon the supposition that drone warfare takes on and bears the mantle of a national 
strategic approach to future conflict resolution.  
     One targeted, yet misplaced response prior to the Guiora and Brand proposal was advanced 
by Neal K. Katyal, in 2013, in The New York Times opinion section. Katyal, who successfully 
pleaded the Hamdan v Rumsfeld case (striking down President Bush’s use of military tribunals in 
Guantanamo), suggested the same type of structural framework as that laid out by Guiora and 
Brandt, but housed directly within the executive branch itself. Such an imperceptive suggestion 
would miss the point. It would defeat the entire purpose of the proposal, by Guiora and Brand 
that of retaining autonomy from executive overreach. Both Guiora and Brand seem to have 
picked up on this shortcoming in their pertinent analysis. 
Summary 
The previous chapter was both exceedingly long and complex. I shall, therefore, attempt here to 
summarize the contents as clearly and succinctly as possible, highlighting the central points of 
these important themes. This chapter served as an introductory view, laying the foundations to 
the chapters which are to follow. We initially began the chapter by examining and discussing the 
four central motivations behind the adoption of robotic aircraft for targeted killing missions. 
These motivations consisted of the strategic and political aspects of drones and targeted killing; 
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the legal aspects; The economic components, and finally the ethical, moral, social, and 
psychological elements involved. 
     We examined the relative advantages and disadvantages of the use of robotic aircraft, or 
drones, from a purely political and strategic perspective. It was noted that when used as a 
constrained tactic, rather than a full-fledged strategy, that drones could serve as an effective 
response to asymmetric forces. We also recognized the danger of their alluring siren call, due to 
their expediency, lack of friendly casualties, and the possibility they afford for plausible 
deniability.  
     The topic of respect for sovereignty was broached and the balance between rights and 
responsibilities according to the international relations paradigm was also considered. We 
witnessed that the previous Obama administration had succumbed to the facility of selecting 
drones and targeted killing as their overarching strategy in response to terrorism. Far from 
curbing or stemming the tide of terrorism, they may have unwittingly contributed to its further 
spread. 
     A rather unique consideration was the introduction of the concept of the drama of small 
numbers. According to this view I proposed that smaller numbers of casualties were easier for 
the public to focus upon and relate to—on a personal and visceral level, rather than larger less 
impersonal events composed of nameless and featureless victims. Anyone who recalls the impact 
behind the now famous image of the Saigon chief of police, as he executed his handcuffed 
Vietcong prisoner, in1968, will also recall that the image made a powerful contribution to ending 
that war.  This example underscores both the power of the media to influence events and the 
drama of small numbers, regardless if those involved are innocent or guilty.  
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     It became evident that the U.S. Government and the Obama administration, despite its 
international popularity, eventually came under fire for their increasing reliance upon employing 
drones as a strategy, rather than using them as they were intended to be used; as a tactic. In some 
respects, the reliance of drones played into the hands of the terrorists who were able to employ 
4GW propaganda tactics and manipulate such strikes to their own benefit. Careful manipulation 
of numbers and images at frequently inaccessible target sites, were carefully diffused to depict 
exaggerated numbers of civilian casualties. 
     The complex legal issues, both under domestic and international law, surrounding the use of 
robotic warfare, were considered. We began the discussion with an examination of the now-
flawed near certainty standard. We also saw that certain states had a Janus-faced nature or were 
duplicitous in their dealings. There was a striking contrast between what they stated and what 
they permitted behind the scenes. Part of the problem related to this duplicity was the fact that a 
good portion of the coalition intelligence, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT) was being 
transmitted by the host nations, and those nations had vested interests in the outcomes.  
     While legal constraints and the limits of enforcing international law remain weak and 
uncertain at best, there is nevertheless an interest, on the part of the states employing robotic 
warfare, to respect the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and attempt to do so in a responsible 
manner. Excessive or indiscriminate force would, at least theoretically, jeopardize their standing 
in the world community of nation states. Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for a 
country attempting to portray and instill democratic values, to thrive, were they not to adhere to 
such values themselves.  
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     Many of the legal and strategic principles behind the combat against terrorism, targeted 
killing and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles were initially justified by the now time-worn 
AUMF agreement, which we briefly considered. The legal debate is one of the most complex 
and contentious issues concerning these developments and they are examined more fully in 
chapter VII. It was suggested that a newer, more radical approach to dealing with transnational 
armed conflict required new thinking and quite possible new legislation. 
     The economic facet of drone warfare was presented. Again, the advantages, or seeming 
advantages, and the disadvantages were presented and carefully weighed against one another. 
The economic element, it was explained, is closely related to Just-War Theory, since this aspect, 
by necessity, enters in the calculus of waging armed conflict. Force reductions and sequestration 
were considered, as were various strategies intended to balance the research and development 
(R&D) costs of robotic research. Sales to foreign countries, one possible solution, it was shown 
needs to be balanced by concerns for long term security. 
     The research delved into the convoluted aspects of the ethical, moral, social and 
psychological perspectives involved in the long-standing conflict against terror. We began this 
segment by examining assassination and the ostensible public anathema towards that practice. It 
became apparent that any misgivings could, however, be easily and rapidly quashed and 
sacrificed in the name of expedience and under the guise of humanitarian intervention 
     The long-term and far reaching social and psychological effects of killing by distance were 
raised. We considered the work and contributions of Grossman. While, drones appeared to be an 
ideal and harmless solution, at least for those operating these machines, it soon became apparent 
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that there were many residual, unintended secondary effects which have only recently begun to 
manifest themselves. 
     In the segment Ethics, vs., Morals, vs., Ethics, the difference between morality and ethics was 
raised. While many scholars make no distinction between these two states, it was the opinion of 
the current research that there are indeed differences. Far from being a simple question of 
semantics, they do matter in influencing our perspective. We presented a model examining their 
similarity and their differences and this particularly as it related to the decision-making process. 
In a related vein, we discussed the increasingly common and misleading phenomenon of cultural 
relativism. The close relationship between ethics, morality and law was raised and fully 
examined. 
    The question of imprecision in targeting was brought up. The current situation is exceedingly 
unclear with parties on both sides of the debate declaring vast discrepancies in their findings. 
Many of the numbers reported by interested parties remain suspect. What was apparent is the fact 
that, given all possible alternatives the drone strikes are far more accurate and less damaging, 
overall, than any other weapons system currently employed. The only possible less lethal 
approach is, of course, direct military intervention. This is a less viable option, however, as it 
would inevitably result in unnecessary casualties, and reduce the possibility of success. 
      Related, to targeting precision, is the important question of collateral damage and the 
proportionality calculus. It was shown that by comparing various available weapons platforms 
that the drone is both stealthy and efficient in its conduct of combat missions. The fact is that any 
lack of precision in targeting is more likely due to ancillary considerations such as a failure of 
intelligence, rather than the fault of the weapons system itself. We saw that given the pressing 
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need for introducing these robotic weapons in service that the shortcomings had to be coped with 
as an evolutionary process. This technological evolution is complimented by constant 
enhancements and improvements in avionics, optics, and missile guidance systems. This has led 
to even greater efficiency and precision. 
      . There are some scholars and jurist who consider the drone as a unique phenomenon 
changing the actual face of modern warfare, while others, this research included, consider them 
as merely another military weapons system. Despite such observations, their employment is but 
one facet of a new type of warfare, a type labeled fourth generation warfare or 4GW by Thomas 
X. Hammes. It is precisely this multivariate phenomenon, which requires reordering and 
regulation through the means of new and improved legislation. It may seem contradictory at first 
blush to declare these robotic systems as tactical weapons platforms and then turn around and 
call for them to be regulated. Clarification is therefore required. Such proposed regulation is 
geared toward a host concerns outside the actual theatres of military operations.  
     The question of collateral damage and noncombatant deaths was discussed. We learned that 
while regrettable, noncombatant deaths are, and have always been a part of the “fog of war.” 
While everything must be done to avoid and ensure that civilian casualties are not excessive, in 
comparison with military advantage gained. According to international humanitarian law, that 
calculus and the ultimate decision-making, however, rests firmly with the commander in the 
field. It was pointed out that the figures, concerning noncombatant casualties, being bandied 
about are often suspect and can even be manipulated to support any number of agendas. 
     The small segment, “Boots on the Ground,” relating to service in the combat zones of Iraq 
and Afghanistan were intended to contribute a “downrange” perspective. The reality of being in 
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a war zone tends to provide a firsthand understanding of many of the ideas and topics that are 
being discussed. Being caught up in the clutches of an armed conflict one quickly realizes that it 
is a messy dirty business and there is little place or time for indulgence in misplaced rhetoric 
when survival is at stake.  
           In the section relating to assassination, treachery and perfidy, consideration was given to 
the historical foundations and associated legislation. The various strength of the various 
normative proscriptions against such practices were examined. We learned that what had once 
been a strong norm against the practice of assassination, may have in fact weakened. 
      The final section of this chapter dealt with striking a balance. This balance refers to several 
different aspects of armed conflict, national security, and geopolitical relations. The balance, in 
question, focused upon the tensions between the rights of state self-defense and military 
intervention, but also the balance between individual freedoms and the maintenance of national 
security imperatives. We spoke of the measured restraint required between the alternatives for 
conflict resolution. One of the core hypotheses of this research was reiterated; that the seductive 
allure provided by robotic warfare will continue to override and erode the resort to other, less 
reactive forms of conflict resolution. The balance between the rights and responsibilities relating 
to national sovereignty were examined as were the eventual consequences of the unjustified 
breach of those rights. The phenomenon of humanitarian intervention was analyzed. The danger 
that interventions in the name of humanitarian assistance might serve to circumvent the 
restrictions of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter were also evaluated. In other words, there is a 




     Part of the equation in striking a reasonable balance, regarding the resort to armed conflict, 
resides in the very real need to address and redefine the issues of sovereignty, targeted killing, 
the concept of imminence, the use of multifaceted technology in warfare. It was posited that, 
strong international condemnations combined with effective sanctions and commitment to 
enforce are the only response to unilateral violations.  A fundamental consideration was that: 
either the law is the law, equally applicable, for all or it is not the law for any. 
     The promising model for creating a” drone court,” at the national level, was proposed by both 
Guiroa and Brand. The advantages, disadvantages and problems associated with establishing 
such an institution were presented for scrutiny. It was pointed out that one of the most significant 
problems facing the establishment of such a court would be the safeguards guaranteeing its 








“Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime.”  
― Ernest Hemingway . Introduction "Treasury for the Free World" by Ben Raeburn. (1946). 
 _________________________________ 
“The question is not its success—it is its lawfulness.” 




Rules, Regulations and Guidelines 
Regardless the legal perspective adhered to, or particular position adopted, in regard to the law, 
the assertion advanced by Stephen C. Neff that war and law have always exercised a reciprocal 
influence upon one another, remains perhaps one of the few uncontested and enduring facts 
relating to that unique partnership.155 Once a thorough examination of the available literature has 
been completed, then the best elements from various poles can perhaps be melded into a more 
reasonable, cohesive and centralized approach for developing a deeper understanding and a more 
adequate application.  
     The following sections offer a deeper, more probing analysis and build upon previous, 
foundational insights.  As discussed, there are many fundamental rules, regulations, and 
guidelines which apply to armed conflict in general. Despite these rules, there have been few 
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concrete precisions regarding the questions of transnational terrorism and semiautonomous 
aircraft; such as drones and unmanned systems. These international customary and conventional 
laws, regarding warfare, define the different reasons and justifications for commencing an armed 
conflict (jus ad bellum), the method in which that conflict is conducted once it has been initiated 
(jus in bello), as well as the aspects of conduct and responsibilities in a post-conflict environment 
(jus post bellum).  
      Within a legal context, as far as the use of drones is concerned, there exist two aspects that 
need to be considered. The first is jus ad bellum or the reasons and justifications for entering 
warfare. This concern only applies peripherally to drones when they are employed in a strategic 
sense. The second framework, which is more applicable, is the jus in bello humanitarian concept 
of how war is to be conducted. Of course, during the post-conflict phase, that of jus post bellum, 
the use of drones is of marginal concern. These two previous frameworks will be examined 
individually since each represents a unique school of thought separate from the other. It should 
be emphasized that the body of law relating to jus ad bellum principles have only very limited 
application concerning the types of armament employed, and these concerns are largely the 
domain of jus in bello and conventional law.  
     Worth noting also is the fact that both these bodies of international law are found as 
theoretical and philosophical foundations of the Just War Theory. It is therefore difficult to 
precisely define where the theory ends, and the law begins, except when the conflicts in question 
have been passed on judicially at the international level such as the well-documented cases of 




The Legal Framework 
 Mary Ellen O’Connell, however, contends that, “The view that the world does not have up-to-
date rules for responding to terrorism and other contemporary challenges is simply incorrect.”156 
While this statement by O’Connell, may, in fact, be true, it is also somewhat misleading.  
     The world may indeed have rules concerning the use of force and the conduct of armed 
conflict; however, they are obsolete and ill-adapted to the current criteria of asymmetric warfare, 
transnational armed conflict, and transnational terrorism. They were initially designed to address 
a traditional model of organized state militaries in international armed conflict and were later 
amended, during the period of colonial struggles of independence, to incorporate non-
international armed conflict (NIAC).  
     There do, in fact, exist specific laws and guidelines related to the concept of self-defense with 
regard to violent non-state actors. We shall examine these various guidelines, which will also be 
applicable, in varying degrees, to the question of targeted killing and the use of armed drones for 
the prosecution of legitimate targets. There are, nevertheless, several consistent and perplexing 
aspects relating to the application of these different legal principles and we shall examine these 
over the course of the following pages. 
      There are drastic differences in interpretation, which lead to widely varying perspectives; 
differences which are rarely resolved. Another significant hindrance, to the proper application of 
these laws, is the failure to obtain universal recognition, acceptation, adherence, and enforcement 
by all states 
The lack of enforcement power is a significant hindrance to the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the international legal regime. 
103 
 
Laws, treaties, and international covenants are important for establishing the foundations, which 
define international ethical and normative standards. Unfortunately, these conventions and 
treaties mean absolutely nothing if they are not backed by effective mechanisms of enforcement. 
      Elshtain cites the Soviet Union’s continued biological weapons development—despite 
having signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, as a prime example and rightly 
concedes, “The evidence by now is pretty clear that various treaties and conventions often 
provide a cover behind which determined states go forward with whatever they want to do.”157 
The same observation applies in regards to various resolutions passed by the United Nations 
Security Council, which are frequently violated or ignored completely.  
      One clear example was the passage of Resolutions 1054 (April 26, 1996) and 1070 (August 
16. 1996),158 in response to an assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. 
These resolutions were intended to apply strong pressure on Sudan, in response to harboring 
terrorists and sponsoring terrorist acts. Micha Zenko points out that while these specific 
Resolutions were intended to curb Sudanese behavior, they had absolutely no effect since few 
states bother to properly implement and respect them.159  In addition to these previously cited 
examples, there is an extensive historical record of other well-documented violations. Anthony 
Clark Arend asserts that “Given this historical record of violations, it seems very difficult to 
conclude that the charter framework is truly controlling of state practice, and if it is not 
controlling, it cannot be considered to reflect existing international law. “160 The  logic associated 
with such an assertion raises a problem and needs to be nuanced. While there exists a penal code 
for theft, murder assault and so forth, these crimes continue to be perpetrated, however, few 
would consider suggesting that such laws be abolished. What Arend is really emphasizing here is 
the fact that the Charter framework is far less effective than we would like it to be. 
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     Colonel Peter M. Cullen, another proponent for change, states that “The ongoing U.S. 
campaign against terrorism does not fit neatly into the existing system on the use of force in 
international law.”161  Fortunately, however, there exist many laws, guidelines, rules, and 
regulations which could serve as a springboard for the possible formation of newer and more 
serious protocols. These precepts are examined more closely in this research.  
     The current state of legal doctrine and the rapidly changing face of the globalized world, offer 
very little in the way of a clear and succinct definition, concerning the right to self-defense and 
the use of preemption, or first strike doctrine. “Nations perceive the threat of armed aggression 
differently, and international law has not attempted to codify precisely the circumstances that 
justify the use of force in self-defense,” comments Roger Scott.162 While the author makes a 
valid point, it also is somewhat misleading. There is an entire body of case law surrounding the 
use of force in self-defense. From customary law, such as the Carolina Case, to article 51 of the 
of the UN-Charter, self-defense and the use of force have been spelled out. The author is, 
however, correct that there is no uniform body of coherent law which addresses this subject and 
it remains a gray area which would benefit greatly from clarification, elucidation, and 
codification. The case law which does exist, both its application and shortcomings, is detailed in 
the following sections. 
    In terms of self-defense under international law, regarding the use of legitimate and justified 
force against the violent non-state actor, there are several protocols which constitute the current 
overarching legal framework. These include Articles 2(4), 39, 42, 51 of the UN-Charter; The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38 (1) notably §§ b, d.  We will examine 




There exist two bodies of law, which together constitute what is referred to as international law. 
A distinction is made between public international law, which refers to the law of nations and 
private international law, which refers to commercial affairs. Our focus is upon the former; 
public international law (PIL), also referred to as international law (IL). This latter terminology, 
that of international law, shall be adopted throughout this research.  
     IL is further subdivided into several other distinct bodies of law as well—including those of 
international criminal law, international human rights law, international refugee law, 
international environmental law, and international humanitarian law (IHL). International 
humanitarian law is also referred to as the law of armed conflict (LOAC), or more simply, the 
law of war. The International Red Cross (ICRC) also points out the core principle that 
“International humanitarian law, or jus in bello, is the law that governs the way in which warfare 
is conducted (my emphasis).”163 Our focus shall be largely upon customary and conventional 
law, which together comprise IHL. The laws and rules encompassed under what is commonly 
referred to as international customary law, are separate and distinct from those of treaty law, or 
conventional law.  
     International law traces its philosophical and ethical origins back to the days of early 
Christian theologians, such as St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Their views 
having also been influenced by earlier Greek and Roman philosophers. Additionally, 
international law was further refined by later medieval scholars of renown such as Alberico 
Gentili, Balthasar de Ayala, and Hugo Grotius. Secularized international humanitarian law, was 
created from the earlier seeds of Christian moral thought. International humanitarian law (IHL), 
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or the law of war, a subset of international law, was further developed and refined through the 
customary practices and the subsequent creation of international treaties, such as the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648 (the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück), The Hague Treaties of (1899 & 
1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906, 1929, and 1949).  
     As far as the Additional Protocols I, II, (1977) and III (2005) of the Geneva Conventions are 
concerned, although they are in fact a part of international law,  many states, such as the U.S., 
Israel, and much of Southeast Asia have failed ratify them are not party to them and are thus not 
bound by their terms. An important feature relating to human shielding (hostages) is addressed 
and terrorism may be found as a new addition within this Protocol. Specifically, Article 4(2) of 
Additional Protocol II, (Part II) of the section which deals with humane treatment clarifies that: 
 
Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the 
persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever: (a) Violence to the life, health and physical or 
mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment 
such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; (b) Collective 
punishments; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of terrorism…164 
 
Author Michael Byers, writing on the ethical aspects of warfare, began his interesting research 
with a rather inaccurate description relating to the regulating of armed conflict.  The author 
rather misleadingly states that “Historically speaking, legal rules on the use of military force are 
a relatively recent development. Prior to the adoption of the UN-Charter in 1945, international 
law was conceived in strictly consensual terms during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries: countries were only bound by those rules to which they had agreed, either through the 
conclusion of a treaty or through a consistent pattern of behavior that, over time gave rise to what 
is referred to as ‘customary international law.’”165  Strictly speaking, this is not entirely correct, 
since there were many other precedents that had already set the stage for the codification of the 
laws of war, notably: The Lieber code of 1863, The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field first adopted in 1864, and 
later amended and replaced by the versions of 1906 and 1929 before arriving at its final form in 
1949; The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (which in fact form one half of IHL), the Saint. 
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, renouncing the use of explosive projectiles under 400grams, and 
so on. Thus, it is understandable, if somewhat misleading to assume that the UN charter, while 
significant, represented a watershed of unparalleled historic proportions. 
     Below is a schematic depiction drawn and developed from the most recent version of the U.S. 
Army Judge Advocate General’s Law of Armed Conflict DESKBOOK, as it is presented and 
taught to military lawyers. It is immediately apparent that The Hague Conventions, customary 
law, and the Geneva Conventions, play a major role in shaping policy and determining the 




International customary law, itself, like many other facets of law and ethics, is widely disputed 
concerning its precise composition, however, it is generally accepted that it is composed of two 
parts. The first is consistent state practice while the second, opinio juris 166 is the consideration 
by the state that is bound or obligated to adherence. The psychological component involved in 
opinio juris includes a rational evaluation of the risks and benefits. This can also be termed as 
psychological compliance and as Janina Dill so aptly asserted in her work, “Compliance is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition of IL’s [international law’s] effectiveness.”167 
Additionally, there is a distinct difference, that is not immediately obvious, that needs to be 
Fashioned after:  Di Meglio J.A., LTC Richard P, et al. Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook: 2012. Edited by MAJ William J. 
Johnson, & MAJ Andrew D. Gillman. Charlottesville, Virginia: International and Opertional  Law Department. The United 
States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2014. (Based upon and modified from the original). 
 
         Figure 2 © James P. Welch 2018. 
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considered; the difference between this sense of obligation and the underlying normative desires. 
They are two entirely different constructs. It does not automatically follow, for instance, that the 
requirement to behave in a certain way is founded upon a desire to do so.168 Thus, we see that 
there exist psychologically constraining obligations relating to opinio juris. 
    According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the definition of customary international 
law is laid out in Chapter 1, Article 38(1)(b) which describes it as "evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.”169  Which stipulates: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states [invoking the legal principle of 
pacta sunt servanda];  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.170 
 
These customary “laws” most often become legitimized through lex scripta or conventional law 
(treaty law)—the establishment of international treaties and protocols, (governed by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969), but also by persistent practice and 
implementation.  It is important to point out, however, that customary law and conventional law 
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should not be considered identical. The further we move away from conventional law and 
written instruments the weaker the application and the adherence becomes. 
     Anthony Clark Arend confirms that the validation of customary law occurs with the 
convergence of practice and acceptance as a defining rule, “...when there was both a near 
universal practice and a belief that the practice was required by law.”171  David Jayne Hill 
writing in the introduction to the 1901 translated edition of Hugo Grotius’s Rights of War and 
Peace also underscores this vision of the concept of state practice, “There are CUSTOMS of 
nations as well as a universally accepted law of nature, and it is in this growth of practically 
recognized rules of procedure that we trace the evolution of law international—jus inter gentes—
as a body of positive jurisprudence.”172 One core problem with these rules is that they were 
originally designed for traditional international warfare between states, and  limited or no 
provisions to address contemporary conflicts, such as  warfare that is conducted in the military, 
religious, political and economic spheres simultaneously by transnational non-state actors (often 
referred to as fourth generation warfare (4GW,).173 To compound matters even further, there 
exists a tension between the rights of states under said customary law, concerning the right to 
state self-defense, and the limitations imposed by treaty law such as that ensconced within 
Article 51 if the UN-Charter.  
     Orakhelashvili underscores the ongoing critical debate that still rages between the reciprocity 
of conventional and customary law in international application. The two bodies have much in 
common and are not mutually incompatible by any means. Orakhelashvili, masterfully analyzes 
the essential parameters of the debate involving the important question: “does custom equal 
consent, and if it does is it therefore binding upon third-party States?” In other words, is tacit 
consent, in this application, tantamount to explicit consent? While this view was certainly a 
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“customary” view (as per Wolff and Grotius) in the Medieval period, it appears to be far less so 
today.174  
     Since customary law is often considered a process of evolutionary adaptation, what then is 
the status of State practice as a form of consent? Orakhelashvili provides a possible response 
here as well, with the astute observation that “Action can be conscious whether it manifests that 
consciousness expressly or by conduct.”175 In other words, quite simply and quite appropriately, 
“actions speak louder than words.” This is certainly the essence inferred in the text of ICJ Article 
38 (1) (b). The author relies upon classical doctrinal support provided by authors such as Vattel 
and Wolff in support of this view, which appears well founded.  
There is a caveat, however, and that is that practice by itself, does not automatically 
correspond, with customary law, it requires its opinio juris counterpart as well. Much like the 
war of ideas, customary international law also contains both a kinetic and a psychological 
component. Fitzmaurice (as cited in Orakhelashvili), also emphasizes the important point, 
according to his interpretation, that to tolerate is to accept. Of course, an obvious difficulty with 
passive acceptance is the actual evidence confirming such unexpressed acceptance. 
     In a unipolar world, where the U.S. exerts such a powerful military influence, despite the 
objections of other States (as was the case if the 2003 invasion of Iraq) can we still rely upon 
custom (i.e., State practice) as a binding instrument of international law? Does tacit acquiescence 
automatically signify acceptance? Is tactic or passive recognition still legitimate if it is borne of 
coercion (economic, political or military)? Relying merely upon conventional law raises the 
obvious specter of selective interpretation. Thus, there is a pressing need to determine and 
qualify an answer to these probing questions of validity, consent, and application.  
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     The important case law underlying the rulings in Nicaragua v. U.S.; Uganda v. Congo, and 
Iran v. U.S., are examples of the application of conventional law in questions of a state’s right 
(or the lack thereof) to self-defense under the international legal order. When considering the 
second half of international law, that of conventional or treaty law, it might seem that, since this 
body of law is based upon written instruments of agreement, things should be much more clearly 
defined. There exist, nonetheless, some formidable challenges which must be considered. The 
first obstacle is one of application and arises under two legal principles: the pacta sunt servanda 
principle, indicating that treaties must be respected and the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 
rule, which is the fundamental legal principle that there is no erga omnes requirement upon third-
party States—treaties neither impose rights nor obligations upon third-parties (who have not 
consented to them), according to this rule of law. In other words, if a State is not a signatory to 
an agreement or treaty, they are not bound by it.  
     The only exception to this rule is that of peremptory norms, or jus cogens, Latin for 
compelling law (in cases such as, piracy, genocide, slavery, torture…), which is indeed erga 
omnes—incumbent upon all persons A violation of these principles is considered as malum in se, 
or evil in and of itself, in contrast to mala prohibita, conduct that constitutes an act that is 
unlawful only by virtue of statute. There does exist, however, another exception to the pacta 
tertiis principle. 
Kelsen also points out that “general multilateral treaties to which the overwhelming majority of 
the states are contracting parties, and which aim at an international order of the world” are 
exceptions to the pacta tertiis rule”176  Rafael Nieto-Navia, relying upon Article 38 of the Vienna  
Convention,177 echoes Kelsen’s earlier assertion “However it can be noted that if a treaty or 
convention simply codifies existing norms which are already binding on States as customary 
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international law, States not party to the convention or treaty in question may nevertheless find 
that they remain bound by the terms of the relevant customary law principle.”178 Thus, in 
essence, they are bound by the underlying principle, rather than the specific conventional 
instrument it engenders.  
     The second major challenge to conventional law is one of interpretation. It has been reiterated 
several times throughout this research, that it is a characteristic of law, and its attendant legal 
instruments, to be flexible in nature and to allow a certain degree of discretion in its 
interpretation. This enables the law to take into consideration exceptions for unforeseen 
circumstances and tailor it to a more just application. Thus, a strict textual adherence to an 
agreement or treaty often creates direct tension with a looser (spirit of the law) purposive 
interpretation. Conflict arises when these different interpretations clash head-on, often with 
completely opposite readings. This is the basis of the complex and long-running debate between 
advocates and critics of comparative interpretations of the UN Charter Articles 2(4) and 51. 
The Law of War and the Concept of Self-defense 
We have spoken about Just War Theory as an ethical precept. We shall now consider how it was 
modeled and adapted to the legal framework of international law. Customary ethical principles 
and their subsequent adoption in thought and practice, often become the guidelines to the 
framing of conventional law. This pertains to both customary international law—through state 
practice and opinio juris (a subjective sense of psychological obligation on the part of the state), 
as well as in positive conventional law (written treaties, conventions, and protocols). The legal 
principles, relating to the concept of self-defense against violent non-state actors, derive from jus 




     Thus, if we are to conduct war against groups such as transnational terrorists, the rules which 
apply are drawn from the jus ad bellum model. The related questions of State-sponsored self-
defense and the debate revolving around Articles 2(4) and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, also 
pertain to the realm of jus ad bellum.  The most important rule of ius ad bellum is art. 2 par. 4 of 
the UN-Charter, which contains the prohibition on the use of armed force. In order to understand 
the current legal regime regarding the use of force we must take a closer look at the UN-Charter 
The UN Charter and the Use of Force 
 
Crucial for the interpretation of the provisions of the UN Charter is recognizing that the drafters 
aimed, above all, to prevent the use of unilateral military force internationally.  This is 
specifically addressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, while Article 2, paragraph 3 demands that 
member states settle their international disputes peacefully. Although some in the past have tried 
to interpret Article 2 paragraph 4 to state that certain instances and forms of force are exceptions 
– e.g., when force is used to protect human rights -- it is generally assumed to forbid all uses of  
force, and for whatever reason.179 It follows, then, that every use of force against another state or 
its territory falls within the ban on violence, and is only permissible when an internationally 
recognized justification vindicates its use, and the conditions for exercising such force are 
fulfilled. 
 
     According to the Charter, currently there are two situations in which force can be justified: 
The Security Council can decide to authorize military action (article 42)180, and a state may 
execute military actions in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence in the 




     To begin with the first situation: Article 39 of the Charter requires the Security Council to 
determine the existence of  a threat to the peace,  breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and 
on those grounds to make recommendations, or decide on the enforcement measures of article 41  
(non-military coercive measures like economic sanctions) and article 42 (military enforcement 
measures).  The “peace” referred to here concerns exclusively international peace; purely 
internal conflicts, such as those during NIAC do not apply.181 
 
     The second permissible use of force under the Charter occurs when states, either individually 
or collectively, take military action in response to an armed attack (article 51). The Charter fails 
to define what an “armed attack” specifically consists of, however, and neglects further to outline 
or specify from whom it must come.  But before we examine this question more thoroughly, a 
few statements have to be made about the relationship between article 51 and article 2, paragraph  
4 of the Charter. 
 
The relationship between article 51 and Article 2(4) 
 
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter reads: “All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
 
A reading of Article 2 paragraph 4 indicates, then, that not every breach of the ban on force 
automatically triggers the right of self-defence.  In fact, the phrase “armed attack” is a more 
limited term than the phrase “threat or use of force.”  Consequently, a state that is the victim of 
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force which cannot be qualified as an armed attack cannot claim a right of self-defence, and so 
may not react militarily, as this would entail a breach of the rule forbidding the use of force.  But 
does the state that is the victim of the use of force therefore stand empty-handed? Not entirely; 
non-armed countermeasures are available when international obligations are violated.182 But 
these measures, used as a response to the use of force, often are not effective. 
 
     Though at first glance, this outcome appears undesirable, it’s more understandable if one 
bears in mind that the most important purpose of the Charter is the maintenance of international 
peace and security (article 1, paragraph 1 UN-Charter), and that achieving this, demands that 
unilateral uses of force be strictly avoided.  In other words, in the absence of an  actual armed 
attack, states are to avoid using force in self-defence. In addition to the afore mentioned non-
armed countermeasures, a state can only request the Security Council to determine the use of 
force of whom it was a victim as a breach of the peace or threat to the peace and to take 
measures according to articles 41 or 42. Should the Security Council refuse, however, then 
indeed the state stands without recourse.  But even when there is an armed attack in the sense of 
the meaning of  article 51, the right of self-defence is not unconditional.  Any use of force in 
self-defence must be both necessary and proportional; moreover, the attacked state must report 
all self-defensive actions to the Security Council and be prepared to cease and desist in all such 




It seems obvious that the definition of the term “armed attack” as given in Article 51 would 
determine the extent and reach of the right of self-defence; that is, the more extensive this term is 
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interpreted , the sooner the use of force in self-defence is legally justified, while, by contrast, a 
narrow interpretation would likely result in greater reluctance and hesitation to approve such 
self-defensive measures.  The critical importance of arriving at an unequivocal, unambiguous 
interpretation of the term “armed attack” hence can hardly be overstated. And yet, the term is not 
defined anywhere in the UN Charter.  At most, one can, on the basis of systematic or teleological 
methods of interpretation, assume that the Charter takes a narrow interpretation of the term, since 
the highest purpose of the Charter itself is to maintain international peace and security and  the 
instrument to achieve this is collective action, i.e. action by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII of the Charter. The right of self-defence thus forms an exception to the basic assumption that 
the use of force is not allowed in interstate relations, and therefore must be subject to restrictive 
interpretation.  The fact remains, however, that the lack of a definition leaves crucial 
uncertainties about the precise scope of the concept. And a study of the travaux préparatoirs or 
legislative history brings us no further in this respect.184 
 
     Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the highest judicial authority,  has not 
defined the term either, it has spelled out its essence in the Nicaragua Case.  The Court 
distinguished between direct and indirect armed force, noting that both can, under certain 
circumstances, qualify as “armed attack.”   “Direct force” involves the use of violence by one 
state against the other, across borders – for instance, when an army invades the borders of 
another state.  “Indirect force” describes non-state international violence, such as by mercenaries 
or insurgents with substantive involvement of the state. Whether such an indirect use of force can 
be considered an “armed attack” would depend, however, on the “scale and effects” of that force.  
A “border incident”, for instance, would not be sufficiently egregious to qualify as an “armed 
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attack.”  Given that the outlines provided by the Court remain the deciding factor in determining 
an “armed attack,” the relevant passage is cited in its entirety. 
 
“There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as 
constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be including not merely action by regular armed 
forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force of such gravity as 
to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or ‘its substantial 
involvement therein,’ This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g) of the Definition of 
aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX)), may be taken to reflect 
customary international law. The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the 
prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory 
of another State, if such an operation because of its scale and effects, would have been classified 
as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular 
forces.  But the Court does not believe that the concept of ‘armed attack’ includes not only acts 
by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the 
form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be regarded 
as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other 
States.’”185 
Based on the above stated vision of the Court, we can answer our two-part question – when can 
we speak of “armed attack” and who can be considered the source – as follows: non-state actors 
such as terrorist groups can also be named as the perpetrator of an armed attack, creating the 
right of the victim state to act in self-defence.  Two conditions, however, are here required: first, 
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the attack must involve significant or serious uses of force; a border incident or incidental armed 
action is not sufficient.  Second, the terrorist group must perform its acts through or in the name 
of the state, or the state must be substantially involved in its violent actions.  However, 
“substantial involvement” requires more than the provision of weapons, logistical support, or 
other forms of help.  Rather, on the basis of the Court’s analysis, the right of self-defence against 
the use of force by a terrorist group exists only if the attack is serious enough to be considered an 
“armed attack”, and (cumulative) the state from whose territory the terrorist group operates has 
been substantially involved in the attack itself. 
 
     In this regard, the following two questions represent the deciding factors: can a terrorist attack 
be qualified as an armed attack, and what must be understood by “substantial involvement”?  To 
begin with the former: since the attacks of 9/11, it has been generally accepted that the right of 
self-defence can be applicable in case of a terrorist attack.  Days after these attacks, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1368, wherein it declared itself committed “to combat by all means 
threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, recognizing the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.”  Although the Council 
did not explicitly declare the 9/11 attacks  “armed attacks,” the fact that it determined that the 
right of self-defence applied indicates, at least, that they could be viewed as such. 
 
     The question then remains whether less destructive attacks than those of 9/11 can also be 
considered as such.  But here, much would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.  
Wettberg, in his paper, discusses a criterion of “severe quantitative gravity.”186  In this context, it 
is worth noting a few things about the so-called “pin-prick theory” or “accumulation of events” 
doctrine.187 Where a single border incident or minor use of force cannot be considered an armed 
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attack, the question remains whether the term can be said to apply to a combination of several 
such incidents, or to an accumulation of several such attacks over time.  In other words, when 
Hezbollah continuously, day in and day out, fires rockets into Israel, can this series of smaller 
attacks cumulatively be called an “armed attack”? This question is also known as the 
“accumulation of events” doctrine, or “zoom theory.” 188 By “zooming out” from a particular 
violent incident to all incidents a pattern of attacks appears that, by dint of their cumulative 
effect, can also be seen as “armed attacks.”  In the Oil Platforms Case, for instance, the 
International Court left this possibility open when it determined that: 
 
“[…] the question is whether that attack, either in itself or in combination with the rest of the 
‘series of attacks’ cited by the United States, can be categorized as an ‘armed attack’ on the 
United States justifying self-defence […] Even taken cumulatively […], these incidents do not 
seem to the Court to constitute an armed attack on the United States.”189 (Emphasis mine.) 
 
     This analysis seems to indicate that smaller attacks over the course of time, in separate places, 
can still cumulatively constitute an “armed attack.” At the same time, some paragraphs later, the 
Court adds that it “does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel 
might be sufficient to bring into play the ‘inherent right of self-defence”190 – a statement that 
seems at first glance contradictory in relation to its earlier one. However, if this is indeed the 
case, then a fortiori it would be true as well in the event of a terrorist attack of the caliber of 9/11. 
Zemanek concludes also that “regardless of the dispute over degrees in the use of force, or over 
the quantifiability of victims and damage, or over harmful intentions, an armed attack even when 
it consists of a single incident, which leads to a considerable loss of life and extensive 
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destruction of property, is of sufficient gravity to be considered an ‘armed attack’ in the sense of 
Art. 51 [of the] UN Charter.”191 
 
     Hence the first part of the question – when can we speak of an “armed attack”? – is the least 
problematic.  Terrorist attacks can be considered as such as long as they cause a large number of 
victims and great material damage.  But to claim the right of self-defence, the attack must not 
only be a sufficient serious attack, but also the state from whose territory the attack was 
organized must be substantially involved in the incident. 
 
Determining “substantial involvement”, however,  is more difficult.  The ICJ gives only a 
negative description of the term by indicating only what it is not.  In answer to the question of 
whether the United States could be held responsible for the actions of the “contras” – armed 
opposition groups who, supported by the CIA, worked to overthrow the (Soviet-allied) 
Sandinista regime – the Court determined explicitly that “the question of the degree of control of 
the contras by the United States Government is relevant to the claim of Nicaragua attributing 
responsibility to the United States for activities of the contras whereby the United States has, it is 
alleged, violated an obligation of international law not to kill, wound or kidnap citizens in 
Nicaragua. […]192  
The Court has taken the view that United States participation, even preponderant or decisive, in 
the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its 
military and paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still 
insufficient in itself, […], for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed 
by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.[…] For 
this conduct [i.e. killing, wounding and kidnapping, J.W.] to give rise to legal responsibility of 
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the United States it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of 
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed.”193 
Although the Court did not actually address the issue of self-defence measures taken in response 
to violence perpetrated by non-state groups, it did examine the question of whether certain 
measures taken by the contras could be attributed to the United States, thereby allowing 
Nicaragua to hold the US responsible for violating its obligations under human rights and 
humanitarian law. This “effective control” test has since served as a general standard for 
establishing responsibility of private persons or groups.  
     While the Court did not further explicate the criterion of “effective control,” the cited passage 
suggests that such control involves a form of concrete leadership, management, or control over 
the specific operation or actions for which responsibility is being claimed.  In Article 8 of the 
Articles of State Responsibility the “effective control” test is codified thus:  
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting under the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct.”194 
     In its commentary, the International Law Commission emphasized that the issue must involve 
a “real link” between the state and non-state actor195 that involves actions taken “on the 
instructions of” or “under the direction or control” of the State.196 These are alternative criteria: it 
is sufficient when one or the other of these is fulfilled.197  Despite the fact that numerous judges, 
in their dissents, criticized the Court for the criteria it established for “effective control,” arguing 
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that it (in their eyes) placed the threshold for responsibility far too high, the Court nonetheless 
continued to hold to the standard in subsequent decisions.198  
     Criticism grew louder, however, after the attacks of 9/11.  The most important concerns 
expressed against the decision of the Court argued that it constituted a free license to so-called 
“state-sponsored terrorism” so long as the sponsoring did not take the form of “effective 
control.”  Moreover, the imperative of a “real link” between the state and non-state actor would 
offer no solutions in the case of states that were neither prepared nor in a position to control 
operations by terrorist groups operating within (or from within) their borders. In other words, the 
“effective control test” provides no answers in three important situations: when a strong state 
supports terrorist groups but is not directly involved with its terrorist activities; when a weak or 
failing state is unable to prevent attacks by (organized) terrorist groups from its territory; and, 
finally, the situations in which a non-failing state passively supports or tolerates the operations of 
terrorist groups who are based within its borders. 
 
     It is precisely in this context of terrorism that abandonment of the “effective control test” is 
pleaded for. Two distinct approaches to this have been raised. The first still requires that a link 
can be established between the state and the non-state actor -- that is, that the behavior of the 
non-state actor has to be attributed to the state against whom the attacked state engages in self-
defence. However, the bar for establishing attribution must be significantly lowered.  In the 
second case, the “link” issue is discarded entirely, and considerations based on the nature and 
magnitude of the attack determine whether or not self-defence can be justified.  In other words, 
when “private violence” is measurably severe enough to be viewed as an armed attack, the 
attacked party maintains the right to act in self-defence.    
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     Finally, based upon the principle of consent and collective self-defense, the use of force is 
authorized by a request for intervention another state (the host state). Such conditions are meant 
to reduce the chances of resorting to armed conflict except in cases of justifiable need. They are 
considered as exceptions to the constraints on the use of armed force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state. These legal requirements are important and 
have been reiterated several times throughout the text. 
     Recent history has shown that adherence to either or both principles has been weakened and 
even disregarded. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, in 2003 is but one example where the opinion of the 
international community exercised no significant authority. This situation again offers support 
for the position advanced in this research; that the current outmoded rules, laws, and regulations 
are improperly suited to deal with this new type of armed conflict and the specific challenges that 
it poses. The few attempts that have been made are poorly designed. They are not respected or 
enforced even when they are clearly applicable. Additionally, it should be born in mind that the 
decision-making process of the UNSC is controlled by major Westernized industrial states, 
creating for all intents and purposes a self-interested oligarchy. 
     It is important not to conflate the legal reasoning behind jus ad bellum with its ethical and 
philosophical counterpart. There has been an increasing tendency to blur the borders between the 
two, particularly since both contain the principles of necessity and proportionality as components 
central to their framework. Legally, the right to use justified force in self-defense is defined 
according to a specific set of binding conditions.  
     Jus ad bellum is strongly axed upon the crimes of aggression, and warfare for expansion. 
Crimes which were condemned during the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunal proceedings. 
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Aggression includes invasion, armed attack, blockades, bombardment, the sending of armed 
bands, irregulars or mercenaries on behalf of a State, the list being non-exhaustive (Article 2).199 
     .    Article 2(4) versus Article 51: Between a Rock and a Hard Place200  
 
"The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another." 
—John Austen, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832).201 
 
There have been several interpretations of these two related articles of UN charter, particularly 
the relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51. These positions have tended to rely either on a 
flexible, purposive interpretation, or alternatively, a more restrictive one. Given the unusual 
threat that non-state actor aggression poses, many have pleaded in favor of a looser reading of 
the applicable articles (particularly pertaining to Article 51), including a right for anticipatory 
self-defense (also rather pejoratively referred to by some as preemptive strikes).202  
     The obvious danger of such flexibility is increased and unjustified conflict through 
manipulation of the concept of imminence. International law cannot and must not be adjusted to 
suit a political agenda, the result would be the failure of the rule of law itself and ultimately, total 
anarchy under unipolar military domination. It was creative interpretation and clever 
manipulation of this condition—that of a presumed imminent threat, which allowed the Obama 
executive branch to squeak its way through to its own advantage in the case of Iraq, Syria, Libya, 
Yemen and elsewhere. 
     There is a significant lack of clarity related to differences of interpretation, between the above 
two articles, particularly as they relate to the legitimacy of preemptive intervention. This section 
evaluates this contentious debate. A separate section dealing with questions of sovereignty, 
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imminence, and preemptive self-defense will follow. This tension has arisen and been fostered 
by the comparative interpretation of Articles 2(4) and Articles 51 of the UN Charter, though this 
was never the original intent of the instruments.  
     Suffice it to say that there is a constant, long-running, and heated debate over the exact 
interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 and their application to armed intervention; particularly as 
they pertain to anticipatory and preventative attacks. The critics call for restraint and adherence 
to a more literal interpretation, while proponents plead for a more expansive one. Somewhere, 
midway along this contentious continuum are situated the more balanced and limited narratives 
of those caught in-between. 
     This inherent lack of clarity and precision is also noted in the JAG officers LOAC Desk 
Book, Chapter 4, which importantly points out that: 
“The use of the term “armed attack” leads some to interpret article [Sic] 51 as requiring 
a state to first suffer a completed attack before responding in self-defense. This is likely 
the cause of much of the debate between the restrictive approach and the expansive 
approach. However, the French version of the Charter uses the term aggression armée, 
which translates to “armed aggression” and is amenable to a broader interpretation in 
terms of authorizing anticipatory self-defense.203 Orakhelashvili points out that, “The 
right to self-defence is also denoted as an inherent right in English text of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter and as a natural right in the French text.”204  
      Examining the question more closely, it is apparent that the difference between the traditional 
state-to-state conflicts of the past, and present-day asymmetric confrontations, has been further 
complicated by the introduction of two unforeseen and diametrically opposed—yet, by the same 
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token, inherently linked—elements; that of advanced technology in the battlespace and the 
advent of the violent non-state actor as a full-fledged military entity. Some authors such as 
Michael Walzer and Brian Orend have argued that preemption or anticipatory self-defense, is 
acceptable under situations they classify as supreme emergencies. a doctrine in the case of 
Walzer and an exemption for Orend.205 In either case this exemption stands as a last resort 
measure when the state faces catastrophic defeat. Furthermore, not only would preemption be 
acceptable but for some, the laws of war might also be suspended particularly as they relate to 
jus in bello ethics.206 That brings us to the next section on anticipatory self-defence. 
Leo Van Den Hole offers a very thorough treatment of the critical question of anticipatory 
self-defense and its relationship to article 51 of the UN Charter, in his probing study, 
Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law. Van Den Hole argues that article 51 was 
never intended to be restrictive regarding the right of state self-defense, either individually, 
collectively, or preemptively, but was geared more toward a collective defense initiative. He 
bases his argument upon several convincing premises:  
 Historical language [employed] during the San Francisco Convention of 1945 
 The specific wording within Article 51, itself 
 The ambiguous [and hence flexible] nature of the language adopted 
 The fact that Article 51 was placed within Chapter VII and not Chapter VIII 




     Prior to the adoption of the UN Charter, there was more widespread universal acceptance of 
the concept of preemptive unilateral action. Much of the basis for this was founded upon the 
famous Caroline incident of 1837, itself based on preexisting formulations. This latter is 
sometimes referred to as the Caroline test when referring to the customary law justification for 
anticipatory self-defense, which has taken place outside the limitations imposed by Article 51. 
The primary elements and foundational principles drawn from this approach to self-defense, 
which remain viable today, were the concepts of necessity, proportionality, and last resort, or in 
the words of Daniel Webster, "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation.” Webster further asserted that nothing “unreasonable” or “excessive” 
could be done in the name of self-defense, thus establishing the important principle of 
proportionality. In other words; the force employed must be commensurate with the threat. This 
principle places restraint on the unlimited use of force by the state. Byers notes that these were 
all important foundational principles underlying necessity and proportionality as they relate to 
self-defense.208   
     The Caroline test, therefore, not only serves as the underlying framework for the justification 
of the use of anticipatory intervention—under justified and qualified circumstances.  However, it 
is important to note that the wording and intent of the Caroline test, in the opinions of both 
Crawford and Molier, relates more precisely to a situation based upon the excuse of necessity 
rather than directly to one calling for anticipatory self-defense.209 Over a five-year period, the 
U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, formulated, clarified and fostered these principle 
criteria, in diplomatic exchanges with his British Counterpart, Lord Alexander Baring, 1st Baron 
Ashburton, which resulted in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.210 The principles were 
raised and upheld during the Nuremberg trials in 1945. 
129 
 
     These fundamental principles largely defined state practice prior to the adoption of the UN 
Charter on October 25, 1945. More recently, there appears to be a trend to revert to a paradigm 
reflective of that of the Caroline incident test. Byers considers that a major shift has taken place 
in international customary law and that “[a]s a result of the law-making strategies adopted by the 
United States and heightened concern about terrorism worldwide, the right of self-defence now 
includes military responses against countries that willingly harbor or support terrorist groups, 
provided that the terrorists have already struck the responding state.”211 Whether such a  
perspective is justifiable under international law is the crux of a seemingly endless debate.  
          The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in a subsequent report entitled, 
Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, indicated the importance of balancing the 
requirements enshrined within Article 51 of the UN-Charter, restricting the use of armed force, 
with the fundamental requirements of State to defend themselves against new, different, and 
deadlier emerging threats, such as, among others, those presented by weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs). The original purpose of Article 51 clearly was designed to maintain 
international peace, security, and international order. A blanket restriction against anticipatory 
self-defense is not conducive to such goals considering the expansion of the worldwide terrorist 
threat and is therefore counterproductive. Quite simply put, when the terrorists come knocking, it 
will be too late for talking. Principles relating to condoning anticipatory state self-defense have 
well-founded precedents, notably the Caroline test of 1837 (though many critics would prefer to 
overlook or disregard this important historical precedent in customary international law).  
     The importance and relevance of legal concepts and precedents cannot be held against some 
sort of imaginary chronological timeline. I believe many would fail to concur with such a view. 
Tladi expounds further asserting: “Moreover, even if the Ashburton-Webster exchange did 
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reflect customary international law in 1842, customary international law continually revolves.”212 
While such a premise is certainly valid—to an extent, we must also question whether such an 
assertion is particularly applicable to the topic at hand. 
          Thus, we are faced with circular logic. Evolution? Yes certainly, however, it would be a 
grave error to jettison precedent on the mere pretext of evolution alone. The Caroline precedent 
took place 103 years prior to the establishment of the UN-Charter. We now find ourselves (at the 
time of writing) almost 72 years onward since the enactment of the Charter. Does this mean that 
in another 31 years it will be time to disregard the Charter as obsolete and anachronistic as well? 
This appears to be little more than a spurious argument in support of ignoring the Caroline 
precedent; portions of which some find inconvenient. Again, these legal wrangles do little to 
offer solutions and support the hypothesis of this research that the current rules of IL are 
inadequate to deal with the species of threat being faced today. Time is however not the only 
element to be considered. There remains a direct tension between the earlier Caroline test and the 
precepts enshrined within the UN Charter. This latter established an entirely different regime on 
the legitimate use of state force. 
     This ability of customary law to adapt to changing needs and circumstances is indeed one of 
its strong points, the fact that it is not codified, on the other hand, also represents its greatest 
weakness. Some examples of case law which continue to play a role and offer guidance in the 
question of self-defense are, The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of 
America (1986),213 and the Caroline affair (1837).214 While these precedents need not dictate 
international law, they should nevertheless be taken under consideration.  
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      Such logic, as that of the legal evolution argument, supports and pleads in favor of revising 
the interpretation underlying Article 51, if we follow this conclusion to its logical end: customary 
international law evolves with time according to necessity 
      It is certain that clearly defined limitations must be prescribed in any relaxing of the 
interpretation of Article 51, however, change it must. One problem posed again, is that of 
ambiguous language. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee speaks of a “threat of 
catastrophic attack.” An empirical evaluation is required to designate what exactly constitutes a 
catastrophic attack and what separates it from other types. Given the difficulty to provide a 
coherent definition of terrorism, this poses a significant challenge to those who would alter the 
interpretation of Article 51.  
     When considering international customary law and State practice, the looser interpretation of 
anticipatory self-defense has been frequently practiced with other States either demurring 
(indicating tacit consent according to certain) or remaining silent. This tends to lean toward 
acceptance and hence, customary State practice. As Sir Daniel so aptly points out, the reality of 
academic debate is not that of the reality of the battlefield and the threat environment which 
emerges therefrom, when he states, “There is little intersection between the academic debate and 
the operational realties.”215 He further expounds upon this theme in a very clear reality-based 
assessment, “And on those few occasions when such matters have come under scrutiny in court, 
the debate is seldom advanced. The reality of the threats, the consequences of inaction, and the 
challenges of both strategic and operational decision-making in the face of such threats 
frequently trump a doctrinal debate that has yet to produce a clear set of principles that 
effectively address the specific operational circumstances faced by states.”216 
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Self-defence against Non-state Actors 
     There are scholars, such as Yoram Dinstein, who base the legality of cross-border attacks, 
such as those upon Afghanistan—emanating from the FATA region of Pakistan, upon whether 
the host state is either unable or unwilling to deal effectively with the perpetrators or to prevent 
such attacks from occurring. This is commonly referred to as the “unwilling or unable test.”217 
While this doctrine has previously appeared in different guises and inferences; notably the 
Chatham house Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence, 
back in 2006;218 it is Ashley Deeks who is remarked for supporting this current terminology. 
This relatively recent doctrine has created controversy and hostility equal in scope to that 
pertaining to questions of preemptive self-defense, targeted killing, or the strategic use of armed 
drones. Many of the same proponents and critics once again find themselves at odds.  
     According to Deeks the doctrine, in no-nonsense fashion, asserts that “[I]t is lawful for State 
X, which has suffered an armed attack by an insurgent or terrorist group, to use force in State Y 
against that group if State Y is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat. During their incursion 
in to Syria in 2014,the United States laid claim to this right of individual and collective self-
defense. The justification under Article 51, and in accordance with this doctrine, was presented 
in a letter to the UN Secretary General.219  The United States further noted that the actions taken 
were in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Other legal scholars, 
such as Michael N. Schmitt, lay a greater burden of proof at the doorstep of the targeted victim 
state for the victim to legitimately resort to self-defense such as delineated under article 51 of the 
UN Charter.220 There persist several probing issues related to this doctrine which remain to be 
clarified under international law, to wit: 
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1. Whether this doctrine is indeed part of customary law as some have asserted (State 
practice and opinio juris). Certainly, its limited application would seem to argue against 
such a premise. 
2. Whether the unwilling or unable host state has clearly expressed their inability or 
unwillingness to deal with the situation. This cannot be merely a speculative and 
subjective calculation on the part of the belligerent, which would lead to abuse. 
3. Finally, and perhaps most importantly: Does an attack by a nonstate actor trigger an 
exception to the prohibition of force as outlined in Article 2(4), thus permitting the victim 
state recourse to invoke individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 and the 
use of preemptive military action, and if so under what specific criteria? 
 
The problem facing states, involved in modern conflicts, is that they are largely dominated by 
violent non-state actors. These tensions were the focus of a critical scholarly examination by 
Gelijn Molier, in The War on Terror and Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors. The author 
pointed out that the traditional model of ascribing responsibility for armed aggression, normally 
attributed to the state from whence such entities operated, and from where such attacks emanated 
is no longer as clearly defined (due to the transnational nature of the phenomenon). Additionally, 
it can no longer be as easily and fairly attributed, to a specific State, in the current circumstances, 
as it has been in the past.   
     This is particularly relevant regarding so-called failed states, for if such states cannot put their 
own houses in order and maintain the rule of law, how can they possibly be expected to police 
such disparate groups of transnational fighters? These foreign fighters are often housed, perhaps 
temporarily, within their own unsecured and porous borders. There is no clear definition of what 
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constitutes an armed attack under art. 51 of the UN-Charter, nor from whom such an attack may 
emanate. Does a cyber-attack, for instance, justify the meaning of this definition?  
     There have also been some positive efforts to establish a more cohesive set of formal 
guidelines. Unfortunately, many of these efforts are often driven by personal agendas or 
blinkered vision. A ten-year study undertaken by the ICRC was but one example. The 
International Law Association, chaired by Mary Ellen O’Connell, adopted yet another, which 
resulted in a report conducted by a panel of eighteen experts originating from fifteen different 
states and presenting five years of investigative research and documentation.  
     Finally, there is the significant problem of the restrictive interpretation of the article itself. 
Since the central tenet of the charter is to ostensibly avoid armed conflict, maintain security and 
ensure peace at all costs. As outlined in Article 2 paragraph 4, many scholars consider the self-
defense clause as logically adhering to a more restrictive interpretation, concerning the collective 
or individual state rights to self-defense.221 Thus, a state according to this restrictive type of 
interpretation would only have recourse following an armed attack of significant magnitude, by a 
formidable opponent resulting in grave injury or harm. A definition with echoes of the criteria 
cited in the Caroline doctrine. Such a definition would, by necessity, preclude preemptive self-
defense and certainly the type being currently practiced internationally.   
   The UN Charter was ostensibly designed to avoid the madness and bloodshed that had 
defined the previous two World Wars, and the use of force was to be restricted to only three 
permissible exceptions. The first was authorization by the United Nations Security Council for 
the maintenance or reestablishment of peace under Articles 39, and 42 (39 determines the status 
and while 42 provides authorization for intervention). The second, covered under Article 51, was 
135 
 
the inherent right of self-defense for nations.  Finally, the third related to a State invitation for 
assistance whether or not under the guise of collective self-defense.  
James Green concurs that “The inherent right of self-defense is universally accepted as an 
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force.”222 The difficulty faced today is, that the 
wording of the Charter itself, and more specifically that of Article 51, pertaining to the rights 
relating to self-defense, were very loosely worded and allowed several different and opposing 
interpretations to be drawn 
     Regarding drone warfare, it is imperative to note that, this legal framework means that air 
strikes—including those conducted by drones, are and can be considered as an armed attack, thus 
triggering a State’s right to self-defense. Should the government of a state such as Yemen or 
Pakistan decide that air strikes are prohibited and despite this, a drone attack occurs, drone 
attacks may be legally construed as an armed attack, and by consequence, afford the victim state 
the right to armed retaliation in self-defense. Although an unlikely scenario it must nevertheless 
be considered in light of the ruling. 
     The fact that threats, imminent or otherwise, were relegated to the category of “less grave 
forms is problematic for states proposing measures of anticipatory self-defense since according 
to the courts holding only cases of armed attack justify the resort to self-defense. The aggrieved 
state must, in the view of the court, take other, proportionate countermeasures. By the same 
token, however, the court insisted upon the inherent right of states to self-defense against armed 
attack, under international customary law. Finally, it is useful to bear in mind, the context and 
nature of the threat. At the time of this ruling international terrorism posed a much less 
significant threat than it does today.   
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Preemption vs. Prevention 
There has been much heated discussion over the use of anticipatory self-defense, otherwise 
known as the doctrine of preemption. Anticipatory strikes are seen in two different guises, that of 
preemptive attacks and those categorized as preventative. Depending upon the interpretation 
assigned anticipatory indicates something that comes before. Anticipatory indicates the temporal 
characteristic of intervention preceding the actualization of some intended threat. Much like the 
term preventative, it accords the notion of impending harm. Preemptive carries the notion of 
heading off an impending threat prior to its actualization and preventative means that the threat 
may or may not have been declared. While the two terms, preventative and preemptive, are often 
conflated, Stephen Coleman provides a convenient framework for our consideration, where he 
employs, “…the term ‘pre-emptive attack’ in cases where enemy aggression is imminent, and the 
term ‘preventative attack’ in cases where enemy aggression is expected at some [unspecified] 
time in the future [in other words intended].”223 The trend towards a loosening of the self-defense 
criteria, to allow a more flexible response, has been particularly supported and advanced by the 




The real key to preemptive intervention depends heavily, in turn, upon yet another concept, that 
of imminence. Imminence calls to mind the synonym of “immediate” and indeed this was the 
view adopted by most medieval legal scholars. This was the definition encompassed by the 
Caroline incident of 1837 as well. Additional characteristics include that the menace must be 
overwhelming and poses a grave threat (e.g., Walzer’s supreme emergency) to the state in 
question. Francisco Vitoria, for example, exhorted that “Self-defence must be a response to an 
immediate danger, made in the heat of the moment or incontinenti as the lawyers say (author’s 
emphasis).”224 However, is it plausible to consider the same criteria as valid in the fast-paced, 
technologically advanced environment of 21st-century battlespace? Is the essence of “imminent” 
as we understand it today, equivalent with that which existed in the 16th century? Probably not. 
     Given that threats can be far more rapidly organized, transferred, and implemented to pose an 
immediate transnational threat, makes preemptive interventions incumbent upon the targeted 
state, to assure a strategically effective and balanced response. The one factor that remains the 
                                                  Figure 3© James P. Welch 2018. 
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same between the evaluations of then and now, is solid verifiable intelligence. Author David 
Maple defines the realist perspective of preemptive intervention, “Realism insists that at least 
occasionally, preemptive war can also be an indispensable means of defending the state against 
grave but nonforceful threats.”225 It is incumbent then, to clearly define what is meant by 
preemptive as opposed to preventative. 
     The question of preemption was set according to the precedents of the Caroline incident of 
December 29,1837. The principles of necessity, proportionality, and last resort were firmly 
established as the foundational criteria underlying state self-defense. The then Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster outlined the now famous guidelines, “necessity of that self-defense is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”226 The concept 
of preemption was, therefore, the established benchmark for preemptive defense prior to the 
establishment of the UN Charter and particularly Articles 51 and Articles 2(4).  
     Maple draws an intriguing parallel between the view that it was a failure not to have initiated 
a preventative war in 1930, to stop the rise of Hitler (The Munich analogy) and that 
consideration as a possible influence exercised upon George Bush in his [presented as 
preemptive] decision to invade Iraq.227 His observation highlights the lack of a clear delineation 
between the terms preemptive and preventative. Judith Lichtenberg, referring to Walzer, 
correctly underscores the problem of distinguishing between preemptive self-defense and more 
offensive preventative intervention. Lichtenberg further addresses the danger posed by conflating 
them, “But as the threat becomes less imminent, preemptive attack shades into preventative war, 
which, by definition, responds to a more distant danger and is therefore more difficult to 
justify.”228 In other words, the further imminence recedes into the background, the larger looms a 
war of aggression. Lawrence Freedman takes Lichtenberg’s logic a step further.  
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     Freedman, rather controversially, if logically, argues in defense of a doctrine of prevention 
and posits that preemptive interventions are, for all intents and purposes, preventive in nature.  
His reasoning is that prevention is meant to head off a dangerous situation before it arises to the 
critical stage of imminence with perhaps attendant catastrophic results. As both Lichtenberg and 
Freedman correctly indicate the war in Iraq, although dressed up as preemptive, was little more 
than a preventive war camouflaged using smoke and mirrors. These threats exist along a 
continuum. The greater the threat posed, and consequences faced, the greater the need for 
flexibility toward anticipatory self-defense under international law.  
      According to the so-called Bush Doctrine, which was largely formulated from the body of 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, the outlines for 
both anticipatory (legally recognized) and preventive (illegal according to international law), 
figured prominently. The instrument did not banter about or mince words as to its intentions. 
Nothing would stop a determined United States in its pursuit of national defense, regardless 
whether it was justified. The justification for such a position was underscored repeatedly by 
reference to elusive WMDs in the hands of terrorists; WMDs which have never materialized and 
given the difficulty of procurement, transport, and dissemination, hopefully never shall in any 
meaningful sense. The document is an odd blend of reasoned judgment and speculation based 
upon hypothetical projections. While the strategy made sense overall, there exist problematic 
elements:  
 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts 
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of terror.  It then digressed into the realm of speculation …and potentially the use 
of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered 
covertly, and used without warning. The document then returns, just as abruptly to 
the conditions of reality…The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. 
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, 
if necessary act preemptively.229 While such an approach is certainly justified the 
use of the term preemptive, and the challenging way in which the wording is 
expressed, is less than diplomatic. 
 
 
Preventative war was given new impetus following the Bush doctrine implemented by President 
George W. Bush, during the U.S. invasion of Iraq. While the invasion sparked widespread 
condemnation and a distinct lack of international support, the consequences of undertaking a 
preventative war were negligible. Such discussion gives pause for reflection and underscores the 
importance of developing a well-balanced national security strategy. Such a strategy must strike 
a balance between constraints imposed by international law and the legitimate use of judicious 
anticipatory force against grave threats. For instance, it was noted that “The debate over pre-
emptive strikes took on particular salience in 2002, Deeks said, when the United States claimed 
— more clearly and assertively than before — that a state could use force to forestall certain 
hostile acts by its adversaries.  More than a decade later, Deeks' chapter, "Taming the Doctrine of 
Preemption," reviews where the debate currently stands and where it is heading.”230     Selective 
interpretation of the language of the UN Charter, particularly regarding the dispute between 
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Article 51 and the right to preemptive self-defense has resulted in a heated debate over the intent 
of the article. This debate is largely responsible for the polarized positions which have been 
adopted regarding the self-defense issue. Arend proposed three possible solutions to break free 
from this current deadlock: 
 Acceptance of the constrained reactive conditions under the Caroline paradigm 
 Relaxation of imminence requirement due to the nature of evolving threats 
 Abrogate and declare the UN charter framework to be a failure231 
In its current format, the Charter of the United Nations can be seen simultaneously through two 
opposing prisms, leaving the concept of imminence to be ultimately loosely determined. If this is 
indeed the case, and the foundation upon which the U.S. has based its rights to self-defense, then 
one must question the concept of imminence itself. It appears that there is a dangerous gap, in 
international law, concerning the definition of the meaning of imminence. The guidelines for the 
conceptualization concerning the question of imminence were brushed aside under the Bush 
doctrine, carried forward and even augmented further, by the Obama administration. 
      Arend recalls, “…in its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) that the United States ‘must 
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries.’”232 If such semantic juggling, however, is acceptable (as appears to be the case) 
then, this completely invalidates the guidelines for entering a just war. Indeed, if they are that 
outmoded, and out of touch with the reality of modern conflict, then they should perhaps be 
replaced with a more reasonable and adequate framework. 
     This is the position of many current thinkers and the also thrust of the current research as 
well. Some suggestions on how this might be developed are presented in the final chapter.  It is, 
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however, important to emphasize that such modifications must be strictly controlled and created 
in a spirit of global need, rather than geared towards the desires and national vested interests of 
individual states. The rules, otherwise, become automatically invalidated by expanding the 
boundaries largely to suit one’s own needs.  
     Mayer, writing on the Bush policies, highlights the danger of such practices, “By classifying 
terrorism as an act of war, rather than as a crime, the Bush Administration reasoned that it was 
no longer bound by legal constraints requiring the government to give suspected terrorists due 
process.”233  Such an observation obviously precludes the possibility that it can be both a crime 
as well as an act of war. Additionally, it overlooks the important criteria of geographic origins. It 
would seem unlikely that the United States would launch a drone attack on Great Britain, or 
France for instance, even if that were to the point of origin for such an attack. Such positioning 
recalls realist perspectives advanced in The History of the Peloponnesian Wars, by Thucydides: 
The Athenians dictating to the Spartans pronounced that, "Right, as the world goes, is only in 
question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must."234 The weak, in our case often refers to those noncombatants caught in the middle of 
armed conflict. Such thinking was also fundamental to the reflections of Machiavelli (The 
Prince) and Thomas Hobbes (The Leviathan), true genitors of realist philosophy. There are 
critics who oppose such a stance. 
     Milson and Herman assert that “the International Court of Justice and a majority of writers 
take the view that Article 51 preserves the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence that preceded the 
Charter, which included the right to act to prevent an attack from occurring,”235 Unfortunately 
the first part of this premise is flawed. The ICJ  never took a  position of the question of 
anticipatory self-defense.  
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     While the ICJ statured on the material in Nicaragua, there has never been a clear delimitation 
between the actual occurrence of the attack and the act leading up to the attack proper. In both 
cases, self-defense would appear to be a justified response as argued throughout this work. 
Michael Schmitt cogently points out that, “pre-emptive self-defence is not a correct legal term; it 
rather should be labelled anticipatory self-defence, which is recognized as a standard concept in 
international law.”236 This is more than a question of simple semantics and has a great impact on 
our understanding of the concept as it applies to international law. The difference between these 
terms has been indicated in a previous diagram. Quite simply put there is a burden of proof. Such 
intelligence must be confirmed by multiple sources providing that there was a substantial 
possibility of impending attack for the act of self-defense to find legitimacy. 
      In the opinion of this research, for preemption to be justified it would certainly require 
transparency relating to solid intelligence detailing an imminent threat against the state. This 
appears to be the only scenario where anticipatory attacks in self-defense could be considered 
legitimate. On the other hand, a narrow interpretation such as that proposed by O’Connell; 
waiting, to receive the first blow from a committed aggressor, could quite possibly spell the 
death knell for a defending victim. Millson and Herman clearly echoed this sentiment in their 
2015 policy paper, “Awaiting an ‘armed attack’ or even allowing one to become ‘imminent’ may 
leave a State without an effective ability to defend its people.”237  It appears only logical, 
therefore, that the magnitude, veracity, and nature of the attack must all enter the calculus of any 
legitimate self-defense equation. 
     Many critics have made, and indeed continue to make, assertions concerning the legality and 
authorization of the use of force and proportionality. They do so by referring to often vaguely 
worded, misinterpreted, ill-defined or generalized legislation. There are so many circumstances 
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and variables involved, in modern warfare that an inflexible, “one rule fits all” framework, in the 
current environment, is an inadequate response. It is nearly impossible to establish a set of rules, 
concerning anticipatory preemptive self-defense, which is equally applicable to all states, in all 
situations, and for all armed conflicts. This is particularly true with the advent of threats such as 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and transnational terrorism. Anthony Arend tellingly 
reiterates the point that “Both WMD and Terrorism pose threats unanticipated by traditional 
international law.”238 The current situation remains unclear with proponents and critics 
vociferously spinning their wheels on both sides of the legal debate and achieving no 
demonstrable results.  
 
The ethical perspective: Walzer’s moral argument on Anticipatory Self-defense239 
Walzer, a steadfast proponent of the non-intervention rule, considers that the only truly ethically  
justified reason for conducting warfare is a response to aggression levied upon the state. This 
view incorporates this as his fifth principle in his six-point theory of aggression, which begins 
with the premise that, “Nothing but aggression can justify war.”240 But the conundrum is, how 
exactly do we define aggression and what is its relationship to imminence, and even more 
precisely the concept of intent? Such a restrictive view of the use of armed force, would, at first 
glance, appear rather shortsighted tending to preclude the notion that occasionally armed force 
must be employed in the interests of good; to establish peace and to maintain justice.  However, 
Walzer also examines the right to anticipatory self-defense and the character of aggression. 
     Following the earlier publication of Just and  Unjust Wars, Walzer qualified his position 
regarding humanitarian interventions. He distinguishes this type of intervention from others and 
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proposes that the only justification, for states to violate the non-intervention principle, in support 
of humanitarian intervention, would be in the case of egregious atrocities which violate universal 
norms, and then only as a case of last resort, in accordance with just war principles.241 This type 
of intervention still supports the original premise first elicited by Walzer regarding intervention 
as a response to aggression.242 Some might see this, however, as a form of word-play or semantic 
manipulation. Walzer has adamantly refused to reflect upon the philosophical dimensions of 
warfare, preferring instead to adopt a more practical regard. 
     Despite being an ardent critic of the Caroline/Webster standard, in Chapter 5 of Just and 
Unjust Wars, entitled Anticipations, Walzer also recognizes the fact that anticipatory self-defense 
does indeed exist as a legitimate exception, complementing his own interpretation of just war 
theory. In this important chapter, he additionally lays out the required criteria for a moral  
justification of anticipatory self-defense. Walzer establishes several important points worthy of 
consideration and it, therefore, behooves us to examine the chapter in greater detail.  
     While Walzer asserts that the right to anticipatory self-defense does indeed exist as a moral 
right, he also notes that it is, nevertheless, highly restrictive in nature. Restrictive in fact to the 
point of nonexistence. Walzer presents an excellent argument emphasizing the fact that the 
Caroline/Webster standard equates imminence with visibility, or a clear manifestation of acts and 
events. Walzer compares this with an incoming blow being blocked before the punch has 
actually landed. In other words, any response would be quite likely too late to be effective. 
     Walzer goes on to emphasize the importance of the criteria of last resort. A criterion which 
must be based upon reasoned judgment given the gravity of the consequences involved. The 
decisions made in the cold light of reason must be drawn only after weighing all the relevant 
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facts. Walzer asserts that the resort to anticipatory self-defense requires a modification of the 
existing legal framework. A point that has been equally underscored throughout this research as 
well. A spatio-temporal timeline for resorting to anticipatory self-defense is then established. 
This timeline is configured with the Caroline standard on one end, corresponding to immediate 
threats, and preventative war responding to distant threats, at the opposite extreme. Between 
these two imaginary points there exists a space for determining a morally justified intervention. 
     Preventative war, explains Walzer is a geopolitical concept configured to maintain the 
balance of power, avoid the distribution of power from a position seen as balanced to unbalanced 
with the associated creation of hegemony by a single entity. and the author goes on to examine 
this phenomenon in more precise detail. Walzer adopts Vattel’s formula describing acts as 
threats and presents the dichotomous nature of the balance of power model as it relates to both 
war and peace. In this case, acts are considered as moral judgments calling for a military 
response that is morally understandable. Walzer examines the utilitarian and moral arguments for 
preventative war. 
     Despite the fact that the current legal paradigm considers preventative war as always 
unjustified, Walzer lays claim to its moral justification in certain limited circumstances. 
According to Walzer, and indeed Vattel before him, preventative war inherently contains an 
element of just intent (iusta causa). According to Walzer, in order to be morally justified, 
preventative war must be based upon acts not merely speculative assumptions (such as with the 
Iraqi invasion of 2003).  
     Provocations and pontification points out Walzer, are not synonymous with threats. Walzer 
emphasizes the fact that unlike the Caroline standard, “[t]he line between legitimate and 
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illegitimate first strikes is not going to be drawn at the point of imminent attack but at the point  
of sufficient threat.”243 Thus, Walzer shifts the burden from a temporal framework to a more 
logical and reasonable contextual one. Walzer also correctly emphasizes the fact that this specific 
point, where the threat is sufficient, is understandably context-specific and that there must exist a 
sufficient preponderance of elements to draw such a conclusion. The author uses the 6-Day War 
of 1967 as an apt illustration of this concept. 
     Despite the fact that the threat is always inevitably contextual in nature Walzer provides us 
with three points of guidance with which to measure a significant threat: 
 Manifest intent (clear and evident) 
 Active preparation (lacking in the U.S. invasion of  Iraq in 2003) 
 Inevitability 
In addition to these three points presented by Walzer, I would add a fourth and that is the 
maintenance or existence of an ongoing threat.  
     In a spatio-temporal framework, preventative wars span past and future developments. The 
Caroline standard relates to the immediate moment at hand. Walzer’s construct—a time frame he 
refers to as “the present,” lies somewhere along the timeline between these two previous points. 
Walzer adopts a relative and contextual judgment for the implementation of a “Grotius 
Sanction,” and indeed cites Grotius who presciently envisioned the need for such a model of 
anticipatory self-defense. A model of the legitimate use of state-sponsored force through the use 




The chapter began with a discussion concerning the different rules, regulations and guidelines 
that pertain to and determine the conduct of armed conflict. Throughout history the concepts of 
justice and war have been inherently related. The current examination adds deeper insights and 
builds upon the introductory foundations of previous chapters. There was an in-depth 
examination of the legal issues, the various bodies of law, and the complex web of rules and 
regulations relating to war and it’s just conduct. It was observed that, while there are countless 
rules, regulations, agreements, treaties, and precedents that in many cases they fall short. None of 
these legal statutes are distinctively explicit enough to formulate a clear and comprehensive set 
of guidelines, which apply to 4th generation insurgent warfare, or the associated rights and 
protections of self-defense as means of responding to this menace. 
     In her article, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, O’Connell fails to recognize and assign 
proper value to such principles as intent, the scale of risk, probability, and threat levels. The 
author posits that: “Even where militant groups remain active along a border for a considerable 
period of time, their armed cross-border incursions are not considered attacks under Article 51 
giving rise to the right of self-defense unless the state where the group is present is responsible 
for their action.”244 This is precisely why this research argues that the current set of rules, in their 
present form, are no longer applicable, given the changing face of modern warfare. O’Connell 
also argues that relentless cross-border incursions are not a significant enough factor for a state 
to resort to self-defense under the principles of Article 51. O’Connell cites the ICJ ruling against 
Uganda, in Congo v. Uganda.245 While correct in principle, this also depends, realistically, upon 
many factors including the size, intensity, and duration of such attacks.   
     Most of these laws were drawn up with great flexibility and intended to address the risks and 
dangers of conventional, symmetric state level warfare. The face of warfare today, has little 
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semblance with anything we have previously encountered. Liberal, humanitarian oriented, 
society currently imposes far greater restraints upon the conduct of war than ever before, while 
the face of war itself has become increasingly unconstrained, and the consequences for the 
victims are often “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,”246 with little regard for common 
decency and no respect for rules whatsoever. 
     The earlier rules were adequate to address the challenges of traditional warfare; however, they 
are less capable of adapting to this newer hybrid form of asymmetrical, transnational armed 
conflict and the responses that it has engendered. The questions, in either paradigm, nevertheless 
remain the same and relate to the concepts of necessity, proportionality and last resort. However, 
new answers are required in the face of unique threats and unprecedented challenges. As a result, 
these various shortcomings in international law have fostered a heated debate and much discord 
surrounding these controversial subjects. The focus of such concern centers upon questions of 
legitimacy and defining the limitations of justifiable response.    
      It was recognized that there exist three areas which give rise to tensions within international 
law. The first, relates to interpretation, the second related to adherence, while the third concerns 
the aspect of enforcement.  Any weak link along this chain of justice can cause the system to fail.  
In other words, for international law to be effective there must exist, concordance with the 
meaning, adherence and respect of the given laws, and finally an efficient mechanism for the 
enforcement of violations.  
     Many will see the weakness of such formula immediately. Given the vested interests of 
different states vying for power, and the limited resources and authority available to international 
organizations, international law seems like a good idea albeit an unrealistic one. Despite these 
flaws, however, international law is, nevertheless, often being respected and upheld. On the 
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downside, violations of sovereignty do occur and historically the number of violations is on the 
rise. In the balance, this history of violations bears witness to the overall weakness of the U.N. 
Charter frame work.247 
     For customary practices to become conventional written instruments, such as treaties and 
protocols, a great deal of flexibility is required when drafting the various documents. A single 
word or phrase can sabotage the entire process. This is in fact a significant part of the underlying 
problem in the debate surrounding questions of anticipatory self-defense.  
     The following section of the chapter dealt with introducing the legal framework. Paramount 
among these laws is: the law of armed conflict (LOAC), or international humanitarian law; 
international human rights law; and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, concerning the 
right to self-defense. There was an historical view of the development for the legal precedents 
contained within these statutes. 
     While some scholars, such as Mary Ellen O’Connell, argue that the existing framework is 
sufficient, there is also a growing amount of  literature stating  that this is not entirely the case. 
The earlier guidelines were established to contend with two specific types of armed conflict: 
traditional international state level conflict, and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). There 
were no provisions set out to deal with gray area of transnational armed conflict (TAC). It was 
shown that despite the existence of such laws, an important part of the problem relating directly 
to the legal frame work, was their lack of the powers of application, enforcement and adherence. 
Modern institutions of control are entirely ill-adapted, unprepared and lack the appropriate 
instruments to deal with the menace, which currently threatens effective international relations. 
Those agreements, treaties and protocols, which do exist, are often neglected, skirted, or 
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overlooked and violated with impunity. The overarching framework relating to the topic of self-
defense was also introduced at this point.  
     Both sides of the currently raging debate concerning drone warfare were given equal weight. 
The essential point to establish here is that the use of armed drones, in no way infringes 
international law. It is an instrument of legitimate state force, much the same as any other, and if 
used properly, with respect to the existing laws of war, presents no violation whatsoever, either 
legally, morally or ethically. As a weapons platform the armed drone does not violate either 
international humanitarian law during international armed conflict and non-international armed 
conflict. Additionally, armed drones do not contravene the jus ad bellum rules of force, unless 
they are employed to violate sovereignty without justification, and therefore fail to respect the 
constraints imposed by international law. Employed in this fashion, they would serve as an 
extension of an illegal, jus ad bellum violation, much the same as would any other ground unit or 
weapons system. In this respect, if the legal framework regarding the state-sponsored use of 
force is respected and strictly adhered to, then the legal precepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
would suffice.  
     The key to a legitimate and effective anticipatory self-defense strategy involves transparent 
operational processes and solid intelligence which confirm a pending threat. In contrast to other 
authors, who insist that self-defense must occur exclusively as a response to armed attack, this 
research does not concur with that view. This traditional pacifist perspective, based upon biblical 
injunctions, is entirely misplaced in the realist world of transnational armed conflict. Waiting for 
such an attack to occur is not only detrimental to the interests of national security, it is also 
clearly suicidal.  
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      During the preceding chapter it was further determined that, regardless the legality of drones, 
it would not be unreasonable to envisage the creation of a well-balanced, international body 
charged with working to revise outdated and outmoded regulations. While such efforts have been 
attempted in the past, the results have been less than satisfactory. Such a constitutive body would 
be related to defining the limits and boundaries of international, as well as non-international, 
armed conflict, and making them clearer and more applicable to the conflicts of the 21st century 
(and beyond).  The drafting of such a protocol would, inevitably, be a vast and challenging 
undertaking. Notably a typical existing organ to charge and entrust with such a task would be the 
International Law Commission; a special UN Commission. Legislation concerning the use of 
robotics during armed conflict, would necessarily be a part of such legislation or relegated to a 
separate, more specialized body of arbitration.  
      The chapter concluded with a discussion of the changing face of global warfare and the 
threats which must be considered. Again, the composition of the threat and its consequences 
must be weighed proportionally against the timing and severity of the response. In the case of 
threats by weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s), the response must be firm and immediate, 









 “Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime.”  
― Ernest Hemingway: Introduction "Treasury for the Free World" by Ben Raeburn. (1946). 
 
Targeted Killing 
Targeted Killing      
Targeted killing (TK) has both advantages—when used correctly as a limited tactic, and 
numerous disadvantages when it is not. It is a short-term solution to a long-term problem, and 
quick fixes—like bubblegum on a radiator leak or a finger in a leaking dike, are not reliable 
solutions over the longer term. It is essential to emphasize that target discrimination, or target 
distinction—the target selection process, is a core element of targeted killing strategy. If 
preemptive strikes and self-defense were controversial issues, they pale in comparison with the 
heated debate surrounding the phenomenon of targeted killing itself. It is essential to examine the 
subtle differences and accusations as they pertain to targeted killing and assassination and 
precisely how these two phenomena differ if indeed, they differ at all.  The media has 
gratuitously conflated the two terms in the public eye. Before getting ahead of ourselves it is 
perhaps best to provide a clear and concise definition of what constitutes targeted killing (TK). 
     Justifiable questions relating to the use of targeted killing can be raised. Was the elimination 
of Osama bin Laden an orchestrated assassination or a legitimate targeted killing?248 Was 
Operation Wrath of God (also referred to as Operation Bayonet) a legitimate covert action 
employing targeted killing or was it a series of illegal assassinations?249 In many cases, the 
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defining features of what differentiates assassination from targeted killing can be qualified by the 
existence of a recognized state of armed conflict; the criteria of necessity, and a resort to self-
defense against possible future threats. These elements separate and distinguish targeted killing 
from assassination.  Legitimate questions, related to targeted killing, have been raised, and merit 
consideration. Questions such as 1. Can targeted killing be carried out in situations other than a 
recognized armed conflict? 2. Can targeted killing be carried out within the confines of a 
domestic regime? 3. How does targeted killing differ from assassination? The answers to such 
questions must be framed within the legal and ethical framework of national security, including 
the effective balance of proportionality and a target discrimination.  
 One guiding principle is the concept of target discrimination. This was redefined in the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and destined to protect innocent victims of 
armed conflict and limit warfare to recognized participants. Target discrimination is core to the 
laws of war and fundamental to the conduct of any effective counterterrorism efforts. 
     Finally, there exists the associated rule of proportionality. The concept of proportionality, a 
reflection of skilled and ethical warfare, is an integral element in both jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, and to a lesser extent, jus post bellum.  
     An alternative view, was expressed by Kenneth Anderson, testifying before a congressional 
committee. Anderson declared that the laws of war are not the appropriate guidelines.  According 
to Anderson, “…the proper legal rationale for the use of force in drone operations in special, 
sometimes covert, operations outside of traditional zones of armed conflict is the customary 
international law doctrine of self-defense, rather than the narrower law of armed conflict.”250 
This perspective is clearly based  upon “naked self-defense,” than the more traditional view  of 
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jus ad bellum than many would be willing to countenance and obviously tends to blur the 
boundaries between jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria.251 By comparison, Blank on the other 
hand, writing on targeting outside the zone of actual hostilities relating to the  killing of al-
Awlaki, advanced that “Here the mixing of paradigms and blurring of legal authority is 
particularly acute. On one level, the language is of armed conflict: “battlefield;” “enemy 
combatant.” At the same time, the explanation seems to draw on the international law of self-
defense and questions of imminence and necessity: “due process;” “threat;” “holds a gun to your 
head.” Beyond the fact that no precise justification is offered for any individual strike in the 
current approach, the immediate consequence of this blurring of lines is to inappropriately mix 
legal authorities with unfortunate effects.”252 
 
     Strategically, targeted killing has become the “go to” solution in cases where the proposed 
target cannot be easily extradited (the wilderness of the FATA or the vast deserts of Yemen for 
instance), in other words, as a last resort where capture is not a viable option, or in situations 
where the commitment of ground forces would represent an unacceptable risk. Given these two 
concerns, and in view of a substantial and ongoing threat (such as was represented by al-Awlaki) 
in the balance of the national security calculus. Given that an armed conflict exists between 
United States (or any other state) and al-Qaeda and given that al-Awlaki served as a senior 
component in that conflict, the misguided cleric through his affiliated acts, and future threats 
rendered himself a legitimate target.  
      It is essential to note that targeted killing as a term of the art, is not recognized under 
international law. As for targeted killing being carried out in a domestic context, that is a state 
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targeting its own citizens within its sovereign territory, this seems highly improbable (though not 
impossible), since in principle a state of armed conflict is a precondition. Targeted killing differs 
from assassination by the fact that assassination broadly refers to an act with political goals. 
Additionally, as pointed out in the research, assassination is most often undertaken upon an 
unarmed and unsuspecting victim through the use of treachery or perfidy (both condemned under 
international law), whereas targeted killing simply refers to the execution of an individual (or 
group of individuals) posing a direct threat to the security of the targeting state. Assassinations, 
which are more of a political and domestic phenomenon are legally forbidden in the United 
States under Executive Order (EO) 12333. Legal justifications for targeted killing rely upon the 
now time-worn AUMF and the inherent right to self-defense as laid out in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. 
      While frequently associated with the use of armed drones (UCAVs), targeted killing may be 
conducted using any number of tactical solutions including, snipers, aircraft, missiles, and the 
use of small specialized units of special forces.253 Targeted killing has been carried out by both 
military and intelligence components. Though many consider the targeting of al-Awlaki 
(September 30, 2011) as the first instance of targeted killing, the dubious distinction for the first 
recorded targeted killing (initially denied), by the United States, belongs to Mohammed Atef 
(born as Abu Hafs al-Masri, but also known as Abu Hafs al-Masri signifying “the lion of 
Egypt”), in November 2001. This targeted killing killed not only Atef but also Abu Ali al-Yafi'i 
his assistant, and six other al-Qaeda members.254 The first recorded CIA led targeted killing 
occurred February 2002 and removed al-Qaeda leader Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi.255  
     We may wish to clarify the difference for instance between a targeted killing by drone and 
say that by a sniper. The fact is that in the case of targeted killings by drone, there exists a formal 
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structure; a chain of command in place and a system of target validation (See Appendices J, K). 
In the case of a sniper, this is most often a tactical decision made in response to an immediate 
and pressing threat. The rules of targeting, however, remain the same. The sniper, however, 
generally operates with less information than with targeted killing. In the case of a targeted 
killing, the process is far more complex and includes the elements of Find, Fix and Finish (F3). 
The “Find” portion is the most complex and relies upon the collection of significant, convincing 
and confirmed intelligence. To summarize there is no legal or ethical difference between a sniper 
removing a threat compared with the use of a drone-fired missile. The drone is merely the 
instrument being employed to carry out that task. Generally speaking, the planning and targeting 
process will be longer, more complex and backed by intelligence when using a drone than with 
assigning a sniper mission, which is often reactive in nature 
     Critics of targeted killing can have claimed quite incorrectly, that the practice can never be 
justified under any circumstance whatsoever. They have done so by advancing unsupported and 
thus unjustified claims. While targeted killing is certainly not illegal, according to international 
law, IHRL renders the task of justifying targeted killing far more difficult. A blanket 
condemnation of targeted killing runs counter to the laws of war (again think of snipers). Such 
condemnation and IHRL logic is far more understandable when contemplating the case of the 
previous administration’s dubious interpretation (or intentional misinterpretation perhaps) of the 
distinction principle.  
           Adam C, Gastineau, remarks that, “Critics often refer to the tactic [targeted killing] as 
‘assassination’ or ‘extra-judicial execution.256  Abraham Sofaer extrapolates even further that 
“When people call a targeted killing an ‘assassination,’ they are attempting to preclude debate on 
the merits of the action.”257  This forceful and outright condemnation of targeted killing is 
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framed by investing it with extra martial connotations. As Sofaer further elucidates, “But killings 
in Self-defense are no more ‘assassinations’ in international affairs than they are murders when 
undertaken by our police forces against domestic killers.”258 This important point is often easily 
brushed aside by pacifist rhetoric. 
     While various principles outlined by Guiora extend generally to all aspects of armed conflict, 
they are particularly suitable to the use of UCAVs in their targeted killing role. Guiora in an 
earlier article from 2004, considered targeted killing within a framework of active self-
defense.259 Examining targeted killing specifically in the context of the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict, Guiora offered the following definition: 
 
 Targeted killing reflects a deliberate decision to order the death of a Palestinian 
terrorist. It is important to emphasize that an individual will only be targeted if he 
presents a serious threat to public order and safety based on criminal evidence 
and/or reliable, corroborated intelligence information clearly implicating him. 
Intelligence information is corroborated when it is confirmed by at least two 
separate, unrelated sources. There also must be no reasonable alternative to the 
targeted killing, meaning that the international law requirement of seeking another 
reasonable method of incapacitating the terrorist has proved fruitless.260 
 
Thus, Guiora also carries forth many of the same elements we prosed relating to the definition of 
targeted killing. While Guiora was addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, his analysis is 
equally apt for any of the modern, asymmetric armed conflicts engaging State-level actors facing   
Stateless International Entities (SIE’s) involved in transnational armed conflict. Importantly 
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Guiora underscores the fact that it is not targeted killing as a strategy that needs to be called into 
question, rather the legal framework, which seems  to be unable to adequately consider the 
changing reality of armed conflict. When considering the morality of the use of deadly force, for 
instance, Guiora declares that “Protecting a civilian population does not justify non-target 
specific counterterrorism; the measure must be based on legal, moral and operational criteria and 
guidelines.”261 Such specific guidelines, when considered in such a manner, therefore, interact 
and create a fusional entity worthy of serious policy evaluation (author’s emphasis).  Amos 
Guiora emphasizes that the boundaries and limitations, involved with a State’s counterterrorism 
policies, should be limited by three constraints: 
 Domestic law; 
 International law and; 
 Morality.262 
 
The Legal, Moral, and Ethical Aspects of Targeted Killing 
The initial concern here is one of why the targeted killing of an individual should even be 
authorized in the first place. The response to this question shall be examined in detail and will be 
followed by the related question of whom we can legitimately target, if—as this research 
speculates, targeted killing when used as a tactic, can indeed be legally, morally, and ethically 
justifiable.  
     One problem with establishing clear ethical and legal dimensions is that there has been a 
gradual offsetting in the balance and original strategic conception of the targeted killing program. 
Drone attacks and targeted killing were initially designed to remove selected high value targets 
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(HVTs) and disrupt the operations of the terrorist organizations. In this respect, this description 
flushes out more fully our definition and understanding of the concept of targeted killing. This 
can be considered a “leadership decapitation strategy.” There has been limited research relating 
to the topic of leadership targeting practices. The majority of studies published have tended to 
argue against the effectiveness of leadership decapitation strategies.  
     The numerous assassination attacks upon Hitler would tend to contradict such a view. 
Unfortunately, those attacks failed to achieve their objective. Assassination has most often been 
associated with important individuals. Were it not for the existence of a state of recognized 
armed conflict states would be conducting targeted assassinations, rather than targeted killings. 
Decapitation strategy can be effective when the leader or leaders are charismatic and dynamic, as 
well as when the leadership is difficult or impossible to replace. Such a such a view, as that 
previously mentioned, also tends to completely overlook the case of Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin 
Dada, and other sanguinary dictators, who cost the lives of so many.  
     The issue of targeted killing raises many ethical issues which lie at the center of the current 
debate. Guiora lays out four important principles that should define the U.S. counterterrorism 
policy and help to dissipate the misty veil of dubious legality and the sense of improper state 
conduct, under which it currently struggles.  He emphasizes a precisely defined targeting policy 
which clearly outlines the concept of imminent threat; a greater emphasis on all-source 
intelligence , as opposed to technological reliance; an ethically, morally, and strategically 
balanced decision-making process, rather than a simple consequentialist, ‘ends justifies the 
means’ approach (often misattributed to Machiavelli’s The  Prince), and finally, that the target 
determination process should have a moral and legal foundation, when bridging the gap between 
a threat and a target.  
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     More recently, efforts to control, refine, and rein in the strategy of targeted killing, has 
resulted in the publication of official guidelines issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
publication of this document and the associated concern may well represent a response to 
mounting criticism of the opaque and unfettered campaign as directed by the previous Obama 
administration. The current document serves as the handbook for defining targets and the 
targeting process, elucidating what is referred to as the “Joint Targeting Cycle,” and clarifying 
the obligations and responsibilities related to the target selection process. The entire process is 
based upon the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (the Kill list), also known as JPITL.263 
     Bryan C. Price and Patrick B. Johnston have both presented insightful and well-researched 
contributions on questions relating to decapitation strategy. Their studies adopted empirical 
approaches including quantitative multivariate analyses.264 Both studies, that of Johnston and 
that of Price, indicate that, in certain specific cases, decapitation strategy may indeed prove 
effective.  
     Price’s quantitative analysis is truly a brilliant and thoughtful piece of research. It defies the 
previous observations made by most scholars who considered leadership decapitation strategies 
as ineffective or even counterproductive. Price’s study represents a break with earlier research 
efforts, which were both constrained by small N populations, questionable database criteria, and 
the adoption of short chronological cycles, which in turn concentrated upon the number, 
frequency, and lethality of attacks, rather than the duration and resilience of the groups. Thus, 
Price’s study examined existential values rather than performance-based ones. Three specific 
characteristics make terrorist groups more vulnerable to leadership decapitation. These factors 
include the violent and illegal nature of their operations; the attendant requirement for secrecy 
(which enhances relative isolation, small group dynamics, and unit cohesion), and adherence to a 
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value-laden ideology (as opposed to a profit-based orientation). The findings of Price’s study, 
even after controlling for the impact of time sensitivity, over short, moderate, and long-term 
periods reproduced the same results. Six significant findings were presented, which are worthy 
of consideration in relation to targeted killing and the associated leadership decapitation strategy: 
 
1. The groups which experienced leadership decapitation suffered higher overall mortality 
rates. 
2. Implementation of the strikes at an early phase will have a far greater impact upon their 
mortality rate. 
3. Of the three models of group leadership decapitation analyzed—killing, capturing, or 
killing following capture, was largely irrelevant in correlation with the group mortality 
factor. 
4. Regardless the reason for change in leadership, the result remains the same—increased 
mortality rates. 
5. The size of a group has no impact in determining its resilience. 
6. Perhaps the most interesting finding; that religious-based terrorist groups were more 
vulnerable and easier to decimate than were nationalist groups, following leadership 
decapitation.265 
 
Johnston’s research also provides similar interesting conclusions, which tend to “…challenge 
previous claims that removing militant leaders is ineffective or counterproductive.266 On the 
contrary, they suggest that leadership decapitation (1) increases the chances of war termination; 
(2) increases the probability of government victory; (3) reduces the intensity of militant violence; 
and (4) reduces the frequency of insurgent attacks.”267 Although Johnston’s findings are limited 
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in their overall approach they do offer an alternative perspective and statistical inferences worth 
considering. Johnston himself adds the judicious caveat that the findings while useful, they do 
not represent a “silver bullet” solution. 
     Taken together, these two studies present a direct challenge to previous notions relating to the 
effectiveness of leadership decapitation theory and the use of targeted killing as a strategy. The 
studies are more empirically based, with broader and more definitive quantitative analysis and 
must be considered, given their findings. Contrary to popular belief, if the models hold true to 
their findings, targeted killing appears to be an effective strategic approach to diminishing the 
effectiveness of terrorist organizations. This also accords with the emphasis of the current 
research, that judicious and selective targeting of the leadership, when complemented by 
actionable intelligence if a far better option than has been previously exercised.  
     One important point must, however, be borne in mind, when considering large, multivariate, 
quantitative studies such as those by Price and Johnston. The fact that such studies often attempt 
to include extensive independent variables, some of them quantifiably immeasurable, reduces the 
overall precision in the long run. This tends to weaken certain conclusive inferences being 
drawn. Quantitative analyses are only as strong as their input data. When those variables are 
numerous and randomly selected then the degree of confidence diminishes accordingly. It does 
not automatically stand to reason, for instance, that a state with a high GDP, will automatically 
also have an equally effective counterterrorism strategy.268 To summarize the greater the number 
of variables involved (especially those that are difficult to quantify) the greater the chance for a 
larger margin of error. 
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     Strikes carried out by the U.S. were quite successful at the outset, with few civilian casualties 
compared to high-value targets (HVTs). HVT to total reported death ratio was approximately 1:5 
from 2002 – 2004, in the early phase of the program. As the program wore on, however, the 
number of total deaths increased and the number of HVT deaths decreased substantially, arriving 
at a rate of a single HVT for approximately 150 total deaths. Finally, according to a report by the 
London based, human rights group Reprieve, the search for 41, HVTs led to the death of 1,147 
persons in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, with total casualties standing at nearly three times 
that number. Of all those killed only 4% were the actual intended targets, the other 96% being 
unintended targets (whether low-level militants or other).269 Many of the so-called HVTs killed, 
were in fact, falsely listed as having been killed up to as much as seven times. Of course, these 
reports produced by the human rights group remain of questionable validity and must be 
examined with caution.270 Nevertheless, should such figures be confirmed this would be an 
alarming finding. 
     Additionally, more than half of those targeted and killed, according to the report, were not 
among the ranks of senior al Qaeda officials. Moreover, of the strikes which were launched, 
many were against groups (such as the Haqqani network) which were not yet officially 
designated as terrorist groups.271 They were attacked as a matter of concern, for reasons of 
political expediency, a lack of accurate intelligence, or quite simply by tactical error. Even 
though the Haqqani network is replete with sordid and evil individuals that fact is not a 
justifiable legal basis for launching an attack.272  
      The nebulous and morphing nature of modern warfare often precludes a clear delineation, or 
an appropriate definition of exactly whom, or what is the intended target. Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
counters that, “The United States has an obligation to take feasible precautions to protect 
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civilians, such as providing advance warning of an attack; never attacking homes, or only 
attacking at night in open spaces. The author has found no evidence that the U.S. is taking 
precautions in Pakistan.”273 These sorts of precautions had, in fact, been previously implemented 
by the Obama administration. While  Article 57 of AP I lists the precautions that parties must 
take whenever attacks may harm civilians. The assumptions on the part of O’Connell, are rather 
extreme in nature. While the United States, or any other belligerent State involved in armed 
conflict, has an obligation to take necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties, the 
battlefield calculus, which weighs military advantage against proposed civilian harm, relies 
ultimately upon the judgment of the commander in the field. These points have been highlighted 
it is also worth noting that the protection of civilians is codified in Article 48 and 51 paragraph 2, 
as well as Article 52, paragraph 2, of API. Additionally, this rule, concerning the protections of 
civilians from harm, is also considered to form part of customary international law. 
     Guiora, for instance, emphasizes that “Operational decision-making is thus predicted on a 
complicated triangle that must incorporate the rule of law, morality, and effectiveness.”274 
Effectiveness is effectively often overlooked as a criterion. This is important because realistically, 
war is not only an issue related to humanitarian concerns and reducing civilian casualties, but it 
is also one of strategic objectives and operational imperatives as well.  
     Fifth generation warfare or 5GW is a totally asymmetrical approach to warfare, where 
terrorists strike from random obscurity, and undefined and unseen drones respond likewise from 
the lurking shadows of distant anonymity. This type of indirect conflict is about is far as one can 
get from previous traditional state to state warfare paradigms, with large armies facing one 
another on open battlefields. The lines between what constitutes 3GW, 4GW, and 5GW remain 
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blurred according to varying criteria. Some authors are now even speaking of 6GW, where the 
enemy surrenders before a conflict even commences. 
       Perhaps the single most cohesive and convincing (at least at first glance) ethical argument 
against robotics and their use in modern warfare is that they tend to lower the barrier for 
resorting to armed conflict and replace the traditional diplomatic instruments. Singer recalls, 
“Lowering the bar to more and more unmanned strikes from afar would most resemble the so-
called cruise missile diplomacy of the 1990s.”275 Indeed the cruise missile diplomacy of which 
this Singer refers to has morphed into an unbridled strategy of strong-armed intervention and 
short-sighted conflict resolution. It was a failed policy exemplified by lackluster operations such 
as that witnessed during Operation Infinite Reach, on August 20, 1988, in retaliation for the U.S. 
embassy bombings in Africa, where there were few positive results achieved. Such powerful 
responses fell victim to political constraints, while simultaneously being plagued by less than 
perfect technology, which in turn, relied upon even less precise intelligence.  
     This reasoning and view, that of technology facilitating armed response, is heard across a 
wide swath of opinion. Brunstetter and Braun underscored this inherent paradox related to drone 
warfare—and that is, that while drones eliminate the need for troops on the ground and, thus the 
resort to large-scale warfare, simultaneously they tend to facilitate the recourse to armed conflict 
more easily due to this perceivable advantage.276 The reason for this ethical transition and the 
associated dilemmas that it poses is quite simple: The more the factors of risk and danger are 
reduced, the greater the propensity to call upon lethal force as a solution.  This is a simple cost-
benefit analysis, which replaces a strategy with a tactic. The traditional “brake” on going to 
war—the actual risk and cost of conflict—are removed in the case of UCAVs. There is an ironic 
tension, created by the expanded use of drones. The public, which largely approves of the drone 
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strikes, since they keep the horror of war at bay, by the same token, paradoxically calls for 
greater scrutiny and clarity surrounding the use of these weapons. 
      In defense of critics of this technology, this is a very convincing and strong argument, 
however, it is only fair to point out that the conflict in question preceded the acquisition of this 
technology and will continue with or without it regardless. The trend in strategic warfare has 
always been aimed at minimizing the possibilities for sustained casualties, and since UCAV 
technology fulfills this requirement it is not only coherent to adopt it as an instrument of warfare 
but also ethically defensible. Removing this technology would substantially raise the risk to 
personnel while increasing the possibility of deeper and less discriminant military commitment. 
An argument might even be made that the use of such complex technology reduces the risk of 
going to war. Since insurgents are aware of their limited impact, resources, and overall 
opportunities for success, they may take greater reflection prior to engaging in hostilities where 
they are outmanned technologically and strategically. This aspect of enhancing the chances of 
success in armed conflict is an integral component of the Just War tradition. Elshtain cautions, 
“Be as certain as you can, before you intervene in a just cause, that you have a reasonable chance 
of success.”277 This is, of course, one of the important just war principles. 
     Guiora’s active involvement for over 20 years in counterterrorism and covert operations 
has afforded him a unique and measured view. When interviewed, Guiora spoke of the balance 
between strategic considerations, diplomatic effectiveness, and legal ramifications behind armed 
drone usage. Guiora stated that “The drone campaigns are lawful but…”  He then clarified this 
caveat by explaining that this does not necessarily mean that they are always the wisest choice 
and that they must be used in accordance with the rules of law, including the avoidance of 
excessive noncombatant casualties, just like any other type of weapons platform.” He continued 
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by further acknowledging that “Drone attacks are and can be effective but…278 again elucidating 
his position that they can be effective; however, they must be employed as a tactical source of 
force and not as an isolated strategic concept. It is also vital to know exactly when, where, and 
how they might be strategically employed as opposed to their unfettered use.  
    Military leaders, generally, are not fond of the strategy of targeted killing. As Zenko aptly 
iterates, “Senior military officials prefer comprehensive strategies to resolve the long-term 
problems posed by the group or state to which the targeted individual belongs, while civilian 
officials are willing to use force for the potential short-term gain of eliminating a threatening 
individual. In addition, military officials are also less likely than civilian officials to believe that 
targeted killings will succeed militarily.”279  It would seem a wiser proposition to have the 
military making the strategic decisions about which they are better informed, as to the impact 
and consequences of operations, than political appointees with limited mandates and even more 
limited understanding of military strategy. To be fair, it must be borne in mind that civilian 
policymakers, make their selection from a list of options initially developed by senior military 
officials, even if it is the civilian policymakers who ultimately decide that military intervention is 
necessary in the first place.  
     Regardless the decision-making process, there remains the inherent question of legitimate 
liability of the intended target, and this in the case of any attack, including that of targeted 
killing, which is merely an alternative instrument of tactical prosecution. As Jeff McMahan so 
eloquently points out, it is that by causing harm and forfeiting their noncombatant status that the 
objects of lethal force have become liable to attack; both ethically and legally. Walzer echoes 
this perspective throughout his seminal contribution. While speaking on the principle of 
necessity and the liability of the enemy combatant Walzer states that “He can be personally 
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attacked only because he is already a fighter. He has been made into a dangerous man, and 
though his options may have been few, it is nevertheless accurate to say that he has allowed 
himself to be made into a dangerous man.”280 or “a justification grounded in liability” in the 
words of McMahan.281  
     The first contention, that of justified liability, is also addressed by Adam C. Gastineau, in his 
Key Concepts in Military Ethics. Here the author lucidly points out two basic justifications for 
targeted killing, which are the ex-ante and ex-post justifications. Ex-ante justification is a 
targeted killing, based upon liability of an agent due to an immediate or future threat posed, by 
the intended target of lethal force; whereas, ex-post justification relies upon an event which has 
occurred in the past, and according to the view of Gastineau, quite correctly, is tantamount to 
revenge, or lex Talionis—an eye for an eye justice,282 which is totally unacceptable both under 
the tenets of the Just War tradition and international law.  
     Nevertheless, I would present a counterargument in which ex-post justifications are indeed 
not only acceptable and justified, but also morally sanctioned. A simple manifestation of this 
principle can be seen in the congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
passed in 2001. This legislation essentially authorized the hunting down and elimination of those 
entities related to, or responsible for, the unparalleled attacks of 9/11. As a result, we are faced 
with an ethical conundrum. How do we separate the desire for revenge from the search for 
justice, and to an even greater extent the guarantees of self-defense? The simple answer is that 
we cannot. We must, therefore, rely upon an alternative calculus to determine the moral and legal 
acceptability of targeted killing under an ex-post justification. The fact is that any desire for 
revenge is subsumed and satiated under the criteria of self-defense. This premise only remains 
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legal and ethical, however, insofar as the attacks are directed against those entities directly 
responsible for delivering or developing threats to national security. 
      Here I would posit that there are two essential and interlinked criteria which apply in such a 
case: a binary spatio-temporal and imminence consideration, and an impact or consequence 
consideration. As these factors increase in relevance the justification for ex-post targeting 
increases to legitimate levels and becomes not only legally permissible but also morally 
incumbent.  We should recall that the first obligation of a State is to provide security to its 
population. Thus, the imminence (I) of any projected event in combination with spatial 
considerations of actual physical and ‘strategic’ (if relying upon proxies for instance) distance 
(D) of the perpetrator/intended target, must be balanced by the impact that a future attack will 
hold and its resultant adverse consequences (I/C), which will or would result in the event of a 
future attack. Any such intended target will have already proven capable of inflicting further 
damage to vulnerabilities (V) and looms (intent) as a persistent threat (T), or a risk to national 
security and public safety. The calculus can be evaluated, and this threat can be countered 
through several alternative mitigation strategies, including capture and targeted killing (TK). 
Here we can detect the close relationship entertained by the concepts of self-defense and its 
adjacent response that of targeted killing. 
     Given these considerations, targeting such a threat using anticipatory self-defense, 
considering past events, and in defense against future events, should be both legally and morally 
permissible.  Gastineau seems to concede, if not the point in question, at least the conundrum 
when pointing out that, “…the question remains whether or not those targeted in cases that are 
not cases of ‘warfare’ are targeted on the basis of their liability resulting from their status as 
combatants, or because of past wrongs [hence objects of punishment].”283 This view has been 
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shaped by adopting a Security Risk Management Process (SRMP) perspective. Note that Ex-Post 
considerations refer to actual results and knowledge as opposed to forecasted events. Ex-Post 
events are based upon objective facts. Refer to the diagram below.  
 
Target Discrimination 
On an individual level, there is the question of target distinction. Target distinction, according to 
Kevin Heller and others, is the foundational principle and the jewel in the crown of international 
humanitarian law.  The rules relating to target discrimination are clearly outlined under Geneva 
Convention Additional Protocol I, Articles 48 and 51.284 The inherent risk must be measured 
against the possible consequences in each case. For instance, how does one differentiate between 
a combatant (especially from drone captured imagery) and an individual who is hors de combat 
from one merely momentarily stunned? In the same vein, how does the drone operator 
distinguish whether a person is rushing to the aid of a fallen fighter, or running to retrieve the 
weapon and resume combat? It thus becomes clear that, whether rules of engagement (ROE) or 
Figure 4© James P. Welch 2018. 
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no rules, each case is specific, reaction-based, and the interpretation depends upon the discretion 
of the operator and the proportion of risk involved. There has been a great deal of latitude and 
discretion afforded to troops to interpret what constitutes “hostile intent.”  For instance, the 
Harvard Negotiation Law Review noted in their background and source sheet on hostile intent 
that:  
U.S. Standing ROE (SROE), issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, permit U.S. forces 
to use lethal force in self-defense against individuals who commit hostile acts (for 
example, firing at troops) or demonstrate hostile intent (something less than a direct 
use of force). However, in Afghanistan, U.S. and ISAF troops appear to interpret 
hostile intent broadly, leading to the killing of civilians not directly participating in 
hostilities or otherwise demonstrating any hostile intent and therefore protected 
from attack under international law. In many cases, non-threatening behavior by 
non-combatants – picking up a cell phone, running away from the scene of an attack, 
or going to help a family member who has already been shot – is frequently 
interpreted as ‘hostile intent’ by U.S. forces justifying the targeting and use of lethal 
force against such civilians.285 
The development of such broad interpretation is part of a spiraling cycle of action-reaction 
response, based on asymmetric inequality. No clear and concise definition of what intent entails, 
outside of a direct threat has been, so far, forthcoming. Intent is closely related to anticipatory 
self-defense and can be seen on a sliding scale of importance, as indicated in Appendix I. 
    When considering the definition and questions surrounding target discrimination and civilian 
casualties. Keifman recalls that “Currently, concerning drone strikes, what constitutes an 
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indiscriminate attack lacks definition.”286 The assertions of Travalio and Altenberg are no less 
relevant. Their trenchant statement, “The combination of the law enforcement approach where 
appropriate, and the use of military force, where justified, should serve the community of nations 
well in the fight against global terrorism,”287 echoes the premises and recommendations made 
during the development of the current research.  
Bearing in mind the responsibilities for the State to conduct war with humanitarian awareness, 
Guiora emphatically asserted that, “…the state has both the right to engage in preemptive self-
defense and the obligation to protect its own innocent civilian population.”288  These perceptions 
must, however, be nuanced by the constraints of the respect of the laws of war in conjunction 
with a call for enhanced and more flexible doctrine regarding modern warfare. It is, after all, the 
peculiar vagaries of the rules surrounding international humanitarian law which afford both sides 
the ability to be wrong, while, at the same time, remaining right. In other words, a party is 
always able to put advance a legal argument that they have the law on their side, i.e. that he is 
not violating IHL although it is in fact the case. 
Holewinski formulates the following recommendation, “On both ethical and strategic grounds, 
the United States should turn what it has learned about saving lives and dignifying losses into 
standing policy.”  This appears to be very sound advice and worth incorporating into the ethical 
framework of the current drone policy; something that was sorely lacking under the previous 
Obama administration. The probing moral and ethical examination concerning precision 
munitions and the fallacy inherent in the Obama Doctrine289 also raises serious questions about 
national security policy and its relationship to IHL. One thing that was not shrouded in secrecy 
was Obama’s disdain for America’s foreign policy community, and leadership in the Middle 
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East. In relation to the shortcomings of the drone strategy, Kreps and Kaag made two memorable 
points for policy makers to bear in mind: 
• The legitimate definition of targets may not be answered by technologically precise 
munitions, and secondly, 
• Undefined and imprecise goals lead to vague, undefined target discrimination and an 
ultimate lack of legitimacy.    
     Asa Kasher makes an interesting suggestion on the moral justification of target distinction. 
According to Kasher, the question should not rely so much upon combatant status or 
noncombatant status, rather upon the actual level of involvement in the specific conflict. I believe 
that here Kasher is attempting to clarify the separations between those who materially assist and 
those who actively contribute to the efforts of the enemy. If this is the case this is clarified by 
IHL. IHL defines targetable combatants as either members of the armed forces of the enemy, or 
civilians directly participating in hostilities. Kasher further clarifies “Rather than using a concept 
of combatants that blurs a variety of morally important distinctions, one can introduce a scale of 
involvement in hostilities that does not blur such distinctions.”290 Kasher thus, makes a clear 
distinction between those with direct involvement at the tactical, operational and strategic levels 
as being legitimate targets. Importantly, Kasher also emphasizes the importance of clearly 
identifying the targets based on solid evidence and intelligence.  
     This is something that was a marked shortcoming in the approach of the previous 
administration’s drone strategy. Charlie Carpenter also appears to adhere to this view, “Even if 
no new laws are developed in the near future, military planners, government officials, and 
lawyers could reduce civilian casualties by simply modifying their interpretations of existing 
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legal doctrines. To begin, clarifying the notion of what constitutes direct civilian participation in 
hostilities would help states more accurately judge when civilians remain protected and when 
they have lost their immunity.”291  This is an important distinction and a vital insight which 
should be considered in the drafting of any new legislation concerning TAC. The vagaries of war 
must not give way to vagary in legislation. 
     Target distinction has been one of the most troublesome aspects behind the aggressive drone 
campaign. Guiora and Blank insightfully note that “The notion of counterterrorism as self-
defense against imminent threats of harm means that the state must know, in a detailed  manner 
who poses such a threat, in what circumstances, and how and when such persons can be 
targeted.” They further emphasize that “This information and analysis lies at the  heart of the  
legitimate target determination (original authors’ emphasis).”292  The intelligence supporting the 
identification of High Value Targets (HVTs) has often been, weak, misleading, incomplete, or in 
some cases entirely incorrect. With targeted killing almost is simply not good enough. The 
question of who gets targeted, and for what reason, remains veiled largely in mystery. There has 
been a significant lack of clear and precise organizational intelligence, network topography, or 
link analysis. In other words, it has been difficult to ascertain the actual position and importance 
of most figures within the terrorist hierarchy, even though they are designated (correctly or 
incorrectly) as High Value Targets (HVTs).293 Jane Myers in her well-known article, for example  
posited that “The history of targeted killing is marked by errors.”294 
     Peritz and Rosenbach echo this insight, “As with Abu Faraj, US counterterrorism analysts 
could not determine with much degree of precision Abu Hamza’s [Muhammed Rabia Abdul 
Halim Shuayb] actual position within the organization.”295 These lacunae were somewhat 
mitigated in 2007 with the introduction of The Protect America Act. This instrument offered the 
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intelligence community greater flexibility and insight into the organization’s structure and 
communications. It was also at this time that the MQ-9 Reaper, with more than eight times the 
effective range and more than double the speed of its Predator sibling, entered service and 
greatly enhanced the technological, ISR, operational and targeting capabilities of the U.S.  
     While Obama has insisted on strict civilian control of operations, during what has been 
labeled “Terror Tuesdays,” where a select cadre choose future targets for eradication, he had 
been paradoxically far less forthcoming on the counterpart to civilian control—that of oversight 
and transparency. Despite the fact that there is no absolute requirement for transparency under 
IHL, this was a core criticism of the way the campaign was conducted by that administration.296 
Journalists, from McClatchy DC news, obtained access to classified U.S. intelligence reports 
covering the periods 2006-2008 and 2010-2011 the most intensive periods of UCAV activity. 
Their findings were not encouraging.  
     The use of force, which includes targeted killing at the level of domestic legislation, is 
permitted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Resolution of 2001, it 
specifically relates to senior al Qaeda officials and leaders, the perpetrators and individuals who 
assisted in the attacks. When the targeted killing takes place outside the zone of armed conflict 
then the legal regime of IHRL is applicable. The problem is that after more than 15 years of 
warfare, and the elimination of many from the al Qaeda leadership, the AUMF is beginning to 
show its age and is a bit thin on the ground as a result. I find it particularly perplexing that a 
newer more tailored resolution has never been achieved in the interests of good governance 
despite numerous efforts to do so.  
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     This is particularly troubling if we consider the announcement (at the time of writing) 
concerning US Federal budgeting as reported by www.bga-aeroweb.com, “In FY (Fiscal Year) 
2016, the DoD expects a sharp increase in the number of Hellfire missiles purchased. The DoD 
plans to purchase a total of 5,950 missiles for the Air Force (5,567) and Army (383) Procurement 
funds in the amount of $769.2 million have been allocated to the program. Multiple variants (K, 
L, M, N, P, R, R-2, R9B, R9E etc.) of the AGM- 114 Hellfire missile may be procured.”297 This 
works out to an approximate unit price of $129,250.00 per unit an increase of about $30,000 per 
unit since the previous fiscal year. 
      In purely economic terms, if the U.S. is Hell-bent on using Hellfire missiles to eliminate 
lower level insurgents, then this does not represent a very sound cost benefits spreadsheet. On a 
more practical military and diplomatic level, it is not a wise strategic approach either. Note that 
while the missiles are quoted as being destined for the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army, there are 
others destined for the U.S. Navy as well. The increase is dramatic according to any calculation, 
rising from 1,792 in FY 2015 to a whopping 5,950 in FY 2016. Of course, this does not include 
the secret budgeting for the CIA program either, which logically must also be substantial.  
     The McClatchy report found that 265 of the 482, or more than half of the people, reported 
killed by the CIA, were not senior al Qaeda leaders rather had been “assessed as Afghan, 
Pakistani or unknown extremists.” Of the estimated 95 strikes during the stated period 43 or just 
less than half struck at groups other than al Qaeda.298 During my own deployment I remarked 
that there was a greater tendency to target individuals who no longer met the original targeting 
criteria according to the standing rules of engagement . Rosa Brooks pointed out, back in 
September of 2012, that, “…this is precisely what has been happening over the past four years. 
Increasingly drone strikes have targeted militants who are lower and lower down the terrorist 
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food chain, rather than terrorist masterminds.”299 While there is absolutely no legal proscription 
on targeting militants, the question then becomes, although permissible is it wise?  
     Peritz and Rosenbach caution that “This ‘target creep’ is dangerous and its implications are 
dizzying. There must be a sober discussion in America to determine whether this road is worth 
traveling down in the future, long after al-Qaeda is dead and gone.”300 There are ethical, legal, 
economic, and political reasons, which cast a large shadow of doubt upon such policy. The threat 
response calculus to such an equation is certainly flawed when. “Individuals who don’t represent 
an imminent threat in any meaningful sense of those words are redefined, through the subversion 
of language, to meet that definition,” as remarks Edward Snowden.301 
     One of the fundamental principles debated, yet never clearly elucidated, surrounds the vital 
question of whether drones are effective in reducing terrorism and achieving the desired goals of 
stabilization. As with most other areas we have discussed, concerning drone warfare, there are 
two schools of opposing thought. These arguments are reflective of the previous conversation 
concerning leadership decapitation strategy. There are, first, those who affirm that they are an 
effective means for curbing violence, reducing attacks and securing stability. But secondly, the 
opponents argue just the inverse, i.e. that violence, in fact spikes and increases because of drone 
strikes and targeted killing of militant and political leadership.  
     Much of the success lies in measuring the coercion coefficient. In other words, getting the 
enemy to do what the belligerent desires. In a fascinating article, published in the Perspectives 
on Terrorism series, these phenomena are examined and clarified by Charles Kirchofer. 
Kirchofer, like many other researchers, considers that terrorists (suicide bombers in particular), 
work upon the Rational Choice Theory (RCT), that is they make a cost-benefit analysis in 
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relation to the achievement of their goals. Similar in concept to the theories endorsed by 
Skinnerian psychology, aversive behavior is avoided due to a lack of rewards.302 Terrorists have 
a specific logic all their own, which is largely based upon strategic concerns as opposed to the 
rational logic of the general population.303  
     In his article Kirchofer explains that it is vital to adopt a multivariate approach when 
examining the efficacy of targeted killing. There does not appear to be any clear-cut, direct cause 
and effect correlation between targeted killings and the frequency of terrorist attacks. There are, 
however, several intervening factors which must necessarily be taken into consideration. These 
variables do play a role, in both the efficacy of the strikes and the response by the enemy, as a 
direct consequence. 
      First, there is the consideration of whether the strikes are seeking a goal of deterrence 
(maintaining the status quo) or compellence (causing a radical change of behavior). Secondly, 
there is the timing within the cycle of escalation, which plays a significant role. As shown in the 
previous analysis by Brian Price the earlier leadership decapitation occurs the more likely there 
will be an impact on group mortality. According to Kirchofer, attacks conducted during 
relatively peaceful periods tend to result in a more prolonged and stronger retaliation. Third, 
there tends to be a difference of degree in the response to the attacks depending upon whether the 
target is a militant or political leader. Finally, there is the force of the strike. For it to be truly 
effective it must be largely disproportionate in response to the initial cause.  
     We must remember that proportionality is a flexible criterion, established by the individual 
commander. This being said, there do exist limits when comparing the potential military 
advantage to be gained when compared with eventual civilian harm. This is clearly defined under 
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Additional Protocol I, articles 51 and 57. Nevertheless,  these limits are not strictly defined and 
there exists a measure of reasonable flexibility built into this principle. Different commanders 
will have different opinions concerning the strategic value of a military target and the resultant 
civilian damage.  However,, such lack of clear boundaries could, initially at least, to contravene 
the fundamental principle of proportionality as enshrined within IHL. Each situation is novel and 
therefore the flexibility applied in one situation may not be suitable for another. This is another 
reason, as I have noted elsewhere, that there is a compelling need to reexamine IHL and to adapt 
or restructure the rules, contingencies, and constraints to better suit the highly irregular nature of 
5th generation warfare and the transnational nature of the modern battlespace. Kirchofer sees the 
question of efficiency as being based upon the presumption of coercion, of getting the enemy to 
do what one wishes.  
     Coercion is strategically structured either as deterrence, where the attacker aims to have the 
enemy cease a certain behavior or activity, and compellence, where the attack is meant to have 
an enemy feel futility and an obligation to change, thus a more strategic middle-term outcome. It 
should be noted that, for several different reasons, compelling an entity into a situation is far 
more difficult to achieve then deterring them. Kirchofer reminds us that “…the actual use, as 
opposed to the threat of targeted killing is compellent, not deterrent.”304  Finally, a very 
important distinction is drawn between combatting an insurgency (which is a political creature at 
its roots) and that of a terrorist organization, which is millenarian and nihilist in its conception. 
Terrorist organizations, as opposed to political ones, do not wish to alter or change a 
government, rather their goal is to eradicate it and replace it completely.305  Marginal coverage of 
the ethical, legal, moral and overall strategic and political efficacy of targeted killing, as a 
strategic tool, has been provided here to offer the reader a basic understanding. Indeed, entire 
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volumes of research are now dedicated solely to these precise topics. As interesting as these 
findings and their related research are, we must post the question can they be generalized as an 
applicable theory and thus, extrapolated to other actors and theaters of conflict? 
Personality and Signature Strikes 
 When considering the question of legitimate targets, Guiora recalls, “Two central questions with 
respect to operational counterterrorism are who can be targeted and when can the identified 
legitimate target be legitimately targeted.”306  This observation raises a highly problematic issue 
when considering that, according to the laws of war, fighters are obliged to wear distinctive 
emblems which can be recognized at a distance. Neither terrorists nor members of the CIA wear 
such distinctive emblems. In some cases, members of special units have also resorted to wearing 
traditional tribal garb or have eliminated any identifying insignia.307  
     The CIA has adopted two different strategies related to targeting. The first is the use of  
targeted killing for the conduct of personality strikes of individuals designated on kill lists; what 
is referred to as high value targets, or HVTs; targets who pose an immediate threat to national 
security while the second, known as a signature strike is far more controversial.  The latter refers 
to targeting unknown individuals based on a pattern of suspicious behavior and is much less 
precise than the first (which is already a controversial approach).308 Currier and Elliot point out 
that, “The first public reference to a signature strike appears to have been in February 2008, 
when The New York Times reported a change in drone strike policy, negotiated between the U.S. 
and Pakistan.”309 It is worth noting that signature strikes are not, by definition “targeted killings.” 
Regardless the terminology adopted, however, this type of “strategy,” is widely used and highly 
criticized.310 Personality strikes, directed against specific high value targets (HVTs), have not 
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raised much criticism, compared with the controversy surrounding other signature strikes. 
Therefore, the thrust of this section will concentrate upon the latter tactic.  
      Alan Fisher reporting for Al-Jazeera commented, that administration officials (according to a 
report by the Washington Post), admitted approving the controversial signature strikes in Yemen 
on Thursday, April 27, 2012.  The tactic has evidently been employed since at least as early as 
2008 when the first reports of this activity appeared in the press.311 The strikes can be based upon 
nothing more credible than suspicious behavior, or intercepted telephone communications, 
known as their intelligence signature.312 Not content with these enhanced powers the CIA and 
U.S. military also petitioned the Yemeni government for permission to expand their reach; a 
request which was subsequently refused. 
     According to an article published in the Wall Street Journal in April 2012, “The CIA and 
JSOC asked last year for broader targeting powers, however, which would include leeway to 
conduct what are known as ‘signature strikes,’ in which targets are identified based on patterns 
of behavior, such as surveillance showing they are transporting weapons.”313 In April of 2012 Al 
Jazeera also reported  “The Washington Post, quoting administration officials, said on Thursday 
that the U.S. president approved the use of ‘signature’ strikes this month,” 314  thus reconfirming 
the initial report by the Washington Post.  
     In reports by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a combined study conducted by legal 
teams at New York and Stanford Universities and statements by Christof Heyns, UN rapporteur 
on extra-judicial killings, it appears that the CIA has upped the ante by quite possibly using 
follow-up strikes on mourners at funeral services. This rather cynical observation has never 
actually been confirmed. This information has been kept close to the breast and although not 
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beyond the scope of being plausible, is difficult to corroborate or substantiate. Such accusations 
have led the UN to organize further investigations under the aegis of the UN Human Rights 
Council (HRC).  
     Criticism has been leveled at the agency, some no doubt justified, much of the criticism, 
however, is most likely exaggerated and unwarranted. “A thorough review of the arguments 
against the CIA drone campaign, however, shows that most critics invoke laws that do not bind 
American officials or laws that are vague,”315 assert Radsan and Murphy. There were 
considerations within the administration (at the time of writing) concerning the eventual 
transferring of drone operations from the CIA to the Pentagon.  It is important, however, to 
recognize the efficiency and precision of this organization and avoid rashly distributing caustic, 
unfounded criticism of the unknown, and by doing so biting the proverbial hand which protects.  
     It is worth clarifying that many of the critics of the signature strikes have based support for 
their opinions upon the Geneva conventions additional protocols I and II (particularly Protocol 
I), and while the United States generally abides by these rules, they are merely a signatory to 
Protocols I and II, and they have not acceded. The treaty has never been ratified by the U.S. 
government. Nevertheless, there are elements enshrined within the Protocols which have passed 
into international customary law, and hence must be respected.  Bearing these caveats in mind, it 
is interesting to examine some of the details of signature strikes.  Signature strikes) are 
conducted according to the same rules as any other tactical engagement. They require two 
specific conditions: that the combatant being targeted is either a direct participant in hostilities 
(DPH) or maintaining a continuous combat function (CCF). To be clear, signature strikes—a 
descriptive term,  are technically not considered targeted killings. The fact of targeting military 
aged males, who are not wearing distinctive markings, no uniforms, merely for being suspect is, 
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however, a violation of the laws of armed conflict.  If they are not directly supporting hostilities, 
this is a violation, under the Fourth Geneva Convention, of the protections afforded to all 
civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities. Additionally, this would be a violation  
of Article 51, paragraph 5, of AP I, and Customary International Rule 14, whereby “Launching 
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”316 While there are no treaties 
relating to this  the ICRC does provide interpretive guidelines on the notion of DPH. There are 
three specific criteria for qualification to wit: 
1. There must be a minimum threshold of harm and this must be passed 
2. There must exist a direct causal link between the act and the harm 
3. There must exist a belligerent nexus or, in other words, support to a  party in the 
conflict317  
      Kevin Jon Heller laid out a very interesting, in-depth and precise analysis of the various legal 
aspects of signature strikes under both IHL and IHRL. Heller points out that, for signature strikes 
to be legal under the precepts of IHL, they require two supporting requirements: The signature 
must be validated and qualified as sufficiently responding to the prescribed identification criteria, 
and there must be sufficient supporting evidence to authorize such a strike. Like many other 
scholars, and as indicated throughout this text, it is evident that the evidence requirement remains 
murky and undefined due to U.S. national security protocols and the secrecy surrounding such 
attacks.  Heller, relying upon various sources such as the media and official public 
pronouncements, cleverly breaks down the signatures into 14 separate parameters. The last point 
was deemed incorrect and not included. These are, in turn, categorized under three separate, 
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distinct legal classifications: “legal Adequacy of signatures, legally inadequate signatures, and 
possibly adequate signatures.” Heller’s model, well worth examining in greater detail is 
presented here modified by several additional comments, observations, and clarifications: 
1. Legal adequacy of signatures: this has been broken down into what are considered 5 
acceptable parameters according to IHL. 
 
 Planning attacks: This principle could be applied to the strike against al-Awlaki 
for instance due to his proven direct involvement with planning attacks against the 
U.S. 
 Transporting Weapons: there is a distinction here, under IHL, that this principle 
requires greater target discrimination. Transporting weapons is not the same as 
merely being armed. This later condition [being armed] does not qualify as a 
parameter for individual targeting. Transporting weapons does, however, 
designate the target as a legitimate military objective. 
 
 Handling Explosives: No questions here as to the validity of those involved being 
considered as legitimate military objectives. 
 
 Al Qaeda Compounds: The only caveat here is the typical rule forbidding the 
targeting of public service infrastructures such as hospitals and places of worship. 
Perfidy, for instance using an abandoned school, as a bunker, or a mosque as a 
fortified emplacement. A strategic tactic often employed by insurgents, this 
automatically lifts such a ban against retaliation. If there are still civilians present, 
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then the question of proportionality arises, and the justification lies in the 
consequence of the military advantage to be obtained. 
 Al Qaeda Training Camp is a legitimate military objective (LMO). 
 
2. Legally inadequate signatures: The following constitute 4 signature characteristics which 
have been reportedly used by the U.S., but which are banned under IHL.  
 
 Military-Age Male in Known Area of Terrorist Activity: Certainly, one of the 
most controversial, if not indefensible, principles currently practiced under the 
previous administration. Despite the highly accurate (many have questioned this 
assertion) optics, used to identify individuals, there have been many errors and 
collateral victims. How is it possible from such a distance to adequately indicate 
the difference between a 15-year-old boy, who may be tall for his age, and a 30-
year-old terrorist on the ground? Additionally, there is an inherent ethical and 
moral problem, if an individual is being targeted because of his sex and age and 
not for any specific tactical criterion. Heller succinctly points out, “These 
signature strikes have been widely criticized and for good reason—they are 
plainly inconsistent with the principle of distinction.”318 
 
 Consorting with Known Militants: While it is quite possible that individuals who 
do choose to keep company with terrorists and insurgents may become victims of 
collateral damage, they cannot be legally targeted merely due to the fact of their 
association. Again, Heller clarifies that consorting with, or frequenting such 
individuals, in no way confers legitimacy to strike, since this action does not even 
rise to the level of indirect participation by rendering assistance, or support in any 
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way. This would be tantamount to guilt by association and fails to meet the direct 
participation in hostilities (DPH) requirement. Under no circumstances are 
collaboration, sympathy, or even passive support acceptable criteria for targeting 
individuals under IHL. 
 
 Armed Men Traveling in Trucks in AQAP-Controlled Areas: Heller compares 
this feature with the male of military age model, with weapons thrown in. This 
position, however, becomes less tenable when compared against an unarmed male 
of military age, in my opinion. For these men to be, legally and justifiably, 
targeted evidence must exist indicating that they are committing targetable actions 
such as: being part of an organized armed group, transporting weapons, 
explosives or heading toward a zone of active combat. As an interesting side note, 
Heller points out that Israel does not consider possession of a weapon to be an 
automatic loss of protective status. Therefore, to summarize, possession of a 
weapon does not, in and of itself, constitute legitimate grounds for targeting an 
individual.  
 
 Suspicious Camp in AQ-Controlled Area: This provision is generally taken under 
consideration of Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I, concerning the safety 
of civilians and their infrastructure as discussed elsewhere. Where doubt exists 
IHL falls on the side of caution.   
 
3. Possibly adequate signatures: This represents the third and final legal category as 




 Groups of Armed Men Travelling Toward Conflict:  This remains, however, a 
case dependent clause. Probably one of the more questionable regulations, it 
seems rather logical that a group of potentially armed insurgents headed toward a 
battlefront might be legitimately targeted. To do otherwise is to invite disaster. 
According to IHL, however, they must be participating as an integral part of an 
operation or specific action. There is no way of really knowing their intent; 
therefore, the burden is upon the belligerent. According to theory, should the U.S. 
have confirmed evidence of their intent, such as HUMINT or SIGINT, then they 
do not have to delay in their targeting and are permitted to authorize a strike. 
Another intervening variable includes their distance from the zone of conflict. 
Quite obviously the archaic rules established for traditional battlefield warfare are 
outmoded and impractical when applied to new 4th generation, insurgency type 
conflicts. The adage “all roads lead to Rome, (modified from the original: a 
thousand roads lead to Rome, or mille viae ducunt homines per saecula 
Romam)”319 might aptly apply in this instance. 
 
 Operating an AQ Training Camp: The camp itself is a legitimate target but the 
trainers, if they are to be specifically targeted, must be targeted under the 
provisions of DPH/CCF rule.  
 
 Training to Join AQ: The standard Geneva Convention rule against attacking off-
duty reservists is the only caveat against attacking in this instance. 
 
 Facilitators: There are two types of facilitators, direct and indirect. Those 
involved indirectly: supply food, lodging or logistical support; aiding in escape, 
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financing, passing of propaganda, recruitment, creating weapons caches as 
opposed to those who take a more active role: acting as guides; gathering 
intelligence, providing ammunition. The former roles are considered “sustaining” 
acts according to IHL, while the latter qualify as DPH, and thus, by their active 
participation, qualify those individuals as legitimate targets. It should be noted 
that the term war-sustaining refers to objects and is not used refer to people. 
 
 
The CIA: Where It All Began: Where It Is Now… 
The super-secret shadow agency, which conducts targeted killings outside the zones of official 
combat, has become far less surreptitious during the current struggle with transnational terrorism. 
There has always been a love-hate relationship between the Pentagon and the CIA, despite their 
having worked together on several projects, notably the initial development of the armed 
predators themselves. The first documented use of offensive drones by the CIA is considered to 
have occurred on February 4, 2002. According to John Sifton, “The strike was in Paktia province 
in Afghanistan, near the city of Khost. The intended target was Osama bin Laden, or at least 
someone in the CIA had thought so.”320  A more well-known and widely publicized, attack was 
that carried out in Yemen, on November 3, 2002. The targets of the strike were Qaed Salim 
Sinan al-Harethi, aka Abu Ali al-Harithi a Yemeni national, and Kamal Derwish (Ahmed Hijazi), 
a naturalized U.S. citizen. The attack took place in Yemen’s Marib province. Three other al-
Qaeda operatives were also slain in the attack. Since two of the targets were linked to the U.S.S. 
Cole bombing, and the vehicle attacked was part of a convoy, it is reasonable to assume they 
were also well placed within the al-Qaeda hierarchy. This was the first known instance of a U.S. 
targeted killing of an American citizen, during the campaign against terrorism.  
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     This was a very significant event, as it marked the first use of force outside the established 
battlespace of Afghanistan.  Significantly, there appear to have been Presidential Findings, 
(similar in legal standing to Executive Orders), under the George W. Bush administration, 
expanding the approval for targeted killing, to include terrorists connected to al-Qaeda.321 Even 
were this not the case, the Harethi operation did not fall specifically under the heading of 
assassination. It occurred under the auspices of the AUMF, which specifically declares that the 
president is “authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force,” and could also have been 
ostensibly supported under the Covert Action Statute (CAS), 50 U.S.C. §413b.   
     Such widespread, laissez-faire application of the AUMF, as an excuse covering all actions, is 
quite worrisome and limits both the spirit and application of international law. The standing 
Executive Order 12333, barring political assassinations, does not prohibit targeted killing by the 
simple fact that a president may rescind the order (Executive Order) at any time of his choosing. 
If it had indeed stood in the way of the targeted killing campaign, it would have already been 
long gone.  Despite the various justifications, which have been provided, there still tends to exist 
a cautious skepticism as evidenced by numerous requests from Congress for supporting opinions 
and reports on the topic of assassination.322 Finally, President Bush signed into law a Presidential 
Memorandum of Notification (MON, equivalent in status to an Executive Order, or a 
Presidential Finding) authorizing the targeting of al-Qaeda members and associated terror 
networks on September 17, 2001.323 
     Mary Ellen O’Connell, writing on the Derwish strike, indicates, “On November 3, 2002, 
Central Intelligence (“CIA”) Agents in Djibouti fired laser-guided Hellfire missiles from a drone 
at a passenger vehicle in Yemen killing all passengers on board, including an American 
citizen.”324  The campaign has nevertheless, continued unabated with relentless precision, in a 
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program controlled by the CIA. “President Obama’s first known authorization of a missile strike 
on Yemen, on December 17, 2009, killed more than forty Bedouins, many of them women and 
children, in the remote village of al Majala in Abyan.”325 
     But who are flying these “Aethons?”326 As various investigations have divulged, it is 
members of the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron, part of the 732d air operations group, assigned to 
the 432d air expeditionary wing of the Air Combat Command (ACC). They have a long 
historical lineage and are based out of Creech Air Force Base in Indian Springs, Nevada. These 
facts were revealed in interviews during the documentary film, “Drone,” directed by Tonje 
Hessen Schei and released in April of 2014.  
     This raises some very serious issues concerning legal culpability and responsibility, as well as 
the blurring of lines between domestic law enforcement and military intervention, as outlined 
under titles 50 and 51 of the USC. Several former Predator operators spoke out in separate 
interviews. Brandon Bryant, in an interview speaking on the proposed transfer of CIA operations 
to the military, clarified that “There is a lie hidden within that truth. And the lie is that it's always 
been the air force that has flown those missions. The CIA might be the customer, but the air 
force has always flown it.”327 Operations begin in the United States and taken over from isolated 
bases abroad. There exist several stationary bases along the Arabian Peninsula, along with 
several maritime platforms as well. The main task force responsible for launching attacks is TF 
48-4 according to secret documents leaked to the digital online magazine The Intercept. Their 
operational bases were situated in Nairobi, Kenya, Sanaa, Yemen and several in Ethiopia, 
including Arba Minch.328 
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     As for the CIA’s involvement in military operations, it is abundantly clear that they are not 
afforded the same rights and protections as members of the military, in fact, they are in the same 
category as that of their opponents. The OLC memo notes that, “It is true that CIA personnel, by 
virtue of their not being part of the armed forces, would not enjoy the immunity from 
prosecution under the domestic law of the countries in which they act for their conduct in 
targeting and killing enemy forces in compliance with the laws of war-an immunity that the 
armed forces enjoy by virtue of their status.”329  
     This discussion will not delve into the complex legal morass surrounding the definition of 
what constitutes a “lawful combatant.” Much ink has flowed concerning this oft-discussed 
elusive legal and academic topic and it has been broadly treated elsewhere in the literature. 
Landay, of McClatchy newsgroup, highlights the general dissatisfaction among critics; jurists 
and scholars, of the use of the CIA as a paramilitary force engaged in combat activities, “Obama 
they think, is misinterpreting international law, including the laws of war, which they say apply 
only to the uniformed military, not the civilian CIA...”330  Mary Ellen O’Connell has, for 
instance, argued out that, “Under the law of armed conflict, only lawful combatants have the 
right to use force during an armed conflict.”331 However, here the eminent scholar is only partly 
correct. The right to participate in hostilities equates to the granting of special privileges such as 
prisoner of war status and combatant immunity. It is not illegal for anyone to participate in 
hostilities, during IAC,  however they do lose their civilian protects for such time as they actively 
participate in the armed conflict. In the case of  NIAC, they can be held criminally responsible. 
According to international law the moment they lay down their arms and cease the hostilities 
their protections are reactivated.  In the case of  NIAC, they can be held criminally reasonable as 
it is the laws of the state which apply. 
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     The use of civilian personnel and contractors does raise ethical issues as to their legitimacy 
and the rights to which they are entitled during their direct participation in an armed conflict. 
Some such as Gary Solis contend there is little distinction between the armed combatants of al—
Qaeda and those engaged by the CIA. The question becomes even more of a slippery slope when 
considering the status of civilian contractors working for a civilian organization during a military 
conflict. Solis further makes the previously ignored distinction that, “While the  guidance [ICRC 
handbook] speaks in terms of non-state actors, there is no reason why the same view is not true 
of civilian agents of state actors such as the  United States.”332  Hodge cites Loyola Law School’s 
David Glazer who states, “But employing CIA personnel to carry out those armed 
attacks…clearly fall outside the scope of permissible conduct and ought to be reconsidered, 
particularly as the  United States seeks to prosecute members of its adversaries for generally 
similar conduct.”333  The drone strikes, conducted by the CIA, have been shrouded in the veil of 
secrecy which characterizes anything to do even remotely, with the question of national security. 
Kevin Jon Heller warns of the enormous legal difficulties, which would arise with any attempt to 
try CIA drone pilots for war crimes under IHL or crimes against humanity for murder under 
IHRL. There are formidable defenses which make this possibility unlikely.334  
     One related and highly topical issue includes the civilian status and attire. W. Hays Parks 
writing on the legal issue of the military wearing civilian attire cogently elucidates that “From a 
law of war standpoint, neither "force protection" nor a desire to distinguish soldiers performing 
"offensive duties" from those engaged in humanitarian assistance constitutes military necessity 
for soldiers to wear civilian attire in international armed conflict. From the enemy standpoint 
(particularly the Taliban and al Qaeda), humanitarian assistance to Afghan civilians may 
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constitute as much a threat as a soldier engaged in offensive operations.”335 In other words, there 
does not appear to be any strategic or operational advantage.  
     During my time in Afghanistan, many members of the CIA paramilitary and various private 
military contractors (PMCs) indeed wore US uniforms and identification. It was also common 
practice among both military and nonmilitary actors to wear civilian attire without distinctive 
emblems and an admixture of both civilian and military attire according to the prevailing 
regulations in force.336 Note that this practice had its origins during the first incursion into 
Afghanistan in 2001 following the events of 9/11 “This attire was not worn to appear as 
civilians, or to blend in with the civilian population, but rather to lower the visibility of US 
forces vis-à-vis [Sic] the forces they supported” writes Parks337 After carefully examining the 
legal contours of the question Parks goes on to state that “The GPW338 and its predecessors 
contain no language requiring military personnel to wear a uniform, nor prohibiting them from 
fighting in something other than full, standard uniform. Nor does it make it a war crime not to 
wear a uniform.”339 
      Arguments related to possible criminal liability and the public authority paradigm indicate 
that the CIA is not actually behind the kill process, but rather performs the target acquisition and 
provides the strike authorizations. In this measure, they remain, nonetheless, accountable 
according to certain scholars.340 Their attacks have, nonetheless, continued unabated and have 
increased both in number and intensity. The expansion of the lethal targeting to include 
American citizens has been the topic of heated debate.  
     The use of civilian operators is not the only conundrum relating to the legal, moral, and 
ethical aspects of counterterrorist operations and the use of drones in warfare. Schmitt also 
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highlights the important and often-overlooked fact that “Many worry that misconduct by civilian 
contractors may cause reprisals against uniformed forces. They also question the rules of 
engagement under which civilians operate.”341 Precision in correctly identifying and carrying out 
strikes against legitimate designated targets is not only a requirement but also a military 
necessity. The CIA is rather new to this game and this leads O’Connell to speculate that, “The 
heavy involvement of the CIA and CIA contractors in the decisions to strike may alone account 
for the high-unintended death rate. Whether CIA operatives are trained in the law of armed 
conflict [LOAC] is a questionable point. There exist opinions on both sides of the question.” 342 
During my periods of deployment to various FOBs in the Paktia and Khost regions of 
Afghanistan and other sites, I can asset that training in the laws of armed conflict were very 
limited. Long duty hours often precluded such training. This contention, valid on the surface, 
nonetheless requires qualification since many of the CIA operators are indeed qualified ex-
military personnel as well; a fact often conveniently overlooked.   
     Yet there exist further issues which require clarification, nonetheless. As well-known author 
and scholar Peter Singer writes, “Similarly, C.I.A. drone strikes outside of declared war zones 
are setting a troubling precedent that we might not want to see followed by the close to 50 other 
nations that now possess the same unmanned technology — including China, Russia, Pakistan, and 
Iran.”343 This obviously raises a core question related to this research: what are the limitations and 
boundaries on the use of drones? At the same time, this foreshadows a vision of the expanded use of 
armed drones, as predicted in the first hypothesis; the use of drones will become ever more 
prevalent in the modern battlespace. 
     There is the question of a strategic approach to targeted killings. The CIA “hit list,” is an “in-
house” project with apparently little control or oversight from anyone outside the Agency. 
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Radsan and Murphy complain that compared with military initiatives, “…the specific procedures 
for CIA targeted killing cry out for scrutiny and improvement.”344  Although the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA do have joint targets, an unknown number of targeted 
hits are exclusive to the CIA itself. The target list for the CIA remains hidden from disclosure, 
while that of JSOC carries the rather cumbersome and unwieldy title of, the joint integrated 
prioritized target list.  Another significant problem discussed frequently throughout this research 
is the lack of transparency and accountability. Nowhere is this more evident than within the 
hallowed walls of the U.S. intelligence community (USIC). Jane Mayer emphasizes this lack of 
oversight, “…because of the C.I.A. program’s secrecy, there is no visible system or 
accountability in place, despite the fact that the agency has killed many civilians inside a 
politically fragile, nuclear-armed country[Pakistan] with which the U.S. is not at war.”345 
Michael Walzer in his important work Just and Unjust Wars indirectly poses important questions 
which relate to the CIA’s right to exercise lethal authority. Unfortunately, the silence of the 
response is deafening.  
     There is, additionally, the thorny question of Americans being selected as legitimate targets. 
From one perspective, there is the view that a democratic society, such as the United States, is 
not in the business of dispatching its own citizen’s, at least not before having provided them with 
due process. Given the complexity of the current asymmetric conflict, however, should the mere 
virtue U.S. citizenship be enough to keep a belligerent enemy of the state (and by association 
democratic institutions themselves) from being targeted?  John Yoo quite logically, seems to 
think not, “U.S. citizenship doesn’t create a legal force field around Americans who treasonously 
join the enemy,” he continues by citing the now famous, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision, “Citizens 
who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government…are enemy 
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belligerents.”346 Fighting on behalf of belligerent enemy forces makes an individual a legally 
viable target. Equal rights entail equal responsibilities. Yet it is essential that the evidence 
corroborating such treason be clearly defined, traceable, and well-established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. To profit from the protections afforded by the democratic process of due 
rights, an individual must also fully adhere to the laws and conventions of democratic society.  
 Collateral “Damage” 
 
“But we can’t kill our way out of this mess.” 
—Mitt Romney, Final debate against Barack Obama; Lynn University (22 October 2012).347 
 
The concern for avoiding noncombatant civilian casualties, interestingly finds its origins, 
according to James Turner Johnson, in the interaction between Christian canon-based law, 
notably De Treuga et Pace (clarified more fully in this chapter) and the precepts of chivalry 
common to the knighthood of the middle ages. Thus, early modern jus in bello thinking was 
influenced by these characteristics of chivalrous action and right intention. Together these 
elements formed the foundations for protection of noncombatant immunity and were crystallized 
by Western tradition as early as the 14th century, including nascent notions of proportionality. 348 
It is important to stress that the conceptualization often failed to match actual implementation 
and practice. 
     By itself, the term collateral damage is highly misleading. Collateral damage is the measure 
of unintentional destruction, death, or injuries sustained by civilians following an attack. The 
concept of damage transmits the idea of something which can be repaired. The unending cycle of 
drone strikes as previously employed by the Obama Administration left little, if anything, to be 
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repaired. Such an unfettered application is certainly both politically and strategically 
counterproductive. “… the aggression of the targeted killing tactic mandates its measured use in 
only the most urgent and necessary of cases. The government’s interest should be to tame 
violence, not exacerbate it. Where alternatives exist, they should be pursued, not just as a matter 
of law but also as a matter of sound policy.”349 Blum and Heymann astutely commented. 
Meanwhile, Peritz and Rosenbach prophetically asserted that “…firing Hellfire missiles into 
dwellings in Pakistan without regard to civilian casualties—will undermine these methods 
politically and morally and make protecting US interests more difficult.”350 Back at home the 
public remains largely uninformed, comfortable in their complacency, and harbor false illusions 
of safety.  
   The “war on terror” being levied abroad has only limited impact, acknowledgment and support 
domestically. For all intents and purposes, the public is entirely oblivious to the consequences of 
the current drone campaign, which fails to directly impact their daily lives. Mockenhaupt asserts, 
“People care less about what their government does when they are not asked to contribute.”351 
There are many excellent sources available, in the peer-reviewed literature, which provide 
information concerning the complex issues surrounding targeted killing and collateral damage.352  
     Terrorism and collateral damage are not synonymous, though there are some that would 
attempt to equate them, that is collateral damage as a form of State-sponsored terrorism. While 
they both result in the loss of life, by innocent civilian victims, they should never be conflated. 
Caleb Carr pertinently and importantly remarks that, “It is important to note, while clarifying 
terms and definitions, that terrorist bloodshed is quite distinct from what many now label (often 
with utter disingenuousness) ‘collateral damage’—that is, accidental casualties inflicted on 
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civilians by warring military units. While the former is deliberate the latter is entirely 
accidental.”353  
     It is certainly true that the selective use of UCAVs, may result in unfortunate, yet limited, 
noncombatant deaths. This is, however, quite often a regrettable, but direct consequence of 
human shielding. We shall also deal more fully with this phenomenon, later in the body of this 
work. Other possibilities contributing to noncombatant casualties include human error, weather, 
data or platform failure, and so forth. The difference is that, when properly employed, UCAVs 
are targeting—not innocent civilians—rather those guilty of having perpetrated, currently 
conducting or planning future atrocities. Individuals are selected are for targeting as a result of 
the threats they pose or their active participation in hostilities, not because of ideological 
differences, i.e., what they do, not what they say or think.   
     These targets subsequently make capture impossible, either by remote geographic isolation, 
harboring themselves among innocent civilian populations, or through armed and active 
resistance. In this way, it would be equally detrimental to both troops attempting capture 
operations and innocent civilians on the ground. This comparison illustrates the difference 
between the wanton destruction and random illegitimate acts of deadly violence, represented by 
terrorism, and the legal application of applied justice using robotic weapons. While the 
motivation for terrorism is the taking of lives, that of counterterrorism is that of protecting lives 
against future threats. 
     One of the most outspoken critics of the early drone campaign was Phillip Aston, the special 
rapporteur for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). According to 
O’Connell, “In January 2003, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights received a 
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report on the Yemen strike [November 3, 2002] from its special rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary killing. The rapporteur concluded that the strike constituted a clear case of 
extrajudicial killing.”354 The drone campaign has nonetheless continued unabated and has even 
accelerated despite these numerous criticisms and warnings.  
     Collateral damage also came under international scrutiny and condemnation. Bi Mingxin of 
Xinhua News of China, reporting on a previous drone attack wrote, “The strike destroyed the 
compound completely and also damaged many other houses located nearby. Local people rushed 
to the site for rescue work as there was no official or private rescue service available in the 
restive region.”355 Putting the debate into ethical perspective, Bill Moyers speaking on, Juan 
Coles’ site, Informed Comment, asserts, “It brought us to grief in Vietnam and Iraq and may do 
so again with President Obama’s cold-blooded use of drones, and his seeming indifference to so-
called collateral damage, otherwise known as innocent bystanders.”356 This is particularly 
applicable in the case of what is euphemistically referred to as a signature strike (discussed in 
detail within the body of this research). 
      RT journal, in 2011, warned that despite various condemnations, “As the U.S. continues its 
War on Terror, however, the deaths continue to add up.”357 The damage sustained is not only 
affecting the enemy, it has taken its toll both home and abroad. Amster submitted that “Despite 
the distance from their targets, drone operators are not fully immunized from the psychological 
effects of killing people by dint of their not-so-subtle deployment of Reaper and Predator 
technologies.”358 Indeed, whether the killing takes place up close and personal, or at a great 
distance the result remains the same. 
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     Interestingly, those espousing a more pacifist view would have it both ways it seems. Critics 
of drone policies often show two faces of the same argument, which tend to invalidate one 
another; claiming that drones are incapable of accurately discriminating between targets and 
civilians, and, at the same time, capable of precise identification. O’Connell, for instance, poses 
the question, “But can drones ever be precise enough to comply with the rule of distinction in the 
situation of Western Pakistan?”359 Turse, another arch critic, replies, “…the [drone] cameras are 
so powerful the ‘pilots’ can reputedly watch the facial expressions of those being liquidated (my 
emphasis added) on their computer monitors ‘as the bomb hits.’”360 T. Mark McCurley, who was 
actually involved in Predator operations and had the benefit of actual experience, clarified the 
question of optical precision, “We were required to have a long standoff from the target. This 
limited our chance of being detected. But it also degraded the optics so that facial recognition 
was impossible.”361 So, while the optics used are indeed of a high precision—theoretically 
enough so to confirm facial recognition—such precision is dependent upon many variables 
including, operating conditions, movement, ambient light, optical calibration and the standoff 
distance, to mention but a few. Deciphering individual facial expressions may be a future 
possibility, however, for the present, it stretches reality. 
     Careful examination of such statements indicates the inherent contradiction of such reasoning. 
The official government position has been that the precision targeting offered by UCAVs armed 
with Hellfire missile (not bombs) strikes is so precise, as to limit collateral damage to far more 
acceptable levels than say using 500-pound laser-guided munitions (bombs). This is also the 
position of the current research and appears to be a logical conclusion. The alternatives to using 
laser guided munitions are certainly a far less attractive option. 
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     Occasionally, there have also been inaccurate views and questionable statistics reported. 
Amitai Etzioni, for instance, cites the case of Syed Munawar head of the powerful Pakistani 
Islamic party, Jamat-e-Islami as (alternatively, Jamaat-i Islami) claiming a rate of nearly 100 
percent innocent civilian casualties (my emphasis). Etzioni also pointed to an article which 
appeared in The New York Times, authored by former military officers, David Kilcullen and 
Andrew Exum, which made the dubious and convenient claim of 50 civilians killed for each 
militant.362 But it is not only critics who are throwing out questionable and suspicious figures.  
     Etzioni also remains circumspect as to claims, made to The New York Times, by former 
National Security Advisor, John Brennan that, “there hasn’t been a single collateral death 
because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities we’ve been able to 
develop.”363 While the accuracy of the weapons platform may well be precise, the differing, all-
or-nothing, claims are doubtless less so. Such expansive declarations and drastic percentages of 
clear-cut figures do not reflect the reality on the ground and should certainly lead us, to speculate 
as to their validity. Regardless, the numbers reported on both sides of the debate are drastically 
different and are, therefore, unreliable. As for the numerous research organizations that report on 
the effects of drone warfare, their findings are, quite unsurprisingly, most often situated between 
the extremes of Brennan and Munawar. Like the debate over drone warfare, the true answer 
doubtlessly lies somewhere in-between.  
      Noel Sharkey, a most vociferous opponent of UCAV technology, depicts drones, in a 
poetically dystopian fashion, as the final stage of evolution in “a clean factory of slaughter.” This 
sort of metaphorical and biased language, unfortunately, tends to discredit the author and any 
eventual serious contribution he may make. Etzioni responds appropriately that, “This kind of 
cocktail-party sociology does not stand up to even the most minimal critical examination.”364     
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Rosa Brooks certainly concurred and argued against the emotionally laden rhetoric presented by 
many of these critics, as lacking any empirical foundation. She stated, “that many common 
objections to U.S. drone strikes don’t hold up well under scrutiny.” She further emphasized the 
fact that during any period of armed conflict, “every weapons system can cause civilian 
casualties, and planes and tomahawk missiles and snipers, all enable killing from a distance 
(author’s emphasis).”365 Etzioni also concurs with this assessment and sees drones as merely 
another step in the evolutionary process of weapon development and refinement.366 Killing from 
a distance is not a new phenomenon by any means. From long-range artillery and mortars to long 
range bombers, death in warfare has been increasingly dealt out at greater distances. Greater 
distance, after all, is equivalent to enhanced safety for troops on the ground. 
      Collateral damage falls under the umbrella of jus in bello and more specifically the doctrine 
of double effect (DDE).367  It is important to bear in mind, however, that the doctrine of DDE is a 
moral argument and not a legal one. And while there exists conceptual similarity DDE is not the 
same as proportionality and the collateral damage principle as outlined under API article 51 and  
57.  This basically refers to the fact that proportionally limited serious harm or injuries may be 
permissible in the quest to achieve positive military outcomes. Just War Theory sees war as an 
inevitable manifestation of the aggressiveness of human nature.368 Lying mid-path between 
pacifism and realism, JWT attempts to find a humanitarian-based middle way, to alleviate 
suffering and reduce the harsh reality of armed conflict.  
     The theory, however, is based upon a realistic understanding. Part of that understanding is 
expressed in the knowledge that there will always be civilian casualties in warfare. JWT attempts 
to limit those noncombatant losses and associated infrastructure damage to “acceptable minimum 
standards.” Again, the calculus which is made to what is acceptable or not remains the purview 
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of the commander in the field. This does not mean, however, that the commander in the field has 
unlimited discretionary power since strong oversight and legal control are exercised prior to 
conducting any military operation. Civilians and civilian objects must be cared for and afforded 
protections. Article 51 concerning proportionality and Article 57 relating to precautions relate to 
the care that must be exercised prior to any offensive action. Additional Protocol I Article 57, of 
the Geneva Conventions clearly indicates: 
 
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the 
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. 
 
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
 
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
 
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are 
military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 [ Link ] and 
that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them; 
 
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with 
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; 
 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated;369 
 
Thus, according to this doctrine of double effect, there are two ways in which noncombatant 
casualties may occur. They may be either unforeseen and unintended (an unfortunate but natural 
consequence of armed conflict), or they may be foreseen and unintended. This is where the 
calculus of the doctrine of double effect occurs, by attempting to establish acceptable parameters 
for civilian casualties in proportion with military advantage gained.370  
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     We will expand further on this concept later in the research.  The question has been posed 
with increasing frequency, however, as to whether there is any real difference between the two 
conditions and it has been suggested that there is no moral relevancy between intent and 
foresight. The pacifist argument would then, by consequence, entail a series of conditions based 
upon modus ponens, if/then, or if/therefore propositional logic: 
IF If the doctrine of 
double effect is 
considered invalid 
 
THEN Foresight & intent are 
equivalent conditions 
IF The intentional 
killing of Civilians is 
forbidden 
THEN Their incidental 
deaths as collateral 
damage is also 
forbidden 
IF War can be expected 
to produce civilian 
causalities 
THEN All armed conflict is 
unjustified and 
should be forbidden 
 
Of course, this offers a very neat little package which appears difficult to counter until we 
consider the realities of modern warfare. The above schematic was based upon the excellent 
chapter on pacifism, by, Ned Dobos, within Key Concepts in Military Ethics.371 Here the author 
lays out the crux of the argument as presented by the pacifist camp. 
Figure 5© James P. Welch 2018. 
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      Stanley Milgram’s research offers a few insights worth considering in the current context. 
Particularly when we ask ourselves the question of whether is it possible for an operator to inflict 
collateral damage without feeling any sense of remorse?  In other words, can obedience to 
authority override our basic humanity and is such a sociopathic approach even desirable?     
Milgram performed several valuable experiments relating to power and obedience to authority 
and its effect on those carrying out orders. The most notable of these was the infamous 
obedience experiment carried out in the 1960s. These results were verified many times over and 
the findings are consistent. Individuals will carry out orders, even fatal ones, obediently, despite 
personal stress and personal convictions to the contrary. In this case, subjects delivered, what they 
perceived as lethal doses of electric shocks under orders by a lab assistant to innocent persons with whom they 
had no connection.372 We can easily see how such an experimental model might be applicable to 
the current situation relating to targeted killing. 
      Another interesting examination into this area, and along similar lines, was the now famous 
"Stanford Experiment”, conducted by Philip Zimbardo at Stanford University in 1971. During 
this experiment, certain participants were designated as prison guards and others as prisoners. 
Briefly, the experiment got out of hand with severe psychological torture and maltreatment 
occurring and the experiment had to be stopped and cut short.373 Both these experiments had as 
their wellspring the examination of the rationalization behind the Nazi atrocities of WWII. The 
authors were questioning the limits of personal control when faced with overwhelming authority. 
While the situations are very different, there are important lessons that can be drawn from their 
work. 
     These experiments are well worth considering in the context of orders received and actions 
undertaken by drone operators. Randall Amster observes. “Virtual warfare still produces tangible 
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effects on civilians and combatants half a world away as well as on those who are asked to 
control the misnamed ‘joysticks’ here at home,”374 he explains. Distance is but one part of a 
dichotomous relationship which can manifest itself psychologically. The drone operators, 
analysts and crew members also partake of the life of their intended targets over varying periods 
of time. Sometimes they are observing a family for weeks on end, and they finish by making an 
unconscious connection with these individuals. For many, they see themselves not as detached 
players in a theatre of the absurd, rather as participants in an active conflict.  
     The spatiotemporal divide plays no role for them as far as the ends and the means are 
concerned. “We were not drones, but professional pilots and planners who scrutinized every 
target to make sure the shot was legal and just,”375 explains Lt. Col. T. Mark McCauley. When 
the order comes down the line that cathartic relationship may prove psychologically traumatizing 
for certain persons. Imagine, for instance, after having given the order to fire an AGM-114 
Hellfire missile, that a child from the family, or the mother, suddenly appears unexpectedly 
having been thought of as safely out of the target area. The point to understand here is that 
collateral damage is a two-way street and can impact different actors, at different levels and to 
different degrees. When we speak of collateral damage it is not enough to merely consider the 
consequences of the strike. The extremely high number of post-combat related suicides and 
PTSD related illnesses bear witness to this assertion. 
     In an article for Foreign Affairs magazine, Sarah Holewinski, executive director for the 
Center for Civilians in Conflict, brilliantly tied the issues of collateral damage, and grand 
strategy development within an international relations framework. She insists, “…the United 
States needs to turn its recent ad hoc progress into a permanent and formal policy followed not 
only by its own military but also by those of its partners.”376  This is a logical approach given the 
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premise that if the United States leads in the sphere of strategic planning, then they should also 
lead in the realm of diplomacy and soft power as well. Diplomatic and Military power are the left 
and right hands of international relations. 
     One of the major drawbacks politically and diplomatically has been the indiscriminate nature 
of attacks exercised during drone warfare. Lev Grossman writing for Time Magazine pertinently 
notes “Since President Obama took office; the U.S. has executed more than 300 covert drone 
attacks in Pakistan, a country with which we’re not at war.”377 To date, this number has not 
ceased to increase, with ever greater reliance upon this technology. The principle problem here, 
and this is reiterated throughout the current research, has become one of mistaking a technology 
for a strategy.  
     Cristopher Swift, speaking to McClatchy, on the topic of targeted killings pointed out that. 
“We are doing this on a case by case basis, rather than a systematic or strategic basis.”378  If 
Pakistan has surreptitiously allowed targeting of its own citizens for political expedience, or 
merely for concessions and convenience sake they are at fault under international law. The 
United States is also at fault should they be carrying out unauthorized and illegitimate attacks. 
The flexible rendition of the wording contained within the self-defense clause of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, according to some critics, has been used as an excuse and a “Passepartout” to 
override national sovereignty, which was certainly not the original intent, nor the spirit of the 
law.   
     As of January 2014, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the drone strikes 
undertaken in 5 years, by the Obama administration, resulted in nearly 2,400 deaths.379  This has 
created a lack of legitimacy, due to issues of transparency and waning support internationally. It 
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has also created a loss of credibility in the eyes of an aggrieved and victimized public, both at 
home and abroad. Peter Cullen, speaking about the tightening of information and the use of 
drones for targeted killing, asserted, “All this requires a more transparent policy on targeted 
killing in which there is public confidence in its checks and balances to ensure proper targeting 
decisions are made.”380  Michael Schmitt also underlines a most significant concern relating to 
civilian casualties and asymmetric conflict, “…asymmetry creates a paradoxical situation. The 
more a military is capable of conducting ‘clean’ warfare, the greater its legal obligations, and the 
more critical the international community will be of any instance of collateral damage and 
incidental injury (even when unavoidable).”381 Interestingly this statement highlights yet another 
troubling paradox, that of the military and politicians touting and vaunting the successes of their 
precision munitions and the efficacy of their weapons platforms. Just how does one define 
precise in a zone of conflict without affordable access? How can such precision be verified? 
Another related issue of concern when reflecting on noncombatant casualties is respect for the 
proportionality principle.  
     It is not because warfare may become robotic, automated and more humanly isolated that 
these constraints are any less important. The victims, as well as their suffering, will always 
remain very human.  There needs to be a continued balance in the aspects of humanity, 
proportionality, and necessity. These elements must be measured and based upon fundamental 
and universal moral and ethical criteria such as:  
 The taking of human life is ultimately wrong; 
  This fact must be balanced with the obvious realization that warfare is unavoidable; 
 War is an integral component of interstate relations and conflict resolution;  
 Therefore, a balance must be struck; 
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  That balance is to conduct war in the most acceptably humane fashion possible; 
 The absolute injunction against targeting noncombatants; 
 Prosecution for failure to respect the applicable laws of war; 
 The humanitarian, jus post bellum, conditions extend to alleviating suffering, minimizing 
damage, and helping to restore peace and prosperity as rapidly as possible in its wake.  
 
The interest of strategic victory must not preclude the rule of law and principles upon which 
democracy is founded. Should the U.S. flout international law, ignore ethics, and bend them to 
its own needs, the state will ultimately lose its legitimacy and finish little more than a powerful, 
yet failed state ruled with despotic tyranny much like those it purportedly abhors and attacks 
itself.  The solution lies in judicious jus ad bellum decision-making or knowing how to pick your 
battles well. 
Summary 
The chapter began by defining what precisely the term targeted killing (TK) refers to and why it 
is not tantamount to assassination.   Following this brief introduction, the discussion turned to 
examining the questions surrounding the legal, moral and ethical dimensions of targeted killing 
as a strategy. It was noted that targeted killing is a strategy, whereas the drones used to conduct 
such operations were merely the tactics employed to carry out that strategy. Foundational 
principles which satisfy the multiple criteria of Guiora were emphasized by four distinct points: 
the development of a precisely defined targeting policy which clearly outlines the concept of 
imminent threat; a greater emphasis on all source intelligence, as opposed to technological 
reliance; an ethically, morally, and strategically balanced decision-making process, rather than a 
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simple, ‘ends justifies the means’ approach, and finally, the target determination process should 
have a moral and legal foundation, when bridging the gap between a threat and a target. 
     Covering the concept of target discrimination, or target distinction, it was asserted that this is 
a core feature to international humanitarian law, particularly when attempting to identify and 
avoid noncombatant casualties. Target discrimination helps to identify and classify whether the 
responding action pertains to a law of war or law enforcement paradigm. Travalio and Altenberg, 
drew the interesting conclusion that the appropriate response—either law enforcement or the use 
of military force, should be situation dependent, a sentiment echoed, and a theoretical model 
proposed in the current research. One of the major difficulties involved in the war against 
terrorism is the actual identification of legitimate targets. This is one of the fundamental 
elements which led to the creation and adoption of the new category of illegal combatant. It was 
noted that according to Keifman, there is no established definition as to what might possibly 
constitute an indiscriminate attack. 
     Since the enemy seeks safe harbor among the civilian population, discriminating between 
fighters and innocent noncombatants becomes even more difficult. The unfortunate and 
unavoidable end result is often extended civilian “collateral damage” to both lives and 
infrastructure. Such loss of innocent life contributes to an increase in the ranks of the enemy. 
     The standing rules of engagement (ROE) were presented and it was noted that in the 
Afghanistan theater of operations a rather broad exercise of discretion was permitted in the 
interpretation of hostile intent.  
Target discretion exists upon a spectrum. Response to the threat is based upon the criteria of 
imminence. The spectrum ranges from target identification, to direct observation, followed by 
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the assumption of intent, and in the best-case scenario confirmed by reliable actionable 
intelligence. As mentioned elsewhere in this research, intelligence is unfortunately incorrect, 
misguided or manipulated in many cases.  
     One of the points seldom elucidated revolves around the question of whether drones are 
effective in curbing terrorism. There is no clear-cut answer to this question and there exist two 
schools of thought locked in contentious opposition on the matter. There has been little empirical 
evidence forthcoming to shed light on the discussion. One side argues that the decapitation 
strategy helps reduce effective leadership and minimize the threat, while the opponents argue 
that the strategy merely helps to increase resilience and helps to swell the ranks of the terrorist 
groups. 
     Personality and signature strikes were the next item of concern in the previous chapter. Two 
core concerns relating to the legitimacy of any type of targeted killing, according to Amos 
Guiora, revolve around the questions of who can be targeted and when is it legally permissible to 
do so.     Given that those posing the threat do not wear uniforms or distinctive insignia, this 
compounds the problem and renders positive identification far more difficult. This impedes the 
effective prosecution of targets in the area of operations (AO).  
     Personality and signature strikes as conducted by the CIA, were then defined. This first 
practice related to the singling out of high value targets (HCTs) for elimination, in what is 
commonly referred to as a decapitation strategy. Such a strategy would be far less questionable 
were it not being conducted by a civilian organ of the state as is currently the case. The 
signatures strikes are even more problematic since they are based upon a vague notion of 
patterns of personal behavior.  
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     Signature strikes under international humanitarian law (IHL) generally require two specific 
conditions: that the combatant being targeted is either a direct participant in hostilities (DPH) or 
maintaining a continuous combat function (CCF). According to Kevin Jon Heller for the 
signature strikes to be considered legal under IHL two essential criteria are mandatory: the 
signatures must be validated sufficiently to assure proper identification of the designated target, 
and secondly, there must be sufficient supporting evidence. Kevin Jon Heller’s 14 points relating 
to the legitimacy of signature strikes, including some related comments and observations, were 
then presented for examination.  
     Many current analysts including Micah Zenko, feel that the signature strike is a 
counterproductive strategy and this research fully concurs with the view. Targeting according to 
this stratagem is often based upon what is referred to as their intelligence signature. This is a 
rather vague and imprecise method of identifying an individual through their alleged 
communications. The obvious problem arises that phones can be passed about and there is no 
guarantee that the signal intelligence identifying that individual indeed belong to that specific 
target. Yet another rather distasteful strategy possibly employed by the agency concerns post-
funeral strikes upon mourners supported by a combined study conducted by legal teams at New 
York and Stanford Universities and statements by Christof Heyns, UN rapporteur on extra-
judicial killings. 
The concept of collateral damage was the following topic for examination, since it too, is also 
closely related to and often a consequence of targeted killing.  It was suggested that the term 
collateral damage is often misleading in the face of the havoc, chaos and destruction which 
remains in the wake of modern warfare. Damage infers that there is something left to repair 
whereas the increased power and precision of modern weaponry often precludes such a 
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possibility. It was further advanced that the rather unfettered application of the drone tactic 
during the Obama administration, served to exacerbate and contribute to increasingly violent 
responses rather than reducing or alleviating the threat. It was also asserted that the public is 
largely oblivious and exhibit careless disregard concerning the conduct of the distant conflict. 
      A drone strike may be criticized for resulting in civilian casualties, while at the same time 
overlooking the fact that a high value target or a terrorist group had strategically hidden 
themselves among the civilian population. The effective use of precision guided munitions to 
engage a target are a much safer alternative than resorting to traditional strategies such as 
dropping bombs. Certainly, the use of an AGM -114 Hellfire missile is a preferable solution and 
will result in far fewer noncombatant casualties than dropping a 500-pound guided bomb unit 
(GBU).  Additionally, and this is a core argument of the current research: the spirit of 
international humanitarian law would appear to argue for the use of drones and precision guided 
munitions, contrary to arguments stating otherwise. Given the proportionality requirements and 
the injunction in IHL to minimize noncombatant harm, the use of these weapons appears entirely 
justified. Specifically note the wording of Article 57(2)(a)(iii) which stipulates: 
 
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: a) those who 
plan or decide upon an attack shall: …(iii) take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event 
to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects…382 
 
It was advanced that there exist two ways in which noncombatant casualties might occur. They 
may be either unforeseen and unintended (an unfortunate but natural consequence of armed 
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conflict)—in other words, accidental, or they may be foreseen and unintended; for example, 
during a situation which is unavoidable. There has been some debate as to whether there actually 
exists a difference between these two conditions. A schematic, representing the pacifist 
arguments, developed from information provided by Ned Dobos, in his Key Concepts in Military 
Ethics.383, was then presented for consideration. 
     The chapter concluded with an evaluation of possible alternative approaches to be used in 
conjunction with or in the place of a strategy based purely upon targeted killing. Numerous 
authors have also asserted that the blind reliance upon a single tactic to determine strategy is not 
only misguided but that it is also highly counterproductive. Although there exist other models, 















“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”  
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
MILITARY AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Nasty, Brutish and Short: A Return to Hobbes and Asymmetry 
 “And if historical experience teaches us anything about revolutionary guerilla war, it is that 
military measures alone will not suffice.” 
—Samuel B. Griffith Introduction (On War by Mau Tse-tung, 2007) 
Thomas Hobbes, considered by many as the father of social contract theory and author of the 
book The Leviathan (1651), was an extraordinarily influential political philosopher. His writing 
serves as a continued source of insight for all major political thinkers up to and including the 
present day. This influential treatise established the contract theory, formulated guidelines for the 
rights and responsibility of states and their citizens in the wake of chaos and bloodshed of the 
Thirty Years War and which served to complement the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. It should be 
noted that Hobbes made significant contributions to European liberal thought, and jurisprudence, 
notably regarding individual rights and the very important legal precept of nullum crimen sine 
lege (without a law there is no crime). 
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      Modern warfare, over the past few decades, has become increasingly sinister and lawless. 
While this excess is not always justifiable, by any means, it is a direct response to the 
asymmetric types of conflict being waged, which fosters a vicious cycle of overindulgence in 
unethical and immoral bloodshed, reprisals and suffering.  The following segment is meant to 
illustrate some of the spillover effects and the difficulties they create when state actors, abiding 
by the law of armed conflict run up against violent non-state actors who abrogate all laws of 
decency to turn the situation to their own advantage. Insurgent tactics, where possible, need to be 
countered with insurgent-type responses, while still maintaining and respecting the protocols of 
ethical decency and legal restrictions. The use of small and effective SOF units is one step in the 
right direction. Standard operational procedures and traditional tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) employed in a nonconventional combat environment are both inefficient and 
counterproductive. 
     Asymmetry is the most standardized form of warfare today. Schmitt cogently describes two 
types of asymmetry: (i) Positive, which reinforces the advantage of one belligerent over another 
and (ii) negative asymmetry, where a stronger enemy’s weakness can be exploited.384 Sometimes 
these models work simultaneously or are totally intertwined. This type of warfare can also 
contain different sub-categories of asymmetry.  
     There also exists a phenomenon I will refer to here as “reverse asymmetry,” since there exists 
no specific definition for this to the best of my knowledge, outside a broad application employed 
by Michael Raska.385 This is an extension of the concept of negative asymmetry, but one in 
which the weaker opponent does not merely exploit vulnerabilities of a more powerful adversary 
rather, in this sense operates from a position of strength. Reverse asymmetry could be 
represented using weapons of mass destruction, an EMP attack (theoretically drone-deliverable), 
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or some unforeseen or unimagined zero-day vector for instance.386 Alluding to this reverse 
symmetry, Yves Duguay observes, “Simple and minimal resources on the part of the terrorists 
are inflicting major damages, whereas the means to prevent and protect against those attacks are 
both complex and costly, creating an asymmetric conflict.”387 This view tends to slightly 
exaggerate the current state of affairs but offers the distinct advantage of pointing out the very 
real and significant threats and vulnerabilities which do exist.   
     There is, of course, logistical asymmetry where the weaker side lacks the logistics and 
weaponry of their adversaries, but there is also doctrinal or operational asymmetry as well. 
Doctrinal and operational asymmetry exists when a well-formed and trained force faces a 
disorganized, under-armed, and poorly trained enemy. Finally, there is the concept of 
technological asymmetry. Technology is but one form of asymmetry closely related with new 
cognitive approaches and doctrinal asymmetry. Such asymmetry leads to enhanced efficiency, 
not only in the weapons of war but in the way war itself is waged.  Finally, we may say, there 
also exists ideological asymmetry. This is the result of theoterrorist ideologues, being entirely 
convinced of the justification of their divinely mandated cause. They are confronted with a 
Western enemy torn by self-doubt, introspection, and revulsion of their own culture. Liberal 
ideology of the West cultivates doubt, relativism, inclusiveness, and respect as supreme 
attributes. These are not military virtues that contribute to winning the war. 
     Asymmetry represents observable and marked power differentials at various levels and in 
various fields, such as the media, politics, the military, legal frameworks, technology, socio-
economics and so forth. While all these forms of asymmetry create and carry different levels of 
impact with their attendant consequences, what concerns us here, is primarily, its military (and 
politically strategic, by extension) application in relation to transnational armed conflict. As 
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mentioned in our discussion on effects-based operations (EBOs) everything is interrelated when 
it comes to armed conflict.  
     Important, too, is the concept of negative asymmetry, or the responsive strategy adopted by 
what is considered as the weaker side. While seen as inferior, both strategically and 
operationally, in some respects the weaker opponent can, at times, be stronger in both categories. 
Consider for instance the fact that Western forces have their hands bound, so to speak, due to the 
fact that they are forced to adhere to the laws of war and comply with specific rules of 
engagement—rules which have no bearing on the supposedly asymmetrically “weaker” 
adversary. In cases of grave disparity, where there exists an existential threat, an asymmetric 
conflict can engender a suspension of the law of armed conflict and offer a greater propensity for 
violations. Such a situation can and has resulted in a vicious cycle of desperate measures adopted 
by the weaker side, followed by disproportionate reprisals by the stronger belligerent.388  
     The problem is that since ISIS and their affiliates are not recognized as legal combatants they 
cannot be tried for war crimes. Even if they could be prosecuted the status of transnational armed 
conflicts do not fall under any specific legal framework (c.f. they are neither international armed 
conflicts nor are the non-international armed conflicts). Finally, the lack of clearly defined 
parameters between international human rights law and international humanitarian law only 
serves to obfuscate any possible resolution. 
     This is a particularly complex paradigm; however, Michael Schmitt does an outstanding job 
of succinctly describing positive technological asymmetry: “Using networked C4ISR unavailable 
to the other side, friendly forces seek to get inside the enemy’s observe-orient-decide-act 
(OODA) loop. In other words, acting more quickly than the enemy, forces him to become purely 
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reactive, thereby allowing you to control the flow, pace, and direction of battle. Eventually he 
[the enemy] becomes so disoriented that paralysis ensues.”389 This represents a concise and 
encapsulated description of the advantages and disadvantages presented by asymmetric warfare. 
      There also exists the notion of an asymmetric threshold. According to such a view there 
comes a point which when passed renders the asymmetric conflict as no longer justifiable, due to 
such an enormous disparity of means. Galliott explicates, “The asymmetry objection essentially 
holds that the use of remote weapons by one force against another force, without such 
technology, crosses some symmetry threshold making the fight intrinsically unfair and thus 
unjust.”390 Establishing such a criterion would be, not only difficult, it would also be futile.  
     It is difficult to imagine just what such a threshold might encompass, according to what 
standard it might be measured, or how it could even possibly be implemented. Additionally, 
there is no requirement under international law that a war must be “fair,” in the sense intended by 
Gaillot. Indeed, if ever such a measure were instituted it would lead no doubt to a more 
protracted conflict with an even greater number of casualties.  
     The fact is that one of the conditions for a State to justifiably use legitimate force and enter a 
conflict is having a significant chance of success, this automatically creates a physical and 
theoretical imbalance at the outset. It is worth considering another point, relating to asymmetry, 
raised by Stephen Coleman who quite logically asserts that “International law on the issue makes 
it quite clear that combatants may legitimately be targeted at any time, and there is no reason to 
think that the legal situation might change simply because all the risk in a particular conflict 
seems to fall on one side.”391  Related to these previous concerns are questions surrounding the 
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strategic, operational and tactical assessments by the terrorists themselves, and their possible 
choices of retaliation.  
     Terrorists, insurgents and illegal combatants all have one thing in common. They have little 
or no defense against unmanned armed aircraft. Furthermore, they have little or no option of 
surrender. This dilemma forces them into a corner and it is important to consider the future 
possible consequences and analyze such a threat appropriately. Patrick Lin warns, “The Predator 
[and Reaper] UAV pilots in Las Vegas, half a world away from the robots they operate, would 
seem to be classified as combatants and therefore lawful targets of attack even when they are at 
home with family.”392 On the other hand those drone pilots who are civilians are just that 
civilians participating directly in hostilities. An interesting ethical question however arises 
concerning the status of those Air Force pilots engaged under the direct command and control of 
civilian organizations such as the CIA.  The obvious danger if one accepts such a line of thinking 
is that there is a distinct risk of opening the door to an expansion of the conflict and bringing it 
back full circle.  
     On the other side of the equation critics of this point of view argue that it is not a weapon 
system which decides upon the entering or not into armed conflict. Strawser considers unmanned 
technology as merely an extension of executive strategy, and in that respect, much the same as 
any other weapons platform; either manned or unmanned. Previously even long-range weapons 
such as artillery were still considered within the zone of combat. However, if we consider ships 
and distant airbases that have been used to launch attacks, then by logical extension it would 
indeed appear that drone pilots operating combat vehicles regardless their location, would 
indeed be justifiably legitimate targets. The geographical dimensions of the conflict are thus 
expanded to include personnel who directly participate in hostilities (DPH). 
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     There is one factor, however, which tends to be ignored by both parties in this debate and that 
is that with the adoption of unmanned technology the troops are no longer in harm’s way and no 
longer face the risk of death. This makes it both strategically and politically more feasible to 
resort to armed drones as the silver bullet solution to conflict resolution. Strawser admits as 
much himself when he states, “I grant that this worry about asymmetry created by improvements 
in military technology making it easier to go to war may well be a legitimate concern.”393 
How does the process behind the kill chain function? (outside the battlespace) 
According to available secret documents, there is some discrepancy between what was initially 
purported by Obama and the actual reality within the process itself. While Obama is involved in 
each approval (at the time of writing), he is not involved in the authorization of each individual 
strike. This is inconsistent with his claim to having a tight control over the process and indicates 
a far more discretionary process than had been originally declared. The process begins with the 
processed intelligence package, once it has been fully developed by JSOC (Joint Special 
Operations Command), in the field, being sent to the specific theatre commands—either 
AFRICOM or CENTCOM, depending upon the specific geographical location of the intended 
target. The file is then forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for further processing. From 
there is sent on to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) the final review in the process is attended 
by a special committee known as the Principals Committee of the National Security Council 
(NSC/PC, originally established under President George H.W. Bush).394 The NSC/PC also works 
in conjunction with their collectively titled Deputies Committee who serve as their seconds in 
command. The PC for all practical purposes is the membership of the NSC without the President 
and Vice President.395 Note that the basic structure of the NSC is as follows: The President, Vice 
President, the Secretary of State, Defense and Energy (since 2007), as well as any others the 
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President so chooses. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCOS) and the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI), serve in an advisory capacity. Please refer to the diagram in 
Appendix “K” for clarification. 
How does the process behind the kill chain function? (within the battlespace) 
While we have largely focused upon the aspects surrounding those operations other than in the 
authorized warzone areas of responsibility (AOR), it would be remiss to overlook actual 
targeting practices as they are conducted during legitimate combat operations as well. Much like 
those operations conducted outside the actual battlefield, these combat operations also follow a 
similar pattern of target analysis and selection prior to any approval. Targets are selected and 
designated according to their categories of importance and are then filtered along a chain of 
command to satisfy the applicable Target Selection Standards (TSS). The selection process is 
categorized according to the significance of the target (either in size or importance). The top 
targets are listed as category 1 and are attributed to the Division level commands. Category 2 are 
attributed to Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level. Categories 3 and four are handled at the 
Battalion Task Force (BN TF) level, and finally, Category 5 targets are designated as the 
responsibility of Company-level units. It should be noted that this process is employed for both a 
lethal, kill/destroy Course of Action (COA), as well as for less than lethal or behavioral 
capture/disrupt operations.396  
   The nomination process or selection of a target within the defined battlespace follows a simple 
five-step framework: The first two steps consist of nomination, which is followed by the target 
being developed. In the third phase, the target is then approved by various working groups and 
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passed for a review at what is referred to as a targeting Meeting.  Final approval is accorded by 
the commanding officer at the Targeting Board. 
     Regardless, whether the intended operation is inside or outside the battlespace there is a 
targeting cycle which is generally followed. This consists of 6 distinct phases:   
1. Commanders Objective – Guidance and intent 
2. Target Development – Nomination, Validation, Prioritization 
3. Capabilities Assessment – includes weaponeering 
4. Force Application – Planning and Assignment of roles 
5. Force Planning and Mission Execution 
6. Combat Assessment 
It is important to note two points prior to finishing the discussion on the kill chain. First, a strike 
can only be authorized after two forms of intelligence data have verified the target. Sometimes 
this can be flawed since much of that intelligence comes from a single source, the NSA.  The 
second point, to bear in mind is that regardless the operation, be it either within a selected 
combat zone or outside an actual theater of operations, the control of the operations requires a 
dedicated and reliable satellite uplink. This uplink reduces the time between the target in the 
strike zone and the drone sensor operator (doing the targeting) and pilot prosecuting the strike, in 
the United States. None of this would be possible without the satellite relay station situated in 
Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. It is via this base that information is transmitted from the 
battlespace back to the U.S., nor the drone control effected from the United States, with reduced 
latency. Appendices L and M provide images of both Creech Air Force Base in Indian Springs 
Nevada as well as the satellite Transmission station at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. 
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     Tabassum Zakaria, writing for Reuters presciently reported a rather paradoxical situation, 
“President Barack Obama, who vastly expanded the U.S. drone strikes against terrorism suspects 
overseas…is now seeking to influence global guidelines for their use as China and other 
countries pursue their own drone programs.”397 This statement if carried forth into policy would 
raise the following concerns which we have emphasized and addressed over the course of the 
current research: What are the existing moral, ethical, legal and technological boundaries which 
define the use of UAVs and UCAVs and how do these boundaries relate to autonomy and 
discretion?  Furthermore, how do these disparate phenomena interact and what specific criteria 
can be formally established and articulated between them?  
     The prediction that the U.S. would be forced to react due to an ever-increasing expansion of 
foreign development, expansion, and exploitation, has indeed come to fruition. The actual 
motives behind the move by the administration remain veiled. This maneuver may represent little 
more than a political sleight of hand to divert attention away from its own extensive use. The fact 
remains, nevertheless, that the previous administration was forced to recognize domestic and 
international disenchantment related to the expansive use of armed drones forcing acquiescence 
to external pressures, both at home and abroad; at least temporarily.  This fact has been coupled 
with and compounded by, mounting dangers represented by foreign development. Concerning 
this alternative approach evidenced by the administration, Zakaria, writing at the time 
emphasized that “Obama’s new position is not without irony. The White House kept details of 
drone operations- which remain largely classified – out of public view for years when the U.S. 
monopoly was airtight.”398  Now that there exists a threat on the horizon, perhaps the rules of 
play will need to be altered. 
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     That is not to say that such developments will remain steadfast or in force. Following on the 
heels of the previous announcement Kristina Wong writing for The Washington Times reported 
that in contradistinction to the calls for restraint laid at China’s portal, a new set of guidelines for 
commanders had been drawn up in October 2012. These new guidelines are far less restrictive in 
their language than previous ones. The language offers far greater discretion and autonomy to 
commanders in the field, particularly in relation to the prosecution of drone strikes. Wong points 
out that, “The [earlier] 2009 version directs military personnel to take reasonable precautions to 
ensure that civilians are not targeted in attacks; the 2012 version says service members should 
“avoid targeting” civilians.”399 Thus, the second version is even more nuanced and far laxer in its 
directives.  
     Thus, the apparent volte-face carried out by the Obama administration remains a mystery and 
forces us to ask the question, “How can the U.S, administration legitimately justify the call for 
greater restraints upon other states, regarding the use of armed drones, while at the same time 
relaxing the rules for its own military? The answer is obvious, they cannot, or at least they 
should not. Such a stance is both ethically unjustified and strategically unsound. Such a policy 
smacks of hypocrisy of the worst sort.  
     Part of the new guidance policy allows commanders, in the zones outside the traditional 
battlefields such as Yemen and Syria, to target individuals whose names they do not know. This 
is an apparent compromise, albeit a cosmetic one, between personality strikes and signature 
strikes that were carried out by the CIA in Pakistan. This new strategic approach has been 
labeled, Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes, or TADS. Critics are once again alarmed, perhaps 
with reason that the loosening of the constraints will revert to the previous pattern of expansive 
application and abuse. These disruption strikes, like much of the Obama strategy, are also 
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shrouded in a veil of secrecy, however, they are generally considered by many to be the same 
signature strikes with minor tweaks.400 
     Despite the apprehensions, the reports concerning civilian casualties have been encouraging, 
overall. Since 2014, there has been an appreciable decline in civilian casualties in Pakistan for 
instance. This may, however, be more the result of a dwindling number of high-value targets still 
available combined with a stronger reticence on the part of Pakistan to allow the strikes. Even 
though Obama has seen fit to relax the rules for military commanders, the CIA, appears, 
according to most reports, far better suited to the task of targeted elimination.  
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) 
It is worth taking a brief detour to discuss and examine more closely this concept since it is 
highly relevant and central to both the topics of intelligence gathering and targeted killing. Find, 
Fix, and Finish has been attributed to General Matthew Ridgway during his command in the 
Korean conflict and according to Peritz and Rosenbach, reformulated from an earlier maxim 
previously expressed by General Ulysses S. Grant.401 The core principles they express, however, 
date back as far as recorded military history and beyond. In this sense, it appears highly probable 
that the concept is a long-standing strategic perspective and that is integral to the art of war itself.  
     The concept was later worked into a more complete theoretical and functional framework, 
known as F3EA or Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit and Analyze, thus, rounding out the cyclic nature of 
the analytic process of two distinct military doctrines; tactical operations and intelligence 
surveillance and reconnaissance or ISR. The concept fuses the dual role of intelligence gathering 
with that of targeting selected enemies and kinetic operations. Known in its basic tactical 
doctrine form as simply FFF or F3, the strategic blending of tactical and ISR processes led to the 
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appellation F3EAD, or Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate, also pronounced as 
“feed” in special operations jargon.  
     The first half of the formula—Find (identification of the target), Fix (geolocation of the 
precise position of the target), and Finish (terminating the stated objective) refers to the 
identification of the threat, stabilization and subsequent elimination of the target. This represents 
the kinetic or tactical phase of the equation. Exploit, analyze and disseminate, were cherry-
picked from the intelligence cycle as being the most appropriate phases to combine with the 
kinetic operations.  
     Following a kinetic operation, the intelligence phase of the cycle kicks in and any valuable 
information relating to the, presumably, High Value Target (HVT), is then collected, Exploited, 
Analyzed and Disseminated (to the appropriate channels).  Ideally, this is represented in the 
formulation of intelligence-driven incident response,402 where intelligence drives operations and 
not the reverse. In law enforcement, this is referred to as Intelligence Led Policing or ILP.  
     One significant shortcoming with the F3EA formula, at least when employed exclusively for 
targeted killing, which is most often the case, is that the intelligence stops once the Finish 
segment is complete, leaving no further possibility for evaluation and analysis. Killing the source 
effectively closes the circle, but by the same token, permanently severs the opportunity of 
obtaining any more fruitful intelligence.  
     Cora Currier and Peter Maass, quite aptly and succinctly point out in The Assassination 
Complex, “…assassinations are intelligence dead ends.”403 Peritz and Rosenbach also echo this 
sentiment when stating that, “Many intelligence and military officials argue that detaining and 
interviewing terrorist suspects is the  most effective way to finish them, since they can provide 
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information that will allow the find-fix-finish cycle to begin again; the debriefing of one suspect 
can aid in locating, isolating, capturing or killing others.”404 General Stanley McChrystal clearly 
understood this from a commander’s perspective, and made far more effective tactical and 
operational use of the doctrine, in Iraq. “…by 2004, we had integrated ISR into F3EA, learning 
to weave together information from detainees and human sources (my emphasis) with expanding 
communications intelligence and then use aerial assets to build an understanding of a target’s 
behavior and potential links to the insurgency.”405 The problem is that by exercising a penchant 
for kill operations to the detriment of capture operations, there is often very little information or 
intelligence to be gleaned in the after-carnage of a Hellfire strike. This is indeed one major, and 
seemingly well founded, criticism of the unfettered use of drone strikes.  
     There has been little strategic balance employed in the kill/capture doctrine, as the 
administration has been loath to take prisoners opting instead for a more expedient, if 
shortsighted, option of liquidation. This may be also an indirect consequence related to the 
negative publicity surrounding past US capture and confinement policies; such as those exercised 
at Abu Ghraib406 and Guantanamo—water-boarding, enhanced interrogation, and the associated 
policy of extraordinary rendition.  
     Strategically, UCAVS create a debilitating effect upon the morale of the enemy. The fact that 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership are constantly concerned about their own safety and 
survival, means they have less time to ponder strategy and mount counteroffensive operations. 
This is the deterrent effect of their use. A leader who knows that he has become a target, or has 
been hit-listed, must not only be concerned with the complexities of coordination, planning his 
next operation and preparing an offensive, but must also be concerned for his own safety and 
personal welfare. These worries extend from communications to personal tracking and survival. 
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“Some leaders were becoming so concerned about the risk of electronic interception that 
communication between remaining operational leaders became more and more restricted,” note 
Peritz and Rosenbach.  
     This capability to detect, track, and monitor—to find, fix, and finish, seriously impacts 
operations and lowers the efficacy of the enemy organization. Additionally, there is suspicion 
sown within the rank and file causing many of the members to turn on one another like rabid 
dogs. 407 This can, and often does, lead to an internal pogrom with the secondary effects of 
creating yet greater insecurity, wavering loyalty, and over-cautiousness among the group. This 
practice, in turn, reduces the effectiveness and solidarity of the organization and limits 
recruitment efforts as well. An increased campaign of covert misinformation, by the intelligence 
services, if not in place, would be a positive and erstwhile tactical maneuver in this sense. This is 
currently part of the U.S. military’s “psyops” or psychological operations strategy. 
The Elephant and the Mouse: The advantages and disadvantages of asymmetry408 
 
“Guerilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation 
inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.” 




Many of America’s staunchest critics speak of the prowess, advanced technology and the shock 
and awe of its formidable military organizations. Yet these same critics fail to properly address 
the advantages accrued by opponents in an asymmetric conflict. It may seem, at first blush, 
counterintuitive that the weaker side disposes of any advantages, however, this has been the case 
for as long as asymmetric warfare has existed. The oft-quoted Sun Tzu recognized this inherent 
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strength in weakness and adversity “All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an 
enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he 
concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong. avoid him.”409 Facing an existential threat 
can prove a strong inducement to creative responses.      
     Overwhelming numerical strength and complex technological capabilities also create their 
own unforeseen vulnerabilities and burdensome systematic requirements. Indeed, author Peter 
Singer’s book, Wired for War, points to this concept in a section entitled, The curse of 
Superiority: Insurgency. Undoubtedly an exaggeration, the story of David and Goliath in the 
bible is just one example, while historically the battle of Thermopylae is yet another. Again, 
while exaggeration may have played a role in the descriptive nature of such tales, the weaker 
side certainly displayed marked advantages even though facing superior odds. 
    Samuel B. Griffiths who translated and wrote the introduction to Mao’s On Guerilla War (Yu 
Chi Chan), emphasizes that “Guerilla war is not dependent for success on the efficient operation 
of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of 
electronic computers. It can be conducted in any terrain, in any climate, in any weather; in 
swamps, in mountains, in farmed fields. Its basic element is man, and man is more complex than 
any of his machines.”410 Whether this still holds true, considering a future leaning increasingly 
toward full automation, will remain to be seen, however, Griffith’s points serve to underscore the 
principle that the weaker side of an asymmetric conflict also incurs certain advantages which 
may not be  immediately obvious.  
     Insurgents can strike at a moment’s notice and pick up and move as they please. Mao Tse-
tung pertinently remarked, “Some of our weaknesses as apparent only and are, in actuality, 
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sources of strength.”411 The element of surprise plays to their advantage. The asymmetric enemy 
can fight a shadow war while hiding among the civilian population. They are largely 
unconstrained by the rules to which modern armies must adhere. An insurgency, rebellion, or 
guerilla movement does not rely upon decisive victories in battle, nor do they maintain static 
defenses, common to orthodox positional warfare. Their strength lies in a strategy of highly fluid 
mobility. Insurgency movements fight wars of attrition. That is, they only need to stay the course 
and wear down the enemy’s resolve. Over the long-term support usually falters both 
internationally and domestically, and the belligerents are forced to the bargaining table. The 
calculus of the modern battlespace has, however, been altered using uninhabited aerial combat 
vehicles. By lowering the rates of attrition, belligerent states may stay the course far longer than 
was previously the case. We need only compare the conflicts of Vietnam and Afghanistan to 
fully comprehend such differences. 
     In Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), have been 
largely constrained by strategic imperatives tied to—the maintenance of stability, enforcing the 
rule of law, and enhancing the security of the local population. However, these imposed 
constraints have been somewhat mitigated using, enhanced intelligence surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR), effecting regular mounted patrols, embedding units among the locals, and 
protecting the civilian population of the host nation (HN). The title Counterinsurgency on the 
Ground in Afghanistan highlights the fundamental principles involved in conducting a 
counterinsurgency operation. These principles are identical to constraints already outlined in this 
research: “focus on the population, the primacy of politics, restraint in the use of force, and good 
governance.”412 Counterinsurgent strategy then inherently possesses certain disadvantages 
related to its implementation.  
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     The highly decentralized and autonomous regions of Afghanistan and Syria are political 
entities unto themselves. This means that no conclusive overarching strategy can be formally 
developed. The same comment applies equally to the conduct of military and civilian 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In an excerpt from the above research, the authors remark 
that “In Nawa district in central Helmand, the US Marines met with quick success, but efforts in 
Marjah just a short distance away ran into serious trouble—not because of different tactics, but 
because Marjah was a different sort of place.”413 Thus, from one area to another in Afghanistan, 
Syria, or elsewhere, while COIN operations may be effective in one part, the same tactics may 
equally fail in another. One point. However. remains certain, 4GW conflicts place powerful 
belligerents at a marked disadvantage and will continue to do so in the future. If they do not 
adapt to this new type of warfare, they simply shall not achieve their goals and objectives. It is 
worth quoting Hammes, at length, in this regard: 
Not only is 4GW the only kind of war America has ever lost, we have done so 
three times: Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also 
defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the USSR in Afghanistan. It 
continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and in other countries against the al-Qaeda network.414 
 
One clearly negative consequence related to asymmetric superiority is that the weaker side when 
pushed backs to the wall, may resort to unorthodox tactics that are adopted out of desperation. 
Thus, the repertoire of tactics used by insurgents may include, torture, rape, human shielding, 
and the use of weapons of mass destruction if available. Nevertheless, the lack of large-scale 
logistical requirements and the advantages of rapid speed and mobility are undeniable 
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advantages for the weaker participant in an asymmetric conflict. Additionally, the strong side 
belligerent may press home its advantage, employing even greater force, in an asymmetric 
conflict, in the face of diminishing resistance. In other words, the weaker the enemy the greater 
the effort and force pursued. 
     Newton’s third law of physics holds that for every action there is an equal and opposite 
reaction. 415 So too in military strategy, the same principle applies. Therefore, while swift 
mobility and lack of logistical complications may be an advantage to insurgent forces, these 
same advantages can equally serve the stronger force when properly managed and well-
organized. Some of the advantages of the weaker force, such as better knowledge of the terrain 
and environment, have been overcome with steady advances in technology, such as the forward-
looking infrared radar of the Reaper drone (and previously the predator), however, these have 
also been compromised by adverse weather conditions, poor intelligence, and pilot error. The 
purpose of these comparative strategic analyses is to show that in asymmetric warfare things are 
not as asymmetric as they may first appear. 
     While technology may present certain advantages to the superior force, it is not, in and of 
itself, insurmountable. Liquid jelly napalm, first developed by scientists during WWII, was 
improved and used extensively during the Vietnam conflict, along with drone surveillance.416 
Neither of these important additions to the tactical toolbox was significant enough to avoid 
ultimate defeat at the hands of a determined, ideologically motivated, and well-organized 
resistance. Hammes cogently remarks, “True believers in technology see warfare as being 
reduced to a one-sided contest where the technologically superior side dictates all action.”417 
Hopefully, the clarifications provided in this research will dispel any such conclusions.  
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     Hammes further hammers home the point that “We continue focus on technological solutions 
at the tactical and operational levels without a serious discussion of the strategic imperatives or 
the nature of the war we are fighting.”418 This is perhaps one of the most probing, concise and 
evocative statements contained within this entire research. Advanced technology can certainly 
play a leading role and offer significant advantages to the stronger side. When taken in isolation, 
however, it is but one, of a multitude of factors. Technology alone cannot account for the most 
decisive element—the “human factor” in warfare.   
     This obsession with an overreliance on technology as the “silver bullet” solution, to all our 
strategic woes, overlooks some very critical facts. Hammes continues by clarifying, “Because JV 
2010 (Joint Vision 2010, The DoD’s strategic outlook for the future at the time of writing) 
clearly prefers technology to people, it is a bit awkward to address the fact that information 
collection against today’s threats requires investment in human skills rather than technology.” 419  
Hammes notes that this strong axis on technology was mitigated, albeit slightly, in the later JV 
2020 version of the same strategy report.  
     This human factor includes and is influenced by variables such as motivation, skill, resilience, 
knowledge of the terrain, external aid and assistance, support of the local population, ideology, 
and other both measurable and immeasurable characteristics. I would, however, take exception 
with the rather exclusive approach adopted by Hammes and suggest a caveat. While human 
source intelligence (HUMINT) is certainly preferable and perhaps even more reliable than that 
acquired solely by technological means, it is sometimes simply impossible to obtain. 
Technological intelligence should serve as a complement to HUMINT, and not be considered as 
a competitor. The problem, as Hammes so rightfully points out is the overreliance and blind faith 
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in technology. Tangentially, this observation raises the question as to what possible tactical 
responses exist to counter such superior technological asymmetry. 
Summary 
This chapter was dedicated to understannding several interrlated topics of strategic importance, 
most notably, the political and  military process behind a targeted killing order and the 
subsequent ramifications related to initiating and conducting that process. While the chapter on 
targeted killing covered the operational and ethical aspects of targeted  killing, this section was 
more closely focused upon the strategic and political charactersitics.  
     The examination began with an exploration of the phenomenon of asymmetry. Asymmetry is 
often lost in the shuffle when speaking of more controversial topics such as robotic warfare, 
anticipatory self-defense, targeted killing and collateral damage. Nevertheless, asymmery is 
central to all these topics and the advent of transnational armed conflict. Again this term, 
transnational armed conflict is a descriptive term of the art that I have adopted to descripe the 
sort of current international conflicts taking place. This is not a recognized legal status such as 
that of IAC or NIAC. 
     It was further noted that modern warfare due to this specific asymmetric character is no less 
violent or lawless than that of previous conflicts. In some respects it is perhaps even more 
violent. Asymmetry creates a vicious self-suustaining cycle of attacks and reprisals, followed by 
counter attacks and yet even more reprisals in response to these counter attacks. When a 
belligerant develops a new technology to counter enemy tactics, the enmy responds by devloping 
a countermeasure. Even some of the most sophisticated technology has been frustrated through 
the employment of often crude and basic counter-technology. Thus, while the face of modern 
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warfare may be different from that of its predecessors, the character, nonetheless, remains the 
same. 
     The discussion then turned to a consideration of the various types of asymmetry. According to 
Schmitt there exist two classes of asymmetry: positive, which reinforces the advantage of one 
belligerent over another and negative asymmetry, where an enemy’s weakness can be 
exploited.420 Related to this the research postulated a few other variants or categories of 
asymmetry. These included: logistical, doctrinal or operational and technological asymmetry. 
These observations led to the consideration of the asymmetric threshold, as suggested by Gaillot. 
According to this view, there arises a certain point at which the asymmetry is theoretically so 
disproportionate that the conflict becomes “unfair.”  
      This research argued that while proportionality must be respected, fairness was not a 
justifiable criteria or legal requirement of international humanitarian law. Fairness, in the sense 
of combatant equality, is a moral construct not a legal one. The harsh truth is that warfare has 
always been a matter of asymmetry; an attempt by one side to gain the upper hand over their 
adversary, either by strength of numbers or advances in battlefield technology. 
     Even were it possible to wage war with an equal opportunity afforded to both sides, two 
additional considerations preclude the success of such a hypothetical venture. First, leveling the 
playing field would necessarily result in a more protracted and drawn out conflict, which would 
inevitably produce far greater numbers of casualties on both sides. The second factor is related to 
the just-war requirement that the belligerent, defending a just cause, must foresee a reasonable 
chance of success, prior to engaging in hostilities. Surely, in a scenario with such a fifty-percent 
ratio as proposed by Gaillot the chances for success would be drastically reduced and counter the 
jus as bellum, just-war prescription.  
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     Continuing with the investigation of the theme of asymmetry, the research turned to the 
paradox presented by remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs). The argument that guerilla fighters 
cannot surrender to pilotless aircraft was addressed. This is however an extremely weak 
argument since, they cannot surrender to bombers or fighter jets either. In fact, as this research as 
shown, there were instances of Iraqi soldiers doing just that—surrendering to pilotless aircraft, 
during the Persian Gulf War. Another often overlooked consideration in the asymmetry equation 
is the fact that while the pilots and sensor operators are maneuvering their craft from distant 
locations, that spatial separation does not render them immune to reprisals. This fact also need to 
be considered when considering the moral aspect of combatant equality. Enjoining this option, 
however, also carries the risk of extending the battlefield in an already rapidly expanding 
battlefront. 
     At the end of the day, UCAVs represent nothing more than an advance technological platform 
for kinetic engagement, much the same as any other aircraft, vehicle or ship. The level of its 
sophistication does not preclude its legal, moral or ethical employment. The decision to engage 
drones to accomplish lethal missions rests the responsibility of the military under the guidance of 
the executive branch of government. These different observations led to our oft-repeated concern 
expressed throughout this research that various factors including: a reduced risk to personnel; the 
facility offered, and the safety afforded by unmanned aerial combat vehicles, lowers the bar for 
resorting to armed conflict as the “go to” solution in the mediation of international disputes. 
     The following segment was concerned with the operative processes of the “kill chain” outside 
the recognize battle space. This refers directly to the chain of responsibility and decision-making 
involved in the processing of targets. This process has been graphically displayed in Appendix K 
for easier understanding. It was shown that the explanations provided by the Obama White 
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House, following the revelation of certain secret documents, differed from the reality. Contrary 
to the assertions initially made, it was shown that, while Obama was involved in each approval , 
he was not involved in the authorization of each individual strike. This discrepancy resented an 
important distinction placed questions as to his claims of having a tight control over the process.  
     The strikes outside the zones of actual combat allotted to the CIA, were the most 
controversial. The reason for this is the obvious violation of sovereignty they represent. This 
raised the lingering specter of the ongoing debate between the question of sovereignty and 
anticipatory self-defense strategy. This ongoing debate has never been adequately resolved and 
this research calls for enhanced research to address this contentious issue. 
      As for the process itself, the order for the approval of a target follows a well-designed 
hierarchy. Parts of this chain have allegedly been short-circuited depending upon the intelligence 
provided and the existing window of opportunity. In principle the process begins with 
intelligence gathering in the field by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) the finished 
intelligence package is then distributed to the various commands in the target’s geographical area 
of responsibility (AOR), The file is passed to the  Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and after processing 
it goes to the  Secretary of  Defense (SecDef), At this point the file is passed up to the National 
Security Council’s Principals Committee (NSC/PC) for final approval. Logically it appears 
highly unlikely and somewhat strategically and operationally counterintuitive that every target 
on the kill list is approved in this manner, given the limited opportunity and time sensitive 
imperatives at stake. Still there has been no evidence, yet, to either confirm or deny such a 
conjecture. 
     The research then turned to the question of the kill chain process, within the actual recognized  
zones of armed conflict. The targeting analysis and selection process, unsurprisingly is very 
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similar to that employed when targeting outside the recognized zone. The targets in question are 
sleected according to their importance and are filtered alon the appropriate chain of command to 
verify their suitability according to the  targeting slection standards (TSS). 
     According to their level of significance, importance or challenge posed, the various targets are 
designated a command priority status as follows, from most imortant to least important: Category 
1, is attributed to Division level; category 2, to Brigade Combat Team level (BCT); categories 3, 
and  4 to Battalion Task Force level (BN TF), and finally, category 5 targets are assigne to 
Company level responsibility. This target selection process is equally applicable be it a kill or 
destroy operation, or a capture or distupt intervention. The process inside the  AOR, follows a 
similar but more streamlined application than that employed for the more delicate extra-
operational activities. It is a five step process. The first two stages involve the nomination 
process. This is followed by the target being developed. In the third phase, the target obtains 
approval from the working groups and it is then passed for a review at a targeting Meeting.  Final 
approval is given by the commanding officer at the Targeting Board. 
     Regardless whether inside or outside an actual zone of conflict a targeting cycle is employed 
in the conduct of operations. This cycle, like many others reflects a business management model 
of the ubiquitous decision-making process (identify; inform; evaluate; implement; reevaluate). 
The targeting process consists of six stages: Commanders Objective (Guidance and intent); 
Target Development (Nomination, Validation, Prioritization); Capabilities Assessment (includes 
weaponeering); Force Application (Planning and Assignment of roles); Force Planning and 
Mission Execution; Combat Assessment.  
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     It is important to emphasize that there are two fundamental requirements related to the 
targeting process. The first is procedural the second is logistical. First there is a requirement for 
two forms of verifiable intelligence required in every targeting decision. The down side to this 
requirement is that this intelligence can be faulty whether it is human or technologically based. 
Additionally, much of the intelligence is supplied by a single source, the National Security 
Agency (NSA).  
     The second requirement is that of a dedicated satellite uplink to conduct operations. This 
uplink compensates for the vast differences in time and geographical distance which separate the 
pilot and target. Satellite relay stations such as that in Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany, help 
to provide this essential bridge for the conduct of operations in the field. 
     Next in line for examination was the extremely important strategic concept of Find, Fix, 
Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD). This  srtategic conspet has been attributed 
to General Matthew Ridgeway, commading General during the Korean War, who inturn possibly 
developed them from precepts first promoted  by Ulysses S. Grant. The principles they advance, 
however, date to the distant past.  
     The theoretical perspective was expanded to incorporate the vital field of intelligence. This 
move combined the best of both worlds; intelligence and military strategy. The definition is 
relatively straight forward. Find refers to the process of correctly identifying and validating the 
target. Fix refers to geolocating the threat and situating it within the threat environment. Finish 
refers to the actual process involved with eliminating the potential threat the target poses. Exploit 
analyze and disseminate are elements of the intelligence cycle. Exploit refers to putting lessons 
learned, and any intelligence fallout that may occur, to good use. Analyze refers to a post-strike 
consideration based on evaluating any mistakes which may have occurred in the conduct of the 
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operation and to avoid committing similar errors in future operations. Disseminate refers to 
getting the message and intelligence to those who require it on a “need to know” basis. 
     It was advanced that one strategic shortcoming of this formula is its finality. By eliminating 
targets, the door to future intelligence is definitively closed. In this regard many writers have 
urged caution and called for a better balance in the kill/capture paradigm. The Obama 
administration was especially guilty of relying upon the strike versus capture option in its policy. 
It was suggested that part of the reticence to take captives, besides the adoption of a decapitation 
strategy were the negative repercussions related to the scandals of Abu Gharib, Guantanamo, 
accusations of torture, the tactic of waterboarding and the process of extraordinary rendition. 
     In the segment entitled, The Elephant and the Mouse, the advantages and disadvantages of 
asymmetry were considered. While it may seem counterintuitive to speak of the advantages of 
asymmetry, as they relate to the weaker side, it was shown that the weaker side in fact disposes 
of several important advantages in an asymmetric conflict. It was mentioned that overwhelming 
strength, and superior technology carry their own burdens related to complexity and logistics. 
     The rapid mobility of guerilla forces is but one distinct advantage. They can quickly evade 
contact and capture and blend into the surrounding environment. The element of surprise and the 
ability to mount lightning fast strikes, are other benefits. Finally, insurgent elements most often 
have no fixed of static positions to defend, making them less vulnerable to attack by the stronger 
force. Time is on their side and as Mao Tse-tung, opined, they need merely to wage a war of 
attrition and out wait the diminishing resolve of their adversary. Another decided disadvantage to 
the adoption of drones as a strategy, as opposed to using them properly as a tactic, is the fact that 
insurgents without hope or choice, will often resort to barbaric responses in desperation. 
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     The discussion then evolved to cover considerations on the current battlefields. It was 
advanced that, while modern technology can provide certain strong advantages it is not a “one-
shot-one-kill,” solution to the complexities of fourth generation insurgent warfare. 
Unsurprisingly there have been numerous calls for a more comprehensive approach to 
conducting armed conflict; one which combines the human element with that of advanced 


















“Every conclusion drawn from our observations is, as a rule, premature, for behind the 
phenomena which we see clearly are other phenomena that we see indistinctly, and perhaps 
behind these latter, yet others which we do not see at all.”  
―Charles-Marie Gustave Le Bon (1895) 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Examination of the Four Hypotheses 
An interesting phenomenon is that while conducting a lengthy research project, such as this, 
answers to the proposed hypotheses evolve on a day to day basis and can result in unexpected 
findings. The responses themselves are perhaps developed out of necessity for finding solutions 
to the problems which plague us. This is particularly the case with questions relating to military 
phenomena since the battlefields represent living laboratories where theories are tested and 
validated or eventually disproven over the course of time. The first two hypotheses we presented 
at the outset of this research have been positively validated or are in the process of validation, 
while the third and fourth show a strong positive correlation. We shall examine each of these 
hypotheses in turn.  
The first hypothesis  
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The first hypothesis is somewhat rhetorical in nature. The widespread use of drones will become 
ever more prevalent in the modern battlespace. Reduced risk to personnel, plausible deniability, 
and increased public support, foreshadows an increased use of armed drones as the “go to” 
response for conflict resolution.  
Given the inherent success of this technology in the hunter-killer role and its associated political 
expediency, it is the opinion of this research that resort to the use of armed drones will only 
increase in the future.  
The assertions of this hypothesis have certainly been confirmed by a wide variety of sources, and 
barring any unforeseen changes in the geopolitical, environmental, or economic climate, this 
hypothesis is destined to be a rule rather than an exception in the near and immediate future. This 
has been confirmed and cited by numerous official sources and academic writers and has 
followed a predictable trend since the inception of the drone campaigns in 2002. The future most 
likely will entail the increased use of a combination of small units of specialized forces guided 
by enhanced intelligence and supported by remotely piloted aircraft.  
      Reduced risk to personnel, plausible deniability, and increased public support, foreshadows 
an increased use of armed drones as the “go to” response for conflict resolution. Again, not only 
will drones become more prevalent, as was asserted in the initial hypothesis, they will be 
resorted to more frequently as a form of conflict resolution for the many important reasons that 
have been outlined within this research.  
     To politically risk-adverse governments, they represent the best return on investment (ROI). 
Given the fact that they avoid capture and excessive loss of or injury to belligerent troops and 
thus meet with widespread public approval. They are, therefore, both politically advantageous 
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and expedient. They offer a measure of political deniability with proper control and under the 
right circumstances. They are economically efficient and can be easily replaced when compared 
with alternative weapons systems. They are precise and multi-faceted; they can gather vital 
information and intelligence and strike a devastating blow to an unsuspecting enemy. Any 
disadvantages are far outweighed by the advantages they offer.  
     The problem is that they are a tactical instrument and relying upon them as a political strategy 
for conflict resolution is a very short-sighted policy. Such reliance, over the long term, does more 
harm than good. Additionally, the facility afforded, by their enhanced impact and cost-
effectiveness, may well lead to their abuse and unfettered use as an instrument of choice due to 
their political expediency. A lack of profound strategic reflection combined with the long-term 
negative consequences of such abuse remains a clear and present danger. There has been a 
distinct failure on the part of politicians to strategically employ Occam’s razor rather than 
considering a more comprehensive strategy. War, much like a novel, has a beginning, a middle, 
and an end. The conclusion is as equally important, if not more so than the beginning. To reduce 
international conflict these post-conflict considerations will require much greater effort and 
commitment. 
      Additionally, it is not only the United States, at this point, which is employing drones, but 
other states as well. While the use of armed drones, has remained relatively modest, if it is not 
regulated at the international level by a designated body, this stable balance will not continue in 
the future. This has certainly been the case with other previous military technology. From the 
advent of the Egyptian war chariot, Hannibal’s use of elephants, and the Bezerrillo attack hounds 
employed by the conquistadors to nuclear and biological weapons, anti-personnel mines, and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), tactics and technology have always evolved to meet 
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battlefield requirements. If one side has advanced technological military hardware, then the other 
side wants it and shall inevitably procure it, or at least develop a form of counter technology. 
This was evidenced in the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) initiative.421  
The Second Hypothesis 
The Second hypothesis proposed that “A new, revised, and enforceable set of laws and rules of 
engagement should be developed and clearly defined. They shall succeed only if they are shaped 
through unified political will and coherent, but flexible policies.  
This has been the thrust and the contention of this book. Thus, an increased resort to this lethal 
technology also calls for some sort of oversight in its application.  
While there have been numerous efforts to develop some sort of coherent policy, outlined within 
the corpus of this title, none of them have had any significant or conclusive impact. While such 
efforts have been meritorious, a group of researchers bantering ideas back and forth over a period 
of ten years does little to advance the cause of establishing an effective and functional 
framework. Meanwhile innocent people die. The only way to instill a change is through 
international mediation in the form of treaties and protocols and the establishment of an 
international regulatory body with effective powers of enforcement. The time for doing so is 
already past, and it is now time to play catch up. The fact that such a need still exists is 
evidenced by the never-ending polemic surrounding their use and failure to achieve agreement, 
which attests to the continued importance of finding a resolution. This task of self-regulation 
cannot be left to the individual States, given that historically international oversight is at best a 
weak instrument and that such a policy would further prove counterproductive to their own 
vested geopolitical interests. The problem is there is no international body with the power or 
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authority to force states to toe the line. This calls to mind the earlier, Cold-War nuclear doctrine 
of  Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Perhaps the same sort of self-interest and fear of 
proliferation could eventually motivate states towards regulation.   
The Third Hypothesis 
 The third hypothesis stated, “Unmanned aerial vehicles will become more independent, precise, 
and increasingly autonomous in the political and military decision-making process.”  
More production and greater use shall also require more intensive training and more hours “in 
the air.” Mockenhaupt writing in 2009 presciently underlined that “…in coming years, the Air 
Force figures it will need more than one million UAV hours annually to be prepared for future 
wars.”422 Jane Mayer bore witness to this prediction as well when she added “The government 
plans to commission hundreds more [drones], including new generations of tiny ‘nano’ drones, 
which can fly after their prey like a killer bee through an open window.”423 Nanotechnology 
represents an important component in the evolution of robotic warfare. Examination of this topic 
must, unfortunately, be reserved for future research efforts.  
     While some critics discount the possibility of such seemingly outrageous developments—
particularly that of complete robotic autonomy, history has often shown that society has a 
propensity for underestimating its own technological wizardry. Singer also underscores this 
important point, concerning the promise that future technology may hold, compared with rash 
judgments of the period.  He compares this pessimism with the reluctance to adopt the machine 
gun during WWI and the tank to replace the faithful and trusted horse; both decisions, which had 
their own catastrophic consequences for the skeptics.424 That the widespread use of drones will 
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become ever more prevalent in the modern battlespace, cannot be questioned given daily 
accounts on their widespread employment in the conduct of various military operations. 
 It might be considered the logical consequence related to the political and military allure of 
armed drones. Not only will they become more ubiquitous and numerous, they also shall exhibit 
increased autonomy through the use of artificial intelligence (AI). While not yet a “fait 
accompli” the amount of research and effort dedicated to bringing these ends offers partial 
validation of this hypothesis. Nawaz, for instance. considers that “Drone warfare is a sign of the 
times. Unmanned weapons systems and aircraft, whether operating on land or sea, appear to be 
ascendant in terms of preference and costs.”425 Mary Ellen O’Connell cogently adds, “The next 
developments in drone technology will be improvements in precision, reliability, and 
automation.”426 Such development obviously portends an increase not only in numbers, as 
suggested in the first hypothesis but in usage as well. 
     This evolutionary process, combining artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, has also been 
proven throughout the foundational research conducted and presented within this work. The 
trend is a steady, ever-increasing pace, which places more than fifty different nations currently at 
various stages in the development of fully autonomous aircraft.427  Previous statements by the 
Obama administration, concerning possible international regulation, hint at a concern for this 
expanding trend of proliferation. Such a call for international regulation was one of the main 
objectives of the research behind this book and appears to be inevitable in the future given the 
current state of geopolitical relations. Singer presciently alluded to such a paradigm, “We may 
even one day see the need to set up an international body to help the world navigate the tough 
issues that surround robotics, much like the World Health Organization or the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.”428 All three of the initial hypotheses, therefore appear, to be validated 
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and provide the basis for further research on establishing the actual specific boundaries and 
limitations associated with this new technology and its use. These concerns at the international 
level, it should be noted, extend beyond the military use and the employment of drone warfare 
addressed in this research. 
The Fourth Hypothesis 
This hypothesis was developed at a later point in the research.  
The war against terror is both ideological and kinetic. A more coherent approach, such as that 
afforded by effects-based operations, is required to achieve any measure of lasting success. It 
has become abundantly clear we can no longer rely merely upon a tactic to defeat a violent 
ideology. While counterterrorism efforts must, by necessity include a physical response, equal 
efforts must also be afforded to ideological countermeasures as well.429 Thus, as reiterated 
frequently throughout this research, a different strategy and new approaches to combat this 
plague are called for. “Unfortunately, political, demographic, and religious trends since World 
War II indicate that the future wars will be complex, confusing, and nasty 4GW struggles rather 
than the simpler conflicts of earlier generations”430 presciently remarks Hammes. If this is indeed 
true—and it certainly appears to be, then civilization has come full circle, returning to Hobbes’ 
foreboding prognosis of “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." 431  Which has been resuscitated, despite the existence 
of sound and organized government. In other words, a reversion to absolute or total war as 
opposed to limited progressive warfare with clearly defined goals. 
      One readily available instrument resides in enhancing cross-border security. To eliminate the 
danger, we must also eliminate the threat. This can be accomplished by restricting immigration 
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and enforcing enhancing controls at border entry points. Of course, this will not eliminate the 
threat, but it will go far in reducing it. Enforcing stricter controls and measures of security are 
not racist policies, as some allege. They are sound practices for ensuring national security. It 
makes no more sense to offer shelter and comfort to terrorists than it does to feed a rabid dog or 
to harbor and nurture a deadly disease.432 Restricting the entrance of the threat reduces our need 
to combat it after the fact. Additionally, those subversive radical elements—already embedded 
within and being nurtured by the system, preaching violence and inciting the flames of hatred 
must be dealt with in a firm manner, facing either prison sentences or if feasible expulsion. Such 
policies must, of course, be balanced with legitimate humanitarian needs. Given the current 
geopolitical climate and the existential threats posed to States, the interests of national security 
must prevail first and foremost. Those truly in need of assistance should not be ignored or turned 
away. Balance, as so often stressed throughout this research, is the key.    
Specific Recommendations 
The critics and proponents of drone warfare present ethical arguments, statistics, studies and 
various research as well as their own interpretations in support of their claims. Unfortunately, 
none of these is sufficient enough, either by themselves or in conjunction with one another, to 
garner full support. There is a need to respect the reality on the ground and the position of the 
current research has been the following in that regard: Drones are legal when used in accordance 
with the law of armed conflict: point of law; they can also be an effective tool as part of an 
overall strategy. They should be used with parsimony and are not a replacement of all types of 
combat operations. They should adhere, as best possible, even given the fog or war, to the rules 
of law relating to noncombatants, while respecting the principles of necessity and 
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proportionality. Drone strikes should be based upon solid intelligence which has been verified by 
multiple sources.  
1.  Removal of the applicability of signature strikes as a legitimate criterion 
 
The humanitarian constraints which are integral to the laws of war, which clearly establish and 
define noncombatants, must be respected. They must be respected not merely because they are 
ethically and legally binding, but for more pragmatic reasons as well. They are the right thing to 
do. The respect for the principle of discrimination is incumbent upon all states according to the 
laws of war. The failure to apply and follow the rules regarding the respect of noncombatant 
systems would automatically delegitimize the user and open the door for widespread abuse and 
retaliation. Respect of these rules is based upon long-standing historical precedent. Signature 
strikes are perhaps more accurately described by their pejorative sobriquet of “crowd killing.”433 
A pattern of life, while it can certainly provide positive intelligence cannot serve as the single 
criteria for justifying the legitimate use of state-sponsored force. The signature strikes were first 
authorized by President George W. Bush for use by the CIA in Pakistan in 2008. While they still 
exist, they have garnered less attention in recent years, yet nevertheless remain a distasteful part 
of the counterterrorism strategy.  
 
2.  Establishment of an independent, international body for oversight and regulation.  
 
 One of the core suggestions of this research has been geared toward the possible need for the 
creation of an international supervisory board for the control of robotics. Such a board could, in 
principle, be delegated by the UNSC, a “5th Gen” Court or Committee, to draft, oversee and 
enforce guidelines and restrictions on the use of robotic and cybernetic warfare. The creation of 
such a body necessarily would face an uphill battle given the reticence of States to concede any 
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power to international bodies when it is not in their own interest. Another possibility would be 
the establishment of domestic “drone courts,” as proposed by Amos Guiora. These courts could, 
in turn, be overseen through international arbitration.  
 
     For the moment the fact is that the drones are not autonomous, and there is a human in the 
loop. There exist two considerations that would eventually render oversight a more pressing 
issue. The first is a massive proliferation of the use of robotic weapons. While we have spoken 
here only of aircraft, this consideration must be expanded to cover all types of platforms 
including ground vehicles and maritime craft as well. Widescale research and production is not 
some distant and imaginary concept is currently in the process of being materialized. The 
powerful States, which do not already dispose of such technology are well on their way to 
acquiring it, either through production or purchase. Enhanced technology will make these craft 
stronger, stealthier, faster and more lethal than ever before; the future is now.  
     The second consideration concerns that of full autonomy. Full autonomy exists. Autonomy in 
this respect refers to artificial intelligence (AI) and independent decision-making by robotic 
entities. The development and implementation of such technology is not a question of if, but one 
of when. Further research into the advantages and disadvantages (not just the advancement and 
development) and the ethical components requires further research and study. Such research 
should be conducted at present and incorporated at the time of research and development (R&D) 
and not after the “craft has rolled out from its hangar.”434 Closely related to the concerns about 





This research has been designed to examine the legal, ethical, moral, technological, and strategic 
aspects of these precise and lethal weapons, their intimate relationship with terrorism and to seek 
a response to the following questions:  
1. What are the existing moral, ethical, legal and technological boundaries involved in the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and uninhabited aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs)? 
Response: Are drones legal? The response is yes…but. The “but” in this instance, refers to the 
limitations and boundaries clearly established and laid out in the ground work of the current 
research. They are legally permissible when: used in a responsible and discriminate matter as a 
tactical weapon of choice. When employed as a counterterrorism strategy destined to save lives 
and restore justice.  When they flout international law by the blatant disregard of sovereignty to 
satisfy vested national interests, they are neither legal nor ethically justifiable. They are ethically 
and morally repugnant when used excessively and in an indiscriminate manner or to execute and 
assassinate heads of state and impose policy in States with whom they are not at war.  
     There are no different or distinct legal boundaries which apply to the use of  armed robotic 
aircraft as opposed to any other type of weapons system. They are bound by the same 
conventions which apply to bombers, ships and cruise missiles. On the other hand, there are a 
number of reflections which have been made as to the ethical and strategic value of such 
systems. Greater clarification and research will be required to elucidate the best possible 
practices in the use of such armament. This is particularly the case in regard to fully autonomous 
weapons systems. We have emphasized that while armed drones may be a legally permissible 
response to a  threat they may not always be the most optimal political, strategic, or ethical 
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solution. The same reflections also extend to, as yet, untested and untried systems of the futures 
such as satellite warfare.  
     Are drones ethical and moral? Again, the response is a resounding yes, but only under the 
provisions specified and in conjunction with the guidelines provided throughout the body of this 
research. They are morally and ethically incumbent when they are used in accordance with the 
ideals of justice. When they are used to end suffering, alleviate hardship and restore justice. The 
moral and ethical use of drones in the combat against international terrorism correlates strongly 
with the legal justifications. As we have emphasized repeatedly throughout this research the 
relationship between, morality, ethics and law, while not identical is a very close one. 
2. How do these boundaries relate to autonomy and discretion? 
Response: Fully autonomous weapons systems will eventually place great strains upon both 
international law and international relations. The most pressing issue is one of responsibility and 
accountability. Who will be held accountable in the case of severe malfunction and violations of 
international law…engineers? Politicians? The military commander on the ground? IT 
technicians and data programmers? Perhaps all, none, or a mixture of these. Such ambiguity 
relating to legal, ethical, and strategic responsibility, discretion, and accountability needs to be 
addressed with great urgency. Fully autonomous systems are currently in use, while others have 
advanced significantly along the research and development chain. The best possible course of 
action is taken prior to some unforeseen catastrophe. Waiting for the “other shoe to drop,” should 
not be an option; it is waiting too long. Should other states  begin to develop and employ robotic 
weapons systems with the same gusto and margin of flexibility as was exhibited by the Obama 
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administration, the result would be international chaos. Such lethal technology already exists in 
many states, all that is missing is foresight and international guidance. 
3. Furthermore, how do these disparate phenomena interact and what specific criteria can be 
formally established and articulated between them? 
Response: While the legal and ethical considerations are very closely linked they are by no 
means identical. As we mentioned earlier in this work, while ethical considerations are often 
later framed as legal edicts this is not a ubiquitous process by any means. Something may be 
entirely legal yet wholly unethical and vice versa. The key is in attempting to maintain a  
balance. There must be a greater regard for balancing international law with the power and 
vested interest of the individual states. This represents a herculean task and it is doubtful, given 
the historical record, that success may ever be completely guaranteed. As mentioned and  
proposed throughout the body of this text various international organs, agencies and 
commissions could, and indeed should, be involved in addressing these important issues relating 
to the legal and ethical use of all robotic development in general and lethal robotics in particular. 
Furthermore, while ethical implications are not legally binding they should induce pause for 
reflection. The ultimate goal of warfare, justice, has always been superseded by and relegated to 
an inferior position when held against the interests of state power. 
     Discourse by itself, regardless how clear or convincing, is simply an exercise in cognitive 
futility. It is simply not enough unless it is linked to some concrete proposals and offers of 
tentatively viable solutions. This research originally proposed and called for a modification and 
redrafting of the existing laws of war—that they be updated by international consensus to better 
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reflect the reality of armed conflict in the 21st century. A radical change of the legal regime could 
be avoided if a much more effective system of enforcement and control be implemented. 
     Also suggested were several initial steps which, with a modicum of goodwill, could serve to 
both enhance international security while limiting the exercise of abusive power and the 
expansion of armed conflict. This is a tall order bordering on the Utopian and dependent upon a 
global effort. If we do not plant the seed, however, the tree shall never grow, and it shall 
certainly never bear fruit. There are no absolute truths, no entirely right or wrong answers, 
merely more questions in the search for elucidation to many of these ethical, moral, and legal 
dilemmas. “Right,” or “wrong,” is a sliding scale and most often depends upon where you stand 
according to your own set of perceptions and beliefs at the time you express them. 
      Of course, some things are clearly wrong, cannot be tolerated and need to be rectified. This is 
the principle behind both natural law and common law. Slavery, genocide, terrorism (in its true 
sense), and piracy are malum in se—clearly wrong and need to be eradicated, but they must not 
become the springboard for yet further abuse and open the door to the expansion of national 
agendas. While theory lies in the domain of speculation, the time to pass from theory, to 
implementation by actors of change is largely overdue. The problems are real, the victims are 
real and the human loss and suffering on all sides is very real—everyone bleeds red.  A new, 
viable and normative standard of ethical behavior is needed to reduce violence and enhance 
geopolitical stability. The most powerful nations must be the harbingers of peace and democracy, 
as well as the ones who defend the helpless and dispense justice where and when it is needed.  
     Many of the sources utilized within this book offer valuable insights. When examined 
collectively they offer possibilities for the formation of a logical and cohesive approach towards 
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defining a strategic policy regarding targeted killing and the issue of drone warfare. Drone 
warfare and targeted killing, both evil necessities, in the battle against transnational terrorism, are 
intimately linked as though they were some sort of Siamese twin of 5th—Generation warfare 
wreaking vengeance and dispensing justice to those who cannot defend themselves.   
 The findings of this research call for a blend of optimistic hopefulness, which is morally and 
ethically balanced by the constraints of power politics. Although laws appear to be monolithic, 
nothing in life is immutable and life itself is patterned upon a constant process of change and 
evolution. People change and so too must the societies in which they live. We have seen the 
important influence that ideas and perceptions hold over the development of normative ethics. 
Ethics, the foundational cornerstone of law, are nebulous and adapt accordingly to encompass 
new realities. Ethical changes will inevitably exercise a significant impact upon the laws they 
generate.  We may hope one day to see an improved, more just and balanced strategy; a strategy 
fosters a more morally acceptable, ethically sound and strategically wise approach to conflict 
management and resolution. While there is indeed reason to be optimistic, there is also reason to 
fret over excessive complacency and back peddling which are wont to haunt all efforts at 
improvement.      
     It is important to point out that this dissertation has not merely been meant to serve an 
academic exercise in defining the distinction between existing positive law values, or those laws 
already existing, and normative values, or those that ought to exist. It is meant, rather, to serve as 
a real wakeup call for real action—a call for an active, efficient and effective restructuring of the 
laws of war—that they continue to carry the light of humanity into the darkest reaches of human 
conflict. Again, such a restructuring could be avoided if the proper enforcement mechanisms 
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4GW: (Also referred to as “netwar) 
Fourth Generation Warfare: widely 
considered as guerilla type 
insurgency warfare commencing 
with Mao Tse-tung. Thomas 
Hammes defines 4GW as: the use of 
“all available networks—political, 
economic, social, and military—to 
convince the enemy’s decision 
makers that their strategic goals are 
either unachievable or too costly for 
the perceived benefit.”435 
9-Line Command: The sequential 
checklist and command to be entered 
when engaging a target 
AAR: Air-to-air refueling 
AASM: Armement Air-Sol 
Modulaire (Air-to-Ground Modular 
Weapon)  
ABI: Activity Based Intelligence 
ACF: Anti-Coalition Forces 
AFO: Advance Force Operations 
(most often occurring in zones that 
are not official battle-zones).  
AGI: Artificial General Intelligence 
(Strong AI)  
AGF: Anti-Governmental Forces 
AGM: Air to Ground Missile 
AI: Artificial Intelligence/Airborne 
Interceptor 
ANSA: Armed non-state actor 
AO: Area of Operations 
AOI: Area of Influence  
AOR: Area of responsibility 
APG: Aerial Precision Geolocation. 
AQAP: al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (formerly AQY) 
AQI: al-Qaeda in Iraq 
AQIM: al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb 
AQSL: al-Qaeda Senior Leadership 
AQY: al-Qaeda in Yemen 
ARGUS-IR/IS: Autonomous Real-
time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance 
– Infrared/ Imaging System 
(successor to Gorgon Stare) 
ASCOPE: Areas, Structures, 
Capabilities, Organizations, People 
and Events. (Mission Variables). 
ASEA: Active Electronically 
Scanned Array  
ATO: Air Tasking Order:  
ATR: Automatic target recognition 
AUMF: S.J. Res. 23 (107th): 
Authorization for Use of Military 
Force 
ATOLS: Automatic Take-off and 
Landing System 
AUV: Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicle 
AUVSI: The Association for 
Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International  
AWS: Autonomous Weapons 
Systems 
Azimuth: Is basically a triangulation 
between True North (vector), the 
position of the aircraft to the level of 
the horizon and the Ground Control 
station (GCS). 




BAI: Battlefield Air Interdiction 
BAMS: Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance (unmanned aerial 
system) 
BDA: Battle Damage Assessment 
Bellum iustum: Just War Theory 
comprised of jus ad bellum, jus in 
bello and jus post bellum 
BIJ: Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, based in the UK 
Blinking: Spaces of interrupted FMV 
coverage when there are insufficient 
assets, but potentially anything that 
slows or degrades the intelligence 
process (McChrystal, 2013) 
BLW: Blinding Laser Weapon 
BRAA: Bearing, range, altitude and 
azimuth 
BVR: Beyond visual range 
BWC: Biological Weapons 
Convention, 1972 
C2: Command and Control 
C3I:  Command Control 
Communication and Intelligence 
C4: collaboration, communication, 
cooperation, and coordination 
C4ISR: Command, control, 
communications, computers 
intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance 
CA: Combat Assessment 
CAPs: Combat Air Patrols 
CAPECON: Civil UAV Applications 
and Economic Effectiveness of 
Potential Configuration Solution – 
European Commission. 
CAS: Close air support 
CBP: Customs and Border Patrol 
CCF: Continuous combat function  
CCO: Complex Contingency 
Operation 
CCWC: Conventional Weapons 
Convention, 1980 
CDE: Collateral Damage Estimates 
CDM: Collateral damage 
methodology 
CETMONS: Consortium on 
Emerging Technologies, Military 
Operations, and National Security 
CEP: Circular Error Probable. Based 
on the radius of a circle. The 
calculation being that at least 50% of 
rounds dropped or fired will land 
within the CEP. 
CIL: Customary International Law 
CIVCAS: Civilian Casualties 
CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff 
CMT: Continuous memory task 
CNO: Computer Network Operations 
COA: Course of Action 
COAC: Combined Air and Space 
Operations Center 
CODE: Collaborative Operations 
Denied Environment. This is a 
swarm technology being developed 
by DARPA. 




COF: Correlation of Forces 
(Соотношение сил/Sootnosheniye 
sil, in Russian) a Cold War 
comparative power doctrine 
developed by the former Soviet 
Union and similar in approach to that 
of EBO’s except having a decidedly 
Marxist-Leninist axis. “A relative 
alignment of two opposing forces, or 






CONOPS: Concept of Operations 
COTS: Commercial off-the-shelf 
hardware or technology. 
CPU: Central Processing Unit 
CSAR: Combat search and rescue 
CTL: Candidate Target List 
CWC: Chemical Weapons 
Convention, 1993 
D3: Dull, Dirty and Dangerous 
D3A: Decide, Detect, Deliver and 
Assess (US Army FM 3-60 The 
Army Targeting Process Nov. 2010). 
D4: Dull, Dirty, Dangerous and 
Dollars 
DAESH: acronym for the Arabic 
phrase al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq 
al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant). Disliked by ISIS 
synonymous group) due to its 
pejorative semantic associations. 
DARPA: Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency 
DAS: Defensive Aids Suite(s) 
DASS: Defensive Aids Sub-
System(s) 
DCGS:  Distributed Common 
Ground System – A (Army); 
AN/GSQ-272 Sentinel (Air Force). 
The primary ISR gathering system 
for these two military branches 
DCI: Director of Central Intelligence 
(CIA) 
DDE: Doctrine of Double Effect. 
The proportional allowance of 
serious harm in the quest for positive 
consequences. 
DE: Direct Energy (weapons) 
DEAD: Destruction of enemy air 
defenses 
DHI: Declared Hostile Individuals 
DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency 
DITSUM: Daily Intelligence 
Summary (DIA) 
DMO: Discreet Military Operations 
DNR: Dialed Number Recognition 
DoD: US Department of Defense 
DOJ: US Department of Justice 
DPH (-ing): Direct participation in 
hostilities 
DSA: Detect Sense and Avoid 
technology 
EBO: Effects-Based Operations: 
Combines the 5 elements considered 




to be related to National power, to 
wit: Military, Diplomatic, Economic, 
Psychological and Informational.  
EC: Electronic Combat 
ECM: Electronic Counter-Measures 
ECP: Effective Collection Priority 
EEI’s: Essential elements of 
information. At the tactical level, this 
could be the movement of an HVT or 
courier, an IED emplacement or 
alternatively a random heat signature 
picked up by the IR detector. 
EKIA: Enemy Killed in Action 
ELOS: Electronic Line of Sight 
ELSUR:  Electronic Surveillance 
EMD: Effective Miss Distance 
EMP: Electro-magnetic pulse 
ENMOD: Environmental 
Modification 
EO: Electric orbital. Executive Order 
ERMP: Extended Range 
Multipurpose. Such as the US Army 
Warrior platform, and the later 
version, the MQ-1C Grey Eagle 
EWIA: Enemy Wounded in Action 
F2T2EA: find, fix, track, target, 
engage, and assess 
F3EAD: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit 
Analyze and Disseminate (also 
referred to as Fead aka feed) 
FATE: Future Aircraft Technology 
Enhancements 
FEBA: Forward edge of the battle 
area 
FIBUA: fighting in built-up areas 
FISA: Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 1978. 
FLET: Forward Lines of Enemy 
Troops 
FLIR: Forward looking Infrared 
Radar 
FMV: Full Motion Video 
FOB: Forward Operations Base 
FOIA: Freedom of Information Act 
FOPEN: Foliage penetration radar 
FRL: Former regime Loyalists 
(Saddam Hussein supporters) 
FS: Fire Scout, Rotary UAV 
FSCOORD: fire support coordinator 
FSO: Full Spectrum Operations 
(Combat power through: offense, 
defense, stability, and civil support) 
FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization 
FY: Fiscal Year 
GBU: Guided Bomb Unit 
GCHQ: Government 
Communications Headquarters (UK) 
GCS: Ground Control Station 
(sometimes also referred to as “the 
box”) 
GDT: Ground date terminal 
G-LOC: Abbreviation for G-force, 
Gravity-Induced Loss of 
Consciousness 




GMTI: Ground Moving Target 
Indicator 
GRASP:  General Robotics, 
Automation, Sensing and Perception 
GWT: Global war on terrorism 
HALE: High-altitude long endurance 
HAMAS: Harakat a—Muuqawamah 
al-Islamiyyah 
HCI: Human – computer interface 
HCN: Host country nationals. refers 
to those war zone nationals who 
were working on base. 
HF: Human factor 
HFACS: Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System 
HMLV: High Maneuverability 
Lethal Vehicle (concept) 
HN: Host Nation, or host national 
HPM: High power microwave 
systems 
HPT: High Payoff Target: is one 
whose loss to the enemy will 
significantly contribute to the 
success of the friendly course of 
action 
HPTL: High Payoff Target List 
HRC: The Human Rights Council of 
the United Nations 
HSI: Human System Integration 
HUD:  Heads up Display. Located on 
the pilot’s center screen when flying 
an RPA. It shows the current aircraft 
readings and is projected atop of an 
existing image. 
HUMINT: Human Intelligence 
HVD: High Value Detainee 
HVT: High Value Target 
I2P2: Imminence and Intent, 
Preemption and Prevention 
IAC: International armed conflict: 
conflict involving 2 or more states 
IADs: Integrated air defense system 
IAW: Independent Autonomous 
Weapon 
IC: Intelligence Community 
ICC: International Criminal Court: 
Responsible for the prosecution of 
international crimes. 
ICCPR International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
ICISS: International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty 
ICJ: International Court of Justice: 
The judicial body responsible for the 
adjudication and settlement of inter-
State claims. 
ICRAC: International Committee for 
Robot Arms Control 
ICRC: International Committee of 
the Red Cross 
ICT: info-communications 
technologies 
IDF: Indirect fire. The enemy has no 
specific target, such as with a mortar 
attack 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device 
IHL: International humanitarian law 




IHRL: International human rights 
law 
IL: International Law 
ICL: International Customary Law 
ILC: International Law Commission 
IO: International Organizations 
IPB: Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield 
IR: Infrared. 
IRGC: Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps 
IRTPA:  Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
IS: Islamic State, general umbrella 
term for the different terrorist 
organizations such as ISIL. ISIS, 
Daesh, etc.… 
ISAF: International Security 
Assistance Force 
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence 
(Pakistan) 
ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant: See IS 
ISIS: Islamic State in Syria. 
alternatively: Islamic State in Iraq 
and al-Sham 
ISR: Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance 
ISTAR: Intelligence, surveillance, 
target acquisition, and 
reconnaissance 
Ius cogens: peremptory norms 
IW: Irregular Warfare 
Jackpot: When an intended target is 
struck and eliminated they are 
referred to as a “jackpot” 
JAG: Judge Advocate General. The 
legal branch of the U.S. Military 
JAOC: joint air operations center 
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JFC: Joint Force Commander 
JFCB: Joint Force Coordinating 
Board: “A group formed by the joint 
force commander to accomplish 
broad targeting oversight functions 
that may include but are not limited 
to coordinating targeting 
information, providing targeting 
guidance and priorities, and refining 
the joint integrated prioritized target 
list. The board is normally comprised 
of representatives from the joint 
force staff, all components, and if 
required, component subordinate 
units. Also called JTCB.”437 
JFE: joint fires element 
JIOC: joint intelligence operations 
center 
JIOWC: Joint Information 
Operations Warfare Command 
JIPOE: joint intelligence preparation 
of the operational environment 
JIPTL: joint integrated prioritized 
target list 
JOC: Joint Operations Center 
JOPES: Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System 




JPEL: Joint Prioritized Effect List – 
basically the hit list for designated 
targets seeking specific effects 
JPRC: Joint Personnel Recovery 
Center. Responsible for CSAR 
missions. 
JSOA: Joint Special Operations Area 
JSOC: Joint Special Operations 
Command 
JSTARS: Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System 
JTAC: Joint terminal attack 
controller. the point of contact 
between the pilot and the joint 
operations center which provides 
authorizations to “go hot” (fire). 
JTF: Joint Task Force 
JTL: Joint Target List 
Jus ad bellum: Just declaration of 
war 
Jus ad vim: Force short of war 
Jus ex Bello: Continuance or 
cessation of hostilities 
Jus in bello: Just conduct during war 
Jus Post Bellum: Just conduct 
following war 
JWT: Just War Theory 
KEEL® Technology “Knowledge 
Enhanced Electronic Logic” 
KLE: Key Leader Engagement: 
Power relations between unit 
commanders and key civilian figures, 
such as at a Jirga (traditional group 
palaver) 
KST: Known or Suspected Terrorist 
Kt: Knots. 1 Knot equals 1 nautical 
mile or approximately 1.51 mph or 
1.852 km/h 
LAR: Lethal Autonomous Robot 
LCC: Life Cycle Cost 
LGB: Laser Guided Bomb 
LMM: Lightweight Multirole Missile 
LMO: Legitimate military objective 
LNO: Predator/Reaper Liaison 
Officer. The function coordinates 
Reaper missions in that specific 
region. 
LOAC: Law of armed conflict 
LOCUST: Low-Cost UAV Swarm 
Technology. A swarm technology 
program sponsored by the U.S. 
Navy’s Office of Naval Research  
LOS: Line-of-sight 
LOW: Law of war 
LRE: Launch and Recovery Element 
LWR: Laser Warning Receiver 
M2M: Man, to Machine: A view of 
integrated and cohesive joint 
teamwork between man and 
machine.  
MA: Manned Aircraft 
MAAP: master air attack plan 
MALE: Medium-altitude long 
endurance 
MAM: Military Aged Male 




MANPADS Man Portable Air 
Defense Systems 
MASINT: Measures and Signals 
Intelligence 
MATC: Marine Air Traffic Control 
MAUV: Maritime unmanned aerial 
vehicle 
MAV: Micro air vehicle 
MCC:  
MCE: Mission control element 
MCO: Major Combat Operations 
MDMP: Military Decision-making 
Process 




METT-TC: Acronym reminder to 
field commanders of priorities: 
Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops – 
Time available and civilian 
considerations 
MFAS: Multi-function active-sensor 
radar system. 
MISREP: Mission Report 
MITL - Man-in-the-loop 
Morality of Altitude: psychological 
separation of pilot from destruction. 
MLAW Missile Launch and 
Approach Warner 
MOE: measure of effectiveness 
MOP: measure of performance 
MTI Moving Target Indication 
MTOW: Maximum takeoff weight 
MTS-A: Multi-spectral Targeting 
System 
MON: Memorandum of Notification 
MUAV: Miniature unmanned aerial 
vehicle 
NAI: Named Area of Interest 
NCW: Net-centric Warfare: Theory 
of technology as the primary factor 
in increasing battlefield efficiency. 
Closely related to RMA. 




NIAC: Non-international armed 
conflict. Internal state conflict, e.g., 
insurgency  
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate 
NPR: National Public Radio 
NRO: National Reconnaissance 
Office 
NSA: National Security Agency 
NSC/PC: National Security Council 
Principals Committee 
NSL: No strike list 
NSS: National Security Strategy 
NUAV: Nano-unmanned aerial 
vehicles 
NUC: nonuniformity correction. The 
23 second recalibration process 




related to the targeting pod on 
Predators and Reapers. 
ODNI: Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence 
OGC: Office of General Counsel 
(CIA) 
OE: Operational Environment 
OLC: Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ) 
ONR: Office of Naval Research 
OOA: Out of Area 
OOB: Order of Battle. The 
description of a forces’ total 
available military manpower and 
equipment. 
OODA:  Observe, orient, decide and 
act 
OODR Observe, Orient, Decide, 
React 
OPFOR: Opposing Forces 
OPLAN: Operation plan 
OPORD: Operation order 
PA: Probability of arrival 
PAM: Precision Attack Munition 
PB: Patrol Base 
Pd: Probability of damage 
PDD: Presidential Decision Directive 
PEST: Political, Economic, Social 
and Technological factors related to 
EBO operations and the general 
evolution of warfare. 
PGM: Precision Guided Munition 
PID: Positive identification 
PIL: Public International Law 
PIO: Pilot induced oscillation. An 
overcorrection on the part of a pilot 
often induced from countered heavy 
crosswinds or turbulence. This has 
been replaced in the USAF to infer 
pilot-in-the-loop oscillation, thus 
moving away from a blame mindset. 
At its most basic form PIO is pilot 
overcompensation. 
PIR: Priority intelligence 
Requirement 
PK:  Probability of Kill 
PMESHII-PT: Political, Military, 
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, 
Information, Physical Environment 
and Time (Operational Variables). 
POC: Point of contact/Predator 
Operations Center 
POL: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants 
POO: Point of origin: Triangulation 
of incoming fire. 
PPSL: Predator Primary Satellite 
Link. 
PRF: Pulse repetition Frequency. 
The infrared system in weapons can 
detect the PRF in a laser beam (sort 
of Morse code for weapons). This 
means that an alternative aircraft can 
use their laser to guide the weapons 
of another aircraft. This is referred to 
as “lasing” and can be performed by 
high altitude aircraft such as the 
Predator and Reaper. 
PRISM: Officially labeled by the 
SIGAD, US-984XN. A widespread 
FBI-based spying program which 




parses foreign data from numerous 
US internet servers. In 2012 this 
program was responsible for 1,477 
products captured from the internet 
PSYOPS: Psychological Operations 
QC: Queens Counsel recognized and 
appointed by the Crown. Merit based 
R2P: The Right to Protect, also RtoP 
and RTP; concept adopted by the UN 
in 2005. Ties state sovereignty to the 
protection of its population. 
R&D: Research and development 
RDT&E: Research development test 
and Evaluation 
Reachback/ Remote split Operations. 
This is a system whereby takeoff and 
landing are done in-theatre while 
actual in-flight control is handled as 
far as 7500 miles away. 
RFI: Request for information 
RISTA Reconnaissance, Information 
Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
RoE: Rules of engagement 
ROVER: Remote operated video 
enhanced receiver 
RMA: Revolutions in military affairs 
ROI: Report on Investigation 
ROYG: Republic of Yemen 
Government 
RPA: Remotely piloted aircraft 
RPV: Remotely piloted vehicle 
RSO: Remote split operations 
RTB: Return to base. UAV’s are 
programmed to return directly to 
base should they lose the satellite 
connection 
RTOL: Rotary Takeoff and Landing 
Vehicle 
RtoP or R2P: Responsibility to 
Protect 
RUAV: Rotary unmanned aerial 
vehicle 
RUSI: Royal United Services 
Institute. Founded 1831, oldest 
strategic think tank of its type. 
RVT: Remote video terminal 
SAR: Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SCOTUS: Supreme Court of the 
United States 
SCS: Special Collection Service. A 
highly specialized USIC interagency 
service, first established in 1970. 
Joint oversight by the CIA and NSA. 
Part of a larger parent program 
designated “Stateroom,” and part of 
the ECHELON network. 
SDR: Surveillance Detection Route 
(counter surveillance TTP) 
SEAD: Suppression of enemy air 
defenses  
SELECTORS: Metadata indicators: 
computer activity, email addresses, 
cell phone numbers and messages, 
employed in SIGINT and gathered in 
the F3EA process for identification 
of targets 
SI: Swarm Intelligence 




SID: Signals Intelligence Directorate 
of the NSA 
SIE: Stateless international entity 
SIGAD: SIGINT Activity Designator 
Signature Strike: A method of 
targeted individuals based upon 
patterns of suspicious activities. 
SITREP: Situation Report 
SKA: Skills, Knowledge, Action 
SMAVNET: Swarming Micro Air 
Vehicle Network 
SO: Sensor Operator the other half of 
the UCAV team along with the pilot 
SOCOM: Special Operations 
Command 
SOD: Systemic Operational Design. 
An Israeli system which applies 
strategic direction and policy to 
operation ends. Similar in scope to 
EBO. Like the OODA loop it is 
cyclic: design, plan, act and learn. 
SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement 
Spin-up: Refers to preparing the 
AGM Hellfire missiles for launch- 
SRMP: Strategic Risk Management 
Planning or Process 
SROE/SRUE: Standing rules of 
Engagement/Use of Force 
SRS: Swarm Robotic Systems 
SSCI: Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence 
SSE: Sensitive Site Exploitation 
SSO: Special Service Operations 
STAR: Sensitive target approval and 
review 
STUAS: Small Tactical Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems 
SUAS: Small unmanned aircraft 
system 
SV: Signals Intelligence Directorate, 
Oversight & Compliance 
SWEAT-MSO: Relates to 
counterinsurgency strategy and basic 
infrastructure needs. Sewers, Water, 
Electricity, Academic, Trash, 
Medical Facilities, Safety and Other 
TAC: Transnational armed conflict 
TACWAR: Tactical Warfare System 
TADS: Terrorist Attack Disruption 
Strikes. Signature strikes in Yemen 
TAI: Target area of interest 
TAO: Office of Tailored Access 
Operations. Cyber intelligence 
section of the NSA 
TAR: Targeting Rationale 
TDN: target development 
nomination 
TF: Task Force 
TIC: Troops in contact. Ground 
troops engaged in direct contact with 
the enemy 
TIDE: Terrorist Identities Datamart 
Environment 
TK: Targeted Killing 
TLAM: Tomahawk, Land Attack 
Missile 




TLC: Tomahawk launching canister 
TNL: target nomination list 
TOC: Tactical Operations Center. 
Controls the operations and 
movements of ground units. 
TOCA: Transnational Organized 
Criminal Activity (or analysis) 
TOUCHDOWN: A strike which 
eliminates a target based upon cell 
phone signals emission and capture 
TSDB: Terrorist Screening Database 
TSS: Target Selection Standards. 
Criteria designation whether a given 
entity can be considered a target. 
TSTs: Time sensitive targets 
TTPs: Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures. 
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System: 
consists of: GCS, PPSL, 4 
Sensor/weapons craft, operations and 
maintenance crews and spare 
equipment.  
UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicle 
UCAV: Uninhabited combat aerial 
vehicle 
UCLASS: unmanned Carrier 
Launched Airborne Surveillance and 
Strike System 
UCMJ: Uniformed Code of Military 
Justice: (US Military body of law) 
UCV: Unmanned combat vehicles 
UL: Ultralight aircraft 
UMS: Unmanned systems  
UMV: Unmanned Vehicle 
UNHCR: United Nations 
Commission of Human Rights 
UNSC: United Nations Security 
Council. 
UNSCR: United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 
UPSTREAM: Communications 
captured by the NSA from fiber 
cable transmissions (as distinct from 
the PRISM operation). 
URAV:  Uninhabited 
Reconnaissance Air Vehicle 
USAV: Unmanned Strike Air 
Vehicle 
USP: US Person 
UTA: Unmanned/uninhabited 
Tactical Aircraft 
UTAV: Unmanned Tactical Air 
Vehicle 
UxS: Unmanned vehicle systems 
(examples: “x” is “aerial”, “aircraft”, 
“underwater”, “combat air”, 
“manned”, etc. 
VCT: Video capture technology. 
E.g., Gorgon Stare.  
VTOL: Vertical Takeoff and 
Landing vehicle 
VTUAV: vertical take-off and 
landing tactical unmanned aircraft 
vehicle 
WAPS: Wide-Area Persistent 
Surveillance systems. 
Wetware: hardware/software concept 
as applied to human biology 




WEZ: Weapons Engagement Zone. 
Usually delimited to an effective 
range of less than a 1 km radius. 
WMD: Weapons of mass destruction 
WSO: Weapon Systems Officer 
XFC: Experimental Fuel Cell 




Elements from structurally 
applicable philosophical frameworks 
have been considered. They have 
been either adopted, incorporated, 
enhanced, derived from or either 
partially or entirely discarded as 
irrelevant:  
 
1. Utilitarianism: is a theory of 
principles founded upon 
normative ethics—the way 
things should be ideally, not 
necessarily how they are. The 
most renown proponents of 
the theory are Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart 
Mills. Sometimes, the theory 
is expressed as the greatest 
good for the greatest number. 
It is strongly correlated with 
consequences. There are 
several distinct subdivisions 
to this philosophy, including 
act utilitarianism, rule 
utilitarianism, total and 
consequentialism, which 
itself is depicted in the axiom 
“the ends justifies the 
means.” This perspective is 
strongly related to that of 
consequentialism. 
 
2. Liberalism: Was born out 
ideology developed during 
the age of enlightenment. The 
two most prominent features 
are individual liberty and the 
concept of equality. It is a 
philosophy which privileges 
the rights of the individual 
over those of the collectivity. 
The preeminent 
representative of liberalism is 
John Locke. Many of the 
popular revolutions found 
their motivation in or were 
influenced by liberal 
ideology, including the 
British Bloodless Revolution 
and the French and American 
revolutions, and much later 
the Russian or Bolshevik 
Revolution. In the early 20th 
century, liberalism was not 
far removed from the 
ideologies of socialism. 
There are different forms of 
liberalism which represent a 
large swath of views and 
philosophical outlooks. 
 
3. Liberal multiculturalism: 
While there is no real 
consensus among political 
philosophers, as to what 
precisely 
multiculturalism entails, the 
term has been widely used as 
catchall phrase relating to 
what are considered 
disadvantaged or minority 
groups. This includes Native 
and indigenous tribes and 
peoples, the homosexual 
community, Black and Latin 
Americans, religious sects, as 
well as the elderly and 
disabled among others. 
Increasingly, the term has 
become nearly synonymous 
with the international 
phenomenon of widespread 
Muslim Immigration. This 
school of thought largely 
emphasizes advancing the 
rights and privileges of 
minority groups to the 
disadvantage of the 
indigenous population. Thus, 
more stabilizing features of 




social integration, adaptation, 
and assimilation are 
sacrificed in favor of the 
supposed advantages 
associated with multicultural 
diversity.  
 
4. Liberal multilateralism: 
Considered by some authors 
as global governance or 
international governance or 
more pejoratively as 
“globalists,” or the one world 
government. It is the opposite 
of realist unilateralism. The 
NATO organization is an 
example of multilateralism, 
as are the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and the World 
Health Organization (WHO). 
The most prominent example 
being that of the United 
Nations. Of course, other 
forms of world leadership, 
such as unilateral, or bipolar 
balances of power are 
repugnant to multilateral 
adherents with patriotic 
nationalism topping the list of 
odious institutions. Much like 
Internationalists they too 
believe in the benefits of one 
world governance. While, 
multilateralism supposedly 
gives voice to the “little 
people,” that is the smaller 
states, how much this is the 
case remains highly 
questionable in the face of 
vested state interests. The 
best-known proponent of this 
school is Joseph Nye. 
 
 
5. Liberal Internationalism: The 
cornerstone philosophy of 
democratic politics. Liberal 
internationalism stands at the 
polar extreme from realism. It 
favors the concept of 
international organizations 
overseeing and controlling 
the actions of states, in 
exchange for the surrender of 
sovereignty. This is 
sometimes depicted as the 
“One World Government.” 
One of the first utopian 
supporters of such an 
approach was U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson, with his 
largely ineffectual League of 
Nations, which gave way to 
the equally rather 
dysfunctional United Nations. 
While military intervention is 
eschewed in favor of non-
interventionism, liberal 
internationalism does 
condone armed force in the 
case of humanitarian 
intervention and restrictive 
national self-defense. Despite 
this being a largely pacifist 
doctrine, liberal 
internationalism, dragged the 
U.S. into armed conflicts on 
no less than 4 occasions 
under the Clinton 
Administration: Haiti, The 
Kosovo intervention, Bosnia 
and in Somalia. 
 
6. The Ethics of Duty theory: 
otherwise, referred to as 
deontology. One of the most 
well-known proponents and 
developers of this theory was 
Immanuel Kant. Kant used 
pure reason and free will as 




the foundation for the 
development of his 
categorical imperatives. It is a 
rule-based theory and stands 
in marked contrast to other 
theories such as 
consequentialism and 
utilitarianism. Some acts are 
inherently wrong in 
themselves regardless of 
whether they result in a 
positive outcome or not. 
Conversely, with 
deontological principles we 
are meant to adhere to a 
specific set of rules, 
regardless the outcome. This 
principle has great merit for 
military science. 
 
7. Complexity theory: First 
developed in the 1960s, is 
known under several 
appellations. It is 
multidisciplinary in approach 
and derived from 
organizational theory, chaos 
theory and strategic risk 
management processes and 
fuzzy logic among others. 
Part of the central focus is 
how independent actors or 
elements function as a part of 
system. This also relates to 
the concept of 
nanotechnology and the 
concept of an integrated 
mothership. The simplest 
representation of this theory 
is the recognition that 
complex systems, such as 
autonomous drones, are a 
web of interdependent 
component parts dynamically 
interacting. They interact 
according to some basic 
rules, which in turn produce 
complex behavior; behavior 
which cannot be derived from 
consideration of the 
individual components 
themselves. In a word 
understanding order derived 
from apparent chaos. 
 
8. Chaos theory: relates to the 
random nature of events that 
are outside the understanding 
of formal science. In this 
sense Chaos theory is closely 
related to complexity theory. 
One of the defining features 
of chaos theory is 
unpredictability. It is 
unsurprising then, that chaos 
theory concerns itself with 
unpredictable and randomly 
generated phenomena such 
as, the stock market, weather, 
elements from nature, human 
thought rather than with more 
scientifically based 
measurable phenomena. 
Fractal mathematics, also 
referred to as evolving or 
expanding symmetry, is 
related to chaos theory. 
Fractals often occur in nature. 
Accordingly, minor changes 
at the outset can result in 
major impacts. A fractal 
represents an infinite, 
complex, recursive pattern. 
More simply, regarding 
autonomous drones, it 
represents an endless 
feedback loop endlessly 
recreating a simple process. 
Fractals are extremely 
complex but are repeated via 
a very simple process.  





9. Game theory (Neumann and 
Morgenstern): is a well-
established theoretical 
paradigm and model of 
international relations. It is 
employed across a wide 
spectrum of disciplines 
including: biology, 
psychology, economics, 
political science. As a social 
science application mush of 
its focus centers upon “zero-
sum games. Quite simply, 
Zeros-sum games are models 
whereby the benefits or 
advantages accrued by one 
individual correspondingly 
relate negatively to losses or 
a disadvantage for another. 
Game theory incorporates the 
principles of the rational 
choice theory (RCT) and the 
rational actor. 
 
10. Postcolonialism theory: Is 
relatively self-explanatory. It 
relates to the impact and 
consequences of imperialism 
and colonial control over 
indigenous ethnic groups and 
how such events relate to 
international relations. 
Scholar Edward Saïd’s 
Orientalism (1978), is a 
description of just such 
interaction and 
preconceptions. 
11. Isolationism: Modern 
interpretation of earlier 
political views such as that 
promulgated by George 
Washington’s farewell 
address and the Monroe 
Doctrine has been largely 
revived and advanced by the 
writer Patrick Buchanan, 
strongly influenced by 
Patrick Kennedy’s The Rise 
and fall of the Great Powers 
(1987). This theory projects a 
withdrawal of U.S. 
involvement in international 
affairs.  
12. Classical realism: Realism 
concerns the philosophy of 
interstate relations. The most 
notable and best-known 
proponents of realism are 
Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, 
St. Augustine and Niccolò 
Machiavelli with other 
notable adherents such as 
Hans. J. Morgenthau and 
Henry Kissinger. The 
struggle for vested interest 
results in a balance of power 
through interstate relations 
and the tension this 
competition engenders lies at 
the very heart of realist 
theory. States are anarchic in 
nature and warfare is an 
inevitable phenomenon 
related to that conflict. 
Realists tend to be moral 
relativists as well (see 
below). Other branches 
which developed from 
Classic realism include 
neorealism (or structural 
realism), neoclassical 
realism, democratic realism 
and modern democratic 
realism. 
 
13. Communitarianism: relates to 
the fractional, ethnic and 
multicultural dimensions of 




international relations. The 
early principles trace their 
origins as far back as 
Aristotle, with further 
development being made by 
the famed German idealist 
philosopher Georg Hegel. 
Later developments can be 
traced to philosopher John 
Rawls, and his work “A 
theory of Justice,” Rawls is 
the archetype of the ultimate 
liberal socialist. 
Communitarianism reflects 
the interplay of religion, 
ethnicity and culture and their 
impact upon power politics. 
Samuel P. Huntington’s 
seminal opus The Clash of 
Civilizations relates precisely 
to this theme and clearly 
elucidates the dangers 
represented by such 
phenomena. 
 
14. Neorealism: sometimes 
referred to as “structural 
realism,” is a theory relating 
to international relations. The 
core element is relationship 
of power and governance and 
how they interact. It was first 
developed in 1979, by 
Kenneth Waltz, in his work, 
“Theory of International 
Politics.” 
 
15. Democratic realism: Notably 
represented in the writings of 
Robert G. Kaufman, an 
ardent supporter of George 
Bush’s neo-con policies, 
posits, and supports what he 
depicts as an ostensibly 
benign unipolar position of 
power bestowed by right 
upon the U.S. He views the 
United States as a prudent 
unilateral enforcer of Judeo-
Christian morality. Principles 
backed by force for effecting 
regime change. It is power 
politics disguised as a moral 
imperative. 
 
These sentiments were 
echoed by the controversial 
political commentator 
Charles Krauthammer, who 
coined the term “Reagan 
Doctrine, and who is the 
quintessential Democratic 
Realist. He is perhaps best 
known for his monograph on 
foreign policy, "Democratic 
Realism: An American 
Foreign Policy for a Unipolar 
World. Krauthammer, despite 
falling into the 
neoconservative realm of 
political thought, is equally 
critical of neoconservatives 
as he is of political realists. 
“The rationality of the enemy 
is something beyond our 
control. But the use of our 
power is within our control. 
And if that power is used 
wisely, constrained not by 
illusions and fictions but only 
by the limits of our mission–
which is to bring a modicum 
of freedom as an antidote to 
nihilism–we can prevail.”438  
 
16. Democratic globalization is a 
liberal neo-pacifist social 
movement which sees global 
citizens as the individual 
arbiters of their own destiny. 
According to this movement 
individuals should be vested 




with powers of autonomy and 
self-determination. Following 
such a perspective means that 
international institutions, 
such as NGO’s and 
multinational corporations 
would no longer have free 
rein but would also be subject 
to the desires of 
institutionalized democracy 
where individuals would be 
able to exercise an impact 
upon such entities. Related to 
this social movement, there 
has been a screed entitled 
Manifesto for a Global 
Democracy published. 
 
17. Moral democratic realism (as 
typified by the Reagan and 
Bush administrations 
according to Robert G. 
Kaufman): the spread of 
liberal democratic values 
Founded more explicitly 
upon Judeo-Christian ethics 
than democratic realism. 
Tighter geopolitical limits on 
the use of US power (as 
evidenced by Reagan). The 
spread of liberal democratic 
institutionalism, supported by 
regime change, where 
necessary. 
 
18.  Revolution in Military 
Affairs theory (RMA): Is an 
organizational concept based 
upon radical advances in 
technology as a driver of 
change. It was first developed 
by Soviet military thinkers, 
notably by Marshal Nikolai 
Ogarkov during the latter part 
of the 20th century. It 
expanded as a school of 
thought to other major 
superpowers including China 
and the U.S. Today it is a 
core principle to 5th 
Generation (5G) Warfare. 
This perspective includes 













net-centric warfare), among 
others. This perspective tends 
to favor technological 
progress over that of 
traditional military doctrine 
and battlefield tactics. It 
should, however, be noted, as 
Thomas Hammes points out 
that RMA is little more than 
the product of an 
evolutionary process by the 
military responding to 
different needs in the 
battlespace. 
 
19. Identity politics: This 
represents what some refer to 
as minority politics (although 
they are not exclusive to 
minorities). Identity politics 
stand in contradistinction to 
main party politics. 
Environmental and religious 
parties are an example. 
People from various political 
alliances based upon common 
values such as race, religions, 




sex or ideology. This is 
closely related to the concept 
of liberal multiculturalism. 
 
20. Moral Relativism: Holds that 
decision-making and 
judgments regarding moral or 
ethical issues are judged as 
either correct or incorrect, 
according to a specific 
framework, such a cultural, 
linguistic, historical, ethnic, 
or personal and as such 
represent a specific 
perspective. They are thus, 
subjective by nature and one 
is no more valid than any 
other. Adopting such a 
position is to admit there are 
no universal morals that they 
are specific to each culture 
and under each set of 
circumstances. 




The Hague Conventions (1899, 
consisting of 4 articles and 3 
additional protocols and the 
Conventions of 1907 comprising 13 
articles) Entered into force January 
26, 1910. Those which apply most 
closely to the in-bello principles and 
IHL are: II, IV,2; IV,3; XIV; and the 
additional Geneva Protocol of 1925. 



































12. Note that Convention XII 








S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 




The Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property (May 14,1954); 
First and Second Additional 
Protocols (May 14, 1954 and March 
26, 1999, respectively. The first 
deals with the export of cultural 
property from states occupied in a 
time of war, while the second, more 
recent, deals with significant works 
of art and monuments of particular 
value to humanity during periods of 
non-international armed conflicts 
(NIAC), such as the Buddha’s of 
Bamiyan near to the Hazarajat region 
of central Afghanistan, destroyed by 
the Taliban  
 
The Geneva Conventions (1949) and 
their additional protocols I (opened 
for signature Dec. 12, 1977) II (June 
8, 1977), and Protocol III (December 
8, 2005) relating to the adoption of 
an Additional Distinctive Emblem   
 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use of Asphyxiating. Poisonous or 
Other Gases and Warfare (June 17, 
1925) 
 
Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological 




(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on their Destruction (April 10,1972, 
this Convention, also referred to as 
the BWC, largely superseded and 
replaced the earlier, June 17, 1925, 
Geneva Protocol to The Hague 
Convention, concerning the use of 
Chemical and Biological agents in 
warfare) 
 
The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1976) 
 
The Convention on of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification 
Techniques (December 10, 1976) 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (November 20, 1989) and the 
Optional Protocol to the convention 
of the Rights of the Child (May 25, 
2000), These two documents relate 
to children in warfare and the use of 
child soldiers) 
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction (September 
18, 1997) 
 
The Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects (October 10, 1980. Also 
referred to as the CCWC, including 
Protocols I-IV, covering non-
detectable fragments, mines boob 
traps and other devices (May 
3,1996), incendiary weapons, 
Blinding Laser Weapons (October 
13, 1995) 
 
Amendment to the Convention on 
Prohibitions and Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects (December 21,2001, with 
Protocols I, II and III) 
Protocol expanding the CCWC 
(December 21, 2003. Protocols I, II, 
and III during NIAC) 
 
Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction 
(January 13, 1993. Also referred to 
as the CWC) 
 
The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (July 
17,1998. Sometimes referred to as 
the “Rome Treaty”) 
 
The Convention on Cluster 
Munitions (May 30, 2008) 
 
Charter of the United Nations; June 
26, 1945 (notably Articles 2(4), 39, 
42 and, 51 and its attendant 
subsections), 111 Articles 
 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International 
Humanitarian Law (2009) 
 
The Congressional, Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (2001) 
 
United States. September 2002. The 
national security strategy of the 
United States of America. 
[Washington]: President of the U.S.  




The 2002 war resolution (initially 
intended for Saddam Hussein and the 
invasion of Iraq) 
 
Executive Order 12333 (Plus 
previous and subsequent renditions) 
 
Title 18 USC §1119 Executive 
Order: Further Amendments to 
Executive Order 12333, United 
States Intelligence Activities 
 
Covert Action Statute (CAS), 50 
U.S.C. §413b 
 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. 2012. 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
(DSCA). DoD Directive 3500.1. 
Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary 





The Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case 
No.: IT-94-1-A 
 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 
(2004),  
 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
558, (2006). These last two sources, 
indirectly related, serve as the 
underlying foundation for various 
legal positions as they relate to the 
handling of prisoners and their 
rights. Congressional testimony and 
other official references complete the 
sources consulted for establishing a 
sound working legal framework. 
This important judicial decision 
clarified that the war against 
terrorism could not be categorized as 
“international” since there were not 
state-sponsored belligerents on either 
side of the conflict. 
 
Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America); 
Merits, International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), 27 June 1986, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4023
a44d2.html [accessed 9 December 
2016] 
 
United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, 
1. C. J. Reports (1980) 
 
Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports (2005) 
The Lieber Code, General order 100. 
The War of the Rebellion: A 
Compilation of the Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate 
Armies, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1899), 
Series III, Volume 3, pp 148-164. 
ICRC Customary Law Database: 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/home 
Sanremo Handbook on Rules of 




Handbook on International Rules 
Governing Military Operations: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
publications/icrc-002-0431.pdf 




Operational Law Handbook, 2015 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/OLH_2015_Ch5.pd 
ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: (December 21, 2010) pp. 




Acceptance of Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of International Court of 
Justice, (United States) August 2, 
1946. Senate Resolution 196-
Seventy-Ninth Congress 
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States of America), 
Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2003, p. 
161 
ICISS. The Responsibility to Protect: 
Report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty. Ottawa: 
International Development and 
Research Centre (IDRC), 2001 
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The following, non-exhaustive, list 
of international and domestic 
treaties, Acts, and Conventions were 
designed to address the growing 
problem of international terrorism: 
As can be seem most States have 
developed some sort of domestic 
legislation and/or are also adherents 
to international treaty obligations. 
These documents have been 
examined in part or in whole as 
applicable for the purposes of the 
current research. 
 
International & Regional 
Legislation - 
 
Convention on Offences and Certain 
Other Acts Committed On Board 
Aircraft (aka, The Tokyo 
Convention, 1963) This was 
considered as the first international 
treaty against terrorism. 
 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 860 
U.N.T.S. 105 (aka, The Hague 
Convention, 1970) 
 
Organization of American States 
Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form 
of Crimes Against Persons and 
Related Extortion that are of 
International Significance (1971) 
 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (1971) 
 
Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons 
(1973) 
 
European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism (1977, and 
later Protocol of 2003) 
 
International Convention against the 
Taking of Hostages (1979) 
 
Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (1988) 
 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (1988) 
 
Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection (1991) 
 
International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
(1997) 
 
The Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombing (1997) 
 
Arab Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism (Cairo, 1998) 
 
The Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) 
 
Organization of African Union 
Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism (1999., and 
the 2004 Protocol) 
 
Convention of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference on 
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Combating International Terrorism 
(Ouagadougou, 1999) 
 
Treaty on Cooperation among States 
Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Combating 
Terrorism (Minsk, 1999) 
 
Inter-American Convention Against 
Terrorism AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-
O/02., 2002) 
 
Protocol to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (2005) 
 
International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (2005) 
 
Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism (2005) 
 
The ASEAN Convention On Counter 
Terrorism (Cebu, Philippines, 2007) 
 
Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to 
International Civil Aviation (2010) 
 
Protocol Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (2010) 
 
Protocol to Amend the Convention 
on Offences and Certain Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft (2014) 
 
Domestic Level Legislation -  
 
South African Terrorism Act No 83 
(1967)  
 
Antiterrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
572, §1003, 106 Stat. 4522. (1991, 
codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-38 
(2006)). 
 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996, codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 
21, 28, 42 U.S.C.). 
 
The Terrorism Act, of the United 
Kingdom, (2000) 
 
The US Patriot Act (2001, plus 
extensions and sunset provisions) 
 
The USA Freedom Act, (H.R. 2048, 
Pub. L. 114–23., 2015)  
 
The Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF 2001/2002)  
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terrorism provisions   
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Figure 2: The Federally Administered Territories of Pakistan- Area of Drone Strikes 2009 – 2010 
 
             Green pins mark various drone strikes. 







Figure 3: Yemen - Overview 








Figure 4: US Drone strikes which killed al-Awlaki (Sept 30, 2011) and is son (Oct 14, 2011). 
APPENDIX F – COMPSIM TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON CHART 
347 | P a g e  
 
Technology Comparison 
  Neural Nets Fuzzy Logic Bayesian Belief Nets 
AI - Forward / 
Reverse Chaining 
KEEL 
General Concept Pattern Matching Geometric Fuzzification / 
Defuzzification 
Probabilities of Probability Trial and Error Adaptive Functional 
Relationships between Data 
Items 
Source of Understanding Patterns Human Designer Human Designer / Statistics Human Designer Human Designer 
Pattern Training Required Major Problem No No No No 
Explainable Decisions No Difficult Difficult Somewhat Fully Explainable 
Small Memory Footprint ? ? ? No Best 
Easily Extensible Must start over with 
retraining 
Somewhat Statistics may have to be 
regenerated 
Possibly Yes 




Determined by Application Worst Determined by Application 
Suitable for Control Yes Yes Probably Not Probably Not Yes 
Interactive Development No No Somewhat Partial Yes 
Portable Design (device, 
software, web) 
Probably Not Probably Not Probably Not Probably Not Yes (one design, many 
output formats) 
Weaknesses Pattern Training / 
Surprise Information 
Validated Reasoning Statistics may not be available 
for non-linear systems; 
Difficult to explain 
Fragile / Brittle - 
Hard to maintain 
Remain to be evaluated in 
testing 
APPENDIX G – AUTONOMY MATRIX & BANDWIDTH MODEL 




     Restriction of Control                       Shared Control                             Freedom from control 
         Remote Control                            Mixed Inititive(adjustable)                               Adaptive 
  
        Humanized control                 Human Delegated      Human Assisted     Human Supervised                  Full autonomy 
HA: operator responsible for take-off and landings little else. HD: Operator only provides instructions and coordinates. HS: Operator 
merely serves in a supervisory and oversight capacity. MI: Human provides the mission program, but no oversight required. Adaptive 
is the ability to actually learn and is thus, beyond the function of ‘mere’ autonomy.  
 
BANDWIDTH DISRUPTION MODEL†† 
 
Operator              Interruption from weather, enemy interruption, jamming and other intrusion                       UCAV 
Communications are reduced or cutoff completely due to intervening forces. This is a strong argument for autonomy such as proposed 
by KEEL® technology
†Based upon the model outlined in: Singer, Peter W. Wired 
for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st 
Century. New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2009. 
††Ibid. 
APPENDIX H – CIA DRONE STRIKES PAKISTAN & YEMEN 
















































CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan - 2004 to Present
†The information provided above was drawn from statistics provided courtesy of the 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 





























CIA Drone Strikes In Yemen - 2002 to Present
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Figure 6 Note the Predator drone clearly visible in the background 
APPENDIX M – RAMSTEIN SATELLITE RELAY STATION 
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1 This statement by General McChrystal may not be immediately comprehensible to those with limited military 
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strategic knowledge. The point he is making here relates to the organization of combat operations, which is divided 
from top to bottom as, Strategic, Operational and Tactical. Starting at the top there is the strategic approach which 
defines the conduct and general principles involved in a war or campaign. In contrast, the tactical approach focuses 
on the use of troops and equipment in the immediate battle-space. The point he appears to be making here is that 
drones, or any other weapon, or formation, cannot be used to strategically conduct a campaign, as is largely the case 
under the current Obama administration, it should be part of a multi-faceted approach which includes an 
organizational array of various instruments, and approaches besides just one specific technology. 
 
2 Saul, Ben. Defining Terrorism in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
3 For a more detailed discussion and clarification of these various resolutions see: UN Documents for Terrorism: 
Security Council Resolutions. UN Security Council Report, New York: United Nations Security Council, 2018;  
Stroligo, Klaudijo. Guidelines Regarding the Necessary Steps to be Taken for Effective Implementation of the UN 
Security Council Resolutionson Terrorism. MOLI-UA2, Ljubljana: The Council of Europe, 2007; and Umarov, K. 
(2018). Fact Sheet on the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions. New York: United Nations Security 
Council 
 
4 Refer for instance to: http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/3.htm 
 
5 While these terms and even extended versions of them have existed for some time in police, security management, 
and the intelligence field, I have developed my own variation in this respect. 
 
6 Taylor, Maxwell. The Fanatics: A behavioural approach to political violence. London: Brassey's, 1991: p. 193. 
 
7 These were the words uttered by King Henri IV of France in 1598 when Grotius, at age 15, visited the court as part 
of a Dutch delegation. The exact phrase expressed by the king was “Behold the miracle of Holland.”  Indeed, that 
same year the gifted Grotius obtained his Doctor of Law degree while studying in Orleans. 
 
8 Transnational armed conflict is a precept that has become of increasing importance following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. According to such a view, the conflict with groups of international terrorists, such as al-Qaeda 
and IS, should be regulated by international humanitarian law, rather than international human rights law. This view 
sees transnational armed conflict as a new type of conflict; one which falls into a legal vacuum between 
international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict (NIAC) and thus, implying that the current laws 
relating to the international use of force are inadequate. Increasing commentary on this perspective is now available. 
See for instance: https://hhi.harvard.edu/publications/transnational-armed-groups-and-international-humanitarian-
law, (link broken); alternative link: available here: https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:6418. See also Corn, 
Geoffrey S., et al. The War on Terror and Laws of War. 2nd. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015: p. 71-73. 
 
9 Scahill, Jeremy. The Assassination Complex. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016: p. 2 
 
10 While Taylor does not specifically address the asymmetric relationship between terrorism and UCAVs his 
thoughts helped to elucidate this possibly interactive relationship. Taylor, Maxwell. The Fanatics: A behavioural 
approach to political violence. London: Brassey's, 1991: p.190. 
 
11 Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004: p. xiii. 
 
12 Clausewitz, Carl von. The Essential Clausewitz. Edited by Joseph I. Greene. Mineola: Dover Publications Inc., 
2003: p. 16. 
13 Term developed by Professor Paul Cliteur. Refer to: Cliteur, Paul, “The Challenge of Theoterrorism” in: The New 
English Review, 30 May 2013. 
 
14 Sageman, Marc. Unerstanding Terror Networks. Philidelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004: p.80.  
 
15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation. 8th. Boston: Longman, 
2011. Nye developed this term back in 2003 to counter the misconceived perception that conflict resolution could be 
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carried out exclusively using soft power instruments, such as diplomacy. In this regard, he follows and elaborates 
upon the line of thought originally developed by Samuel Huntington. 
 
16 See among others: "Bush, the Truth and Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: President Bush did not lie, but he 
and his administration are guilty of numerous deliberate deceptions." www.wsj.com. February 15, 2015. Passim, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bush-the-truth-and-iraqs-weapons-of-mass-destruction-letters-to-the-editor-
1423868736 (accessed January 3, 2016); "Justifications for War: WMDs and Other Issues." www.globalpolicy.org 
(multiple useful sources). January 3, 2016. https://www.globalpolicy.org/political-issues-in-iraq/justifications-for-
war-wmds-and-other-issues.html (accessed January 3, 2016); Lacey, Jim. "Bin Laden struck first, but Saddam was 
at least as big a terror threat." www.nationalreview.com. September 14, 2011. 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/277115/saddam-what-we-now-know-jim-lacey (accessed Januuary 3, 
2016);Rosen, Armin. "Here's the full version of the CIA's 2002 intelligence assessment on WMD in Iraq." 
http://uk.businessinsider.com. March 20, 2015. http://uk.businessinsider.com/heres-the-full-version-of-the-cias-
2002-intelligence-assessment-on-wmd-in-iraq-2015-3?r=US&IR=T (accessed January 3, 2016);Silberman, 
Laurence H. "The Dangerous Lie That ‘Bush Lied’." www.wsj.com. February 8, 2015. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/laurence-h-silberman-the-dangerous-lie-that-bush-lied-1423437950 (accessed January 
3, 2016);The National Security Archive. "Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction: National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book No. 80." The National Security Archive. Edited by Jeffrey Richelson. February 11, 2004. 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/ (accessed January 3, 2016). 
  
17 Parallel reflection echoed by Taylor in Taylor, Maxwell. The Fanatics: A behavioural approach to political 
violence. London: Brassey's, 1991;p. 1. 
 
18 Dill, Janina. Legitimate Targets? Social construction, international law and US bombing. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015: 290. 
 
19 See:  Tuomi, I. (2002). "The Lives and Death of Moore's Law". First Monday. 7 (11). doi:10.5210/fm.v7i11.1000. 
Generally, see also: Cringely, Robert X. 2001. "Be Absolute for Death: Life after Moore's Law." Communications of 
The ACM 44, no. 3: 94-95. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 23, 2016). 
 
20 Zenko, Micha. Between Threats and War: U.S. discreet military operations in the Post-Cold War World. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010: p.88. 
 
21 The albatross, the bird of misfortune, was made famous in the epic poem, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, by 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 1834. One may ask Why the unfortunate albatross has been saddled with such a 
negative view. The fact is that the albatross is considered, at its most basic form as a symbol of divinely inspired 
innocence and creation. It is a symbol of good luck by sea-farers as it follows their vessel to sea. However, in the 
Coleridge poem, the sailor who killed the bird with his crossbow, visited misfortune upon his comrades. Therefore, 
the albatross (which now embodies the concept of sin) carried bad luck. (Ah! well a-day! what evil looks Had I from 
old and young! Instead of the cross, the Albatross About my neck was hung). Today, the expression to wear or have 
an albatross hung around one’s neck carries the meaning of being cursed and bearing a sense of self-inflicted 
psychological oppression.  
 
22 For further information on Abraham Karem see: Potts, Andy. "The Drone Father." economist.com. Dec 1, 2012. 
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De Grotius Sanctie: 
 Deus Ex Machina. Wettelijk, ethisch en strategisch gebruik van 
drones bij transnationale bewapende conflicten en 
terrorismebestrijding.    
Abstract/Samenvatting 
De opkomst van gerobotiseerde oorlogsvoering hangt nauw samen met het ontstaan van 
transnationale bewapende oorlogsvoering. Na de gebeurtenissen van 11 september zijn beide 
fenomenen drastisch toegenomen. Toen ik met dit onderzoek begon, was het gericht op het 
gebruik van bewapende drones en het wettelijk, ethisch en strategisch gebruik hiervan. Het werd 
echter al snel duidelijk dat over drones spreken zonder terrorisme in ogenschouw te nemen niet 
alleen contra-intuïtief zou zijn, maar ook contraproductief. Het gebruik van bewapende drones 
als een voorkeurswapen in de strijd tegen terrorisme is grotendeels ontwikkeld als reactie op een 
nieuw soort oorlogsvoering: een oorlogsvoering die geen regels, morele principes of grenzen 
respecteert.   
Naast de strategische, operationele en tactische inzet van drones bestaat er een scala aan 
gerelateerde onderwerpen om te onderzoeken. Er waren vragen met betrekking tot concepten als 
dreiging, opzet, preventief aanvallen, zelfverdediging, nevenschade, doelgericht doden, 
autonomie en nationale soevereiniteit. Ik heb hierbij gepoogd een goede balans te vinden tussen 
deze gerelateerde kwesties. De focus van dit onderzoek ligt primair op de juridische, ethische en 
strategische aspecten van het gebruik van op afstand bestuurbare, bewapende voertuigen. Het 
beperken van de discussie en analyse tot deze drie onderwerpen was alleen al een grote 
uitdaging.   
Er is veel literatuur geproduceerd over het gebruik van drones, maar veel hiervan slaagt er niet in 
het onderwerp coherent en onpartijdig te benaderen. Zoals verwacht maakte het onderwerp veel 
debat los, met criticasters en voorstanders die sterk verdeeld waren over de kwestie. Net als in de 
derde wet van Newton heeft elk argument tégen het gebruik van drones een gelijkwaardige 
tegenpool vóór de inzet ervan. Het doel van dit onderzoek is om deze verschillende zienswijzen 
op een onpartijdige manier te identificeren en analyseren evenals te onderzoeken wat de 
mogelijke juridische, ethische en strategische opties zijn. Waar er mogelijkheid bestaat om 
aanbevelingen te doen en conclusies te trekken, probeert dit onderzoek dat te doen.     
     
  
The Grotius Sanction 
The legal, ethical, and strategic use of drones in transnational armed 
conflict and counterterrorism. 
Abstract/Summary 
 
The advent of robotic warfare is closely related to the appearance of transnational armed conflict. 
Following the events of 9/11 both these phenomena witnessed a spectacular increase in activity. 
When I first began this research, it was dedicated to the questions surrounding the use of armed 
drones and their legal, ethical and strategic use. It soon became apparent that to speak of drones, 
without referring to terrorism would not only be counterintuitive, it would also be 
counterproductive. The use of armed drones as a weapon of choice in the combat against 
terrorism was developed largely as a response to a new type of warfare; a warfare that respected 
neither rules, morals, or boundaries.  
     In addition to the actual strategic, operational. and tactical deployment of drones, there 
existed a host of related topics to examine as well. There were questions relating to the concepts 
of imminence, intent, preemption, self-defense, collateral damage, targeted killing, autonomy, 
and national sovereignty. I attempted to strike a fair balance with regard to these related issues. 
The focus of this research centered primarily on the legal, ethical, and strategic aspects of the use 
of remotely piloted armed vehicles. Limiting the discussion and analysis to these three topics 
was itself a major challenge.  
     There has been much literature produced relating to the use of drones, however, much of it 
fails to adopt a cohesive and  unbiased approach to the topic. As might be surmised the topic 
raises a very heated debate with critics and proponents adamantly divided on either side of the 
issue. Much like Newton’s third law of gravity, for every argument against the use of armed 
drones, there exists and equal and opposite argument supporting their use. The purpose of this 
research is to expose and analyze these various viewpoints in an unbiased manner and examine 
what possible legal, ethical, and strategic options exist. Where there exists an opportunity to 
make recommendations and draw conclusions this research has attempted to respond to these 
gaps. 
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